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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Verschuldung von Haushalten hat in den meisten Teilen Asiens erheblich zugenommen 
und unlängst einen neuen Rekordstand erreicht. Teilweise spiegelt diese Entwicklung 
Fortschritte im Finanzsystem und ökonomisches Wachstum wieder, andererseits birgt die 
Haushaltsverschuldung ein erhöhtes Risiko makroökonomischer und finanzieller 
Instabilität. Auf Haushaltsebene ist die zunehmende Verschuldung vor allem unter den 
Armen in ländlichen Gebieten besorgniserregend. Die jüngsten Mikrofinanzkrisen in 
Entwicklungsländern haben gezeigt, wie eine exzessive Schuldenanhäufung Haushalte 
gegenüber Schocks verwundbar macht, die Ausfallrate erhöht und zu einer Tilgungskrise 
führen kann. In Anbetracht des anhaltenden Ausbaus der finanziellen Inklusion als Mittel 
zur Erlangung der neuen nachhaltigen Entwicklungsziele in Asien, ist es wesentlich die 
finanzielle Situation der armen und verletzlichen Bevölkerungsschichten zu bewerten, um 
letztlich die negativen Folgen solcher Interventionen abwenden zu können. 
Zu diesem Zweck wird in dieser Arbeit die Verschuldung ländlicher Haushalte in Thailand 
und Vietnam analysiert mit einem besonderen Fokus auf jene Haushalte, deren 
Konsumniveau nahe der Armutsgrenze liegt. Die spezifischen Ziele dieser Arbeit sind: (i) 
das Ausmaß der Überschuldung und ihre Beständigkeit unter den ländlichen Haushalten in 
Thailand und Vietnam zu untersuchen und die Faktoren zu bestimmen, die zu dieser 
Überschuldung geführt haben, insbesondere verhaltensbezogene und soziale Faktoren; (ii) 
den Einfluss von mannigfachen Kreditzugängen auf das erhöhte Risiko der Überschuldung 
ländlicher Haushalte und deren Gefangensein in einer Schuldenfalle zu analysieren (iii) die 
beobachteten länderspezifischen Unterschiede in der Schuldenmarktbeteiligung, im 
Schuldenstand und in der Überschuldung zwischen den ländlichen Haushalten in Thailand 
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und Vietnam zu analysieren und die Faktoren zu bestimmen, die diese länderspezifischen 
Unterschiede erklären können. 
Zur Bearbeitung dieser Zielstellungen nutzt diese Arbeit einem Paneldatensatz von ca. 4300 
ländlichen Haushalten aus sechs Provinzen im Nordosten Thailands und der Nordzentralen 
Küste und dem zentralen Hochland Vietnams. Die Haushaltsdaten wurden 2007, 2008, 
2010 und 2011 in jenen Provinzen erhoben, die einen hohen Anteil an ländlichen 
Haushalten haben, die in Armut leben oder dem Risiko ausgesetzt sind, in Armut zu fallen. 
Diese Arbeit identifiziert überschuldete Haushalte mithilfe von Indikatoren für den 
Kreditausfall und der Schuldendienstquote. Ein Haushalt gilt folglich als überschuldet, 
sofern der Kredit nicht zurückgezahlt werden kann oder die Tilgung 50% des jährlichen 
Haushaltseinkommens übersteigt. 
Methodisch trägt diese Arbeit zum gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand in der 
Haushaltsüberschuldung und finanziellen Vulnerabilität auf verschiedene Weise bei. 
Erstens, mithilfe der Integration von drei ökonomischen Theoriemodellen, dem 
Lebenszyklus-, dem Verhaltens- und dem Sozialvergleichsmodell, identifiziert diese Arbeit 
Faktoren, die zur Überschuldung ländlicher Haushalte und ihrer Beständigkeit in 
Südostasien beitragen – eine Region, in der bisher wenig empirische Forschung zu diesem 
Thema stattgefunden hat. Dazu liefert ein Random Effects Dynamic Probit-Modell 
empirische Evidenz für die Beständigkeit des Überschuldungsproblems unter ländlichen 
Haushalten in Südostasien. Zweitens, basierend auf der Verhaltenstheorie und der Neuen 
Institutionenökonomik in der Mikrofinanzierung, wird die Hypothese der bidirektionalen 
Relation zwischen multipler Kreditaufnahme und Überschuldung mithilfe eines 
Dynamischen Random Effects Bivariaten Probit-Modells getestet. Dieses Modell erfasst die 
 vi 
 
dynamische Interdependenz und die simultane Kausalität zwischen den beiden finanziellen 
Zielvariablen und kontrolliert dabei die unbeobachtete Haushaltsheterogenität in den 
Übergangswahrscheinlichkeiten. Drittens, die beobachteten länderspezifischen 
Unterschiede in der Schuldensituation ländlicher Haushalte werden zwischen zwei Ländern 
Südostasiens untersucht, in denen bisher die empirische Evidenz an Faktoren auf nationaler 
Ebene aufgrund mangelnder vergleichbarer Mikrodaten begrenzt war.  
Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit liefern neue Erkenntnisse für Finanzinstitutionen, die den 
ländlichen Armen in entwickelnden und aufstrebenden Volkswirtschaften dienen. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein erheblicher Teil der ländlichen Haushalte in Thailand und 
Vietnam überschuldet sind. Die Schätzungen des wahren Zustandsabhängigkeitseffekts 
zeigen, dass das Problem der Überschuldung für ländliche Haushalte in Thailand ein 
dauerhaftes Problem ist, während es in Vietnam nur ein vorübergehendes Problem ist. 
Außerdem heben die Schätzergebnisse hervor, dass der Armutszustand ländlicher Haushalte 
im Sinne eines niedrigen Einkommensniveaus und Einkommensschocks das Risiko der 
Überschuldung beeinflussen. Ebenso scheinen Entscheidungsträger ländlicher Haushalte, 
die überoptimistisch ihre finanzielle Situation betrachten und ihre gesellschaftliche Stellung 
als gering einschätzen, ein erhöhtes Überschuldungsrisiko zu haben.  
Ferner legen die Ergebnisse dar, dass sowohl ländliche Haushalte in Thailand als auch in 
Vietnam mehrfach Kredite von verschiedenen Kleinkreditgebern aufnehmen. In Thailand 
haben Anwender dieser Praxis der mehrfachen Kreditaufnahme ein höheres 
Überschuldungsrisiko. Die vorherrschende Meinung, dass eine mehrfache Kreditaufnahme 
ländlichen Haushalten erlaubt unbezahlbare Schulden zu refinanzieren und sie in einer 
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Schuldenfalle gefangen hält, wurde von den empirischen Ergebnissen allerdings nicht 
bestätigt.  
Während die mehrfache Kreditaufnahme und die Überschuldung problematisch für 
ländliche Haushalte in beiden Ländern sind, gibt es erhebliche länderspezifische 
Unterschiede in ihrem Ausmaß und in ihrer Relation. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich das 
höhere Ausmaß an Schulden und Überschuldung in Thailand durch Unterschiede im 
kulturellen, institutionellen und ökonomischen Umfeld erklären lassen. Während die 
Ausstattung ländlicher Haushalte die beobachteten Unterschiede in der Überschuldung am 
unteren Ende der Schuldenverteilung erklärt, wird die höhere Verschuldung am oberen 
Ende eher durch das laxe wirtschaftliche Umfeld als durch Ausstattungseffekte in Thailand 
erklärt. Das wirtschaftliche Umfeld in Thailand kennzeichnet sich durch eine besondere 
Milde für ökonomisch benachteiligte Haushalte, die hoch verschuldet sind, im Vergleich 
zum vietnamesischen Pendant. 
Daher wird in dieser Arbeit geschlussfolgert, dass, während die finanzielle Inklusion ein 
wichtiger Baustein der ländlichen Entwicklung bleibt, das ungehinderte Wachstum des 
Mikrofinanzmarktes die finanzielle Vulnerabilität und damit das Armutsrisiko ländlicher 
Haushalte durch Verschuldung erhöht, insofern nicht politische Entscheidungsträger 
eingreifen, um die Abwärtsrisiken von Mikrokrediten zu minimieren. 
 
 
Stichworte: Mikrokredite, ländlicher Kreditmarkt, Haushaltsüberschuldung, mehrfache 
Kreditaufnahme, Thailand, Vietnam
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ABSTRACT 
Household debt has grown dramatically in most parts of Asia and recently reached a new 
peak. While this development partly reflects the progress in financial development and 
economic growth, rising household indebtedness has also been linked with increased risk of 
macroeconomic and financial instability. At the household level, the growing indebtedness 
among the rural poor is particularly worrying. The recent microfinance crises in developing 
countries have illustrated how such excessive accumulation of debt might make households 
more vulnerable to shocks, increase delinquency rates and lead to repayment crisis. 
Additionally, in light of the ongoing effort to promote financial inclusion as a means to 
achieve the new sustainable development goals in Asia, assessing financial situation of the 
poor and vulnerable segments of the population is vital to mitigate the adverse consequences 
of such interventions. 
To this end, this thesis aims to examine rural household’s indebtedness in Thailand and 
Vietnam particularly focusing on households whose consumption level is near the poverty 
line. The specific research objectives of the thesis are: (i) to examine the extent of over-
indebtedness and its persistence among rural households’ in Thailand and Vietnam and 
identify the factors that contribute to such financial outcomes among rural households, 
particularly focusing on the effect of behavioral and social factors; (ii) to examine whether 
access to credit from multiple microcredit agencies increases rural households’ risk of falling 
into over-indebtedness and getting trapped in debt cycles; (iii) to analyze the observed cross-
country differences in credit market participation, level of household debt holding and over-
indebtedness between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam and examine factors that 
explain such country-level differences in rural household debt.  
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To do so, the thesis draws on a household panel survey data of around 4300 rural households 
from six provinces in Northeastern Thailand and the North Central Coast and Central 
Highlands of Vietnam. The household panel survey collected in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 
targeted provinces with a large share of rural households that are either living in poverty or 
are vulnerable to fall into poverty. Using this dataset, the thesis mainly identifies over-
indebted households based on the default and debt-service ratio indicators. Hence, an over-
indebted household is one that has either defaulted on a loan or whose annual debt repayment 
requires more than 50% of its annual income. 
Methodologically, this thesis makes the following key contributions to current research on 
households’ indebtedness and financial vulnerability. First, by integrating three economic 
theoretical models: the life cycle, behavioral and social comparison models, the thesis 
identifies factors that contribute to rural households’ over-indebtedness and its persistency in 
Southeast Asia where there has been little empirical research. While the random effects 
dynamic probit model estimation provides an empirical evidence for the persistence of over-
indebtedness problem among rural households in Southeast Asia. Second, drawing from 
behavioral and new institutional economic theories on microfinance, a hypothesis of 
bidirectional relationship between multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness is tested using a 
dynamic random-effect bivariate probit model. This model captures the dynamic 
interdependency and simultaneous causality between the two financial outcomes while 
controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity in transition probabilities. Third, the 
observed cross-country difference in rural household debt situation is examined between two 
countries in Southeast Asia where empirical evidence on country-level factors has been 
limited due to lack of comparable micro-level data.  
The results presented in this thesis provide some novel insights to financial institutions that 
serve the rural poor in developing and emerging market economies. The results suggest that a 
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considerable share of rural households both in Thailand and Vietnam are over-indebted. The 
estimates on the true state dependence effect of over-indebtedness show that Thai rural 
households face the problem of over-indebtedness persistently, while those in Vietnam face 
over-indebtedness transiently. The estimation results also highlight that rural household’s 
poverty status in terms of low-level of income and income shocks influence their risk of 
falling into over-indebtedness. Rural household whose decision makers are overoptimistic 
about their financial situation in the future and those who consider themselves being of low 
social standing were also found to be more likely to be over-indebted.   
Also, the results reveal that both rural households in Thailand and Vietnam take on multiple 
loans from several microcredit lenders. And those that adopt multiple borrowing practices 
face higher risk of over-indebtedness in Thailand. However, the widely held notion that 
multiple borrowing allows rural households to refinance unpayable debts and trap them in a 
debt cycles was not confirmed by the empirical results. While multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness are a problem for the rural poor in both countries, there is a considerable 
difference in the extent of these problems and their relationship across the two countries.   
Furthermore, the results show that the higher prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness 
observed among Thai rural households is largely explained by differences in the cultural, 
institutional and economic environment that rural households of similar characteristics face in 
the two countries. While rural household’s endowments explain to some extent the observed 
difference in indebtedness levels at the lower end of the debt distribution, the higher debt 
holding at the top of the debt distribution observed among rural households in Thailand is 
explained by lax economic environment than by endowment effects. The economic 
environment in Thailand is particularly more lenient to the economically disadvantaged rural 
households holding high amounts of debt as compared to what their counterparts face in 
Vietnam. 
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Hence, this thesis concludes that while financial inclusion remains an important ingredient in 
rural development, the unlimited growth of microcredit markets could make rural households 
more financially vulnerable and further impoverish them through debt, unless policy makers 
take proper steps to mitigate the downside risks of microcredit.   
Keywords: Microcredit, Rural credit market, Houseold Over-indebtedness, Multiple 
borrowing, Thailand, Vietnam.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The rural financial sectors in Thailand and Vietnam have witnessed extensive growth, of 
which coupled with governmental reforms has helped to expand financial services to rural 
households. While the governments of both countries have established several specialized 
financial institutions to mainly serve rural households, these formal financial institutions have 
also developed further and increased their outreach to agricultural and rural areas to provide 
credit products.  
One effect of the development of the rural financial sector has been a growing household 
indebtedness in both countries. In Thailand, policy makers are especially concerned by the 
fact that the lowest income group bears the highest debt burden. There is also a scare that 
poorer households in these rural areas might be caught in a perpetual debt cycle, taking 
multiple loans from several lenders to refinance unpayable debts (ADB, 2013). However, 
assessing rural households’ financial position has been a problem in both countries due to the 
absence of credit information on households’ level of indebtedness and credit histories (ADB, 
2015). In Thailand, the primary lenders of rural households, including the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), the Village Fund (VF), agricultural and 
savings cooperatives, credit unions, farmers’ groups, saving groups and informal lenders, are 
not members of the credit bureaus and therefore do not report credit information(ADB, 2013). 
In vietnam, the private credit bureaus collect credit information on households from financial 
institutions only voluntarily and the National Credit Information Center (NCIC) only collects 
information from regulated credit providers on large loans (International Financial 
Corporation (IFC), 2014). Hence, only little is known about the prevalence of over-
indebtedness and multiple borrowing among rural household in Thailand and Vietnam.  
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Consequently, this thesis intends to fill this gap by examining rural households’ indebtedness 
in Thailand and Vietnam to understand its extent, persistence, interrelationship with multiple 
borrowing practices, and country-level differences.  
1.2 Research Objectives  
The overall objective of this thesis is to assess rural households’ financial vulnerability in the 
context of the broadening financial inclusion in Thailand and Vietnam, two emerging market 
economies in SoutheastAsia. There are four essays in which the overall objective shall be 
reached.  
The first essay investigates the extent of over-indebtedness and its persistence among rural 
households’ in Ubon Ratchathani in Thailand and Thua Thien-Hue in Vietnam. Following the 
insights from institutional economics, behavioral economics and social comparison theories, 
the essay identifies the factors that contribute to rural households’ over-indebtedness and its 
persistency. It has five specific objectives: 
1. To identify the extent of over-indebtedness;  
2. To examine whether over-indebtedness is a persistent problem for rural households;  
3. To identify the demographic and socio-economic factors that influence rural 
household’s risk of over-indebtedness; 
4. To examine whether overoptimistic and risk-taking behavior is associated with 
increased risk of over-indebtedness; and 
5. To examine whether rural household’s subjective wealth assessment and social 
relative standing are associated with increased risk of over-indebtedness.   
The second and third essays focus on examining the relationship between multiple 
borrowing and over-indebtedness to determine to what extent rural households in Thailand 
and Vietnam become trapped in debt cycles. While the second essay investigets this 
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relationship using the sample of rural households from Ubon Ratchathani in Thailand and 
Thua Thien-Hue in Vietnam, the third essay further examines the extent of the two financial 
outcomes and their relationship particularily focusing on Thai rural households from Ubon 
Ratchathani seeing that multiple borrowing is a major problem for the Thai rural households 
than those in Vietnam. Although the theoretical literature on financial intermediation suggests 
a bidirectional relationship between the two outcomes, previous studies focus primarily on the 
unidirectional effects of multiple borrowing on over-indebtedness and do not address the 
potential endogeneity between the two outcomes. Combining the insights from institutional 
and behavioral economics theories, we instead test the bidirectional relationship between 
multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness and address the following specific objectives: 
1. To examine whether borrowing from multiple sources simultaneously increase rural 
households’ risk of over-indebtedness; and 
2. To examine whether over-indebted rural households refinance ultimately unpayable 
debt through multiple borrowing and become trapped in cyclical debt. 
The fourth essay explores differences in credit market participation, level of household debt 
holding and over-indebtedness between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. In this 
regard, the literature on household debt in developed countries decompose cross-country 
differences into a part that arises from differences in household structure and those that arise 
from differences in the economic environment (e.g., Christelis, Georgarakos, & Haliassos, 
2013; Jappelli et al., 2013; Christelis et al. 2015; Bover et al., 2016). This essay contributes to 
the current literature by specifically focusing on rural households and analyzing cross-country 
differences in household debt in Southeast Asia. Focusing on rural households debt situation 
is particularily critical in Southeast Asia since the population is predominantly rural, informal 
lending still plays a crucial role and debt burden falls disproportionately on the rural poor 
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(particularly in Thailand) (ADB, 2015). To do so, the following specific objectives are 
addressed: 
1. To examine whether and to what extent the observed cross-country differences in rural 
household debt prevalence and over-indebtedness are explained by variation in 
household structure or the economic environment; 
2. To examine whether and to what extent the observed cross-country differences in rural 
household’s debt holding and level of indebtedness are explained by variation in 
household structure or the economic environment; 
3. To investigate whether and to what extent the observed cross-country gap in rural 
household debt holding and indebtedness varies across the debt distribution; and 
4. To investigate whether the factors underlying the observed cross-country gap in rural 
household debt holding and indebtedness varies across the debt distribution. 
1.3. Methodology 
To achieve the overall objective of the research, the thesis draws from several theoretical 
models and applies several empirical methodologies that are briefly explained below.    
The first essay draws from three economic theoretical models to identify the factors that 
contribute to rural household’s over-indebtedness and its persistency. In relation to household 
over-indebtedness, most analyses are grounded on the life-cycle-permanent-income theory of 
Modigliani (1966) and Friedman (1957). These models view household debt from a 
microeconomic perspective and construct a theory by examining a representative household 
who makes rational choices in response to changes in income to maximize life-time utility. 
These theories generally suggest that socio-economic and demographic characteristics such as 
age and education level of the household head, size and composition of the household, current 
and future income level of the household and adverse shocks to income and expense 
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significantly influence rural households’ risk of over-indebtedness. Alternatively, behavioral 
economic theories suggest that heuristics such as “bounded rationality” can increase 
households’ likelihood of accumulating excessive amounts of debt compared to their earnings 
(Kilborn, 2005). In this regard, empirical literatures in behavioral economics have shown that 
such behavioral factors as overconfidence bias (Hyytinen and Putkuri, 2012) and risk 
preferences (Brown, Garino & Taylor, 2013) influence households risk of over-indebtedness. 
Finally, both theory and empirical evidence supports that household’s risk of over-
indebtedness is influenced by their perceived relative social standing (Shen, 2013). The 
empirical literature has found a considerable evidence that when household perceive their 
own social standing to be lower than their social reference group, they tend to overspend and 
accumulate debt relative to their income in an attempt to catch up with their peers 
(Georgarakos, Haliassos & Pasini, 2014). Taking the implication of these theories into 
consideration, rural household’s probability of experiencing over-indebtedness, and its 
persistence is estimated using Heckman’s random effects dynamic probit model (Heckman, 
1981; Stewart, 2007; Stewart, 2006). The model allows the persistency of over-indebtedness 
to be tested while controlling for the effect of households’ socioeconomic, demographic, 
behavioral characteristics and unobserved household heterogeneity.  
In the second and third essay, two strands of economic theories underlie the hypothesis of a 
bidirectional relationship between multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness in Thailand and 
Vietnam. The first strand of theories in institutional economics view multiple borrowing as a 
principal agent problem that arises due to information asymmetry and leads to a moral hazard 
problem where borrowers take new loans hiding their other loan contracts from lenders. Such 
hidden information on borrower’s level of indebtedness involves a negative externality since 
the hidden debt increase their level of indebtedness and reduces the probability that each loan 
gets repaid (McIntosh & Wydick, 2007). Additionally, multiple borrowing practices increase 
the problem of fungibility of money and allow households to take loans for consumption 
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purposes. Loans used for consumption purposes increase households’ debt burden since they 
do not generate additional income and improve their repayment capacity (Guha and 
Chowdhury, 2013). Even when loans are used for productive purposes, multiple borrowing 
can lead to over-indebtedness because simultaneously investing in various projects reduces 
the probability that all investments succeed given a borrower’s limited time and capabilities 
(Casini, 2015). The second stands of theories in behavioral economics suggest that multiple 
borrowing allows over-indebted households to refinance unpayable debt and trap them in 
vicious debt cycle. According to these theories, households make such imprudent borrowing 
decisions that trap them in a cyclical debt due to their present-biased and time-inconsistent 
preferences (Arnold & Booker, 2013). To empirically test the bidirectional relationship 
conceptualized by the theories, we used a dynamic random-effect bivariate probit model in 
combination with Mundlak’s (1978) approach that relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption 
for covariates (Devicienti and Poggi, 2010). The model allows us to estimate the persistency 
of multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness and the true cross-state dependence effects 
between the two outcomes while controlling for correlated unobserved heterogeneity and 
accounting for the initial conditions. This econometric approach captures the dynamic 
interdependency and simultaneous causality between multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness (Heckman, 2008). 
The fourth essay aims to identify the factors that underlie the observed cross-country 
differences in credit market participation, level of household debt holding and over-
indebtedness between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam established in the first and 
second essay. To do that, we follow the empirical literature from advance economies and 
decompose the cross-country difference in rural household’s debt situation into a part that is 
driven by differences in cultural, institutional and economic environment and a part that is 
driven by differences in the distribution of the observed household characteristics using three 
counterfactual decomposition methods. First, a non-linear decomposition method (Fairlie, 
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1999 & 2005) is used to decompose the differences in the prevalence of debt, default and 
over-indebtedness between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. Second, the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition method (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) is used to compute the level of 
household debt and indebtedness gap and decompose the gaps into their separate underlying 
factors. Finally, the Recentered Influence Function Regression decomposition method (Firpo 
et al., 2009) is additionally used to decompose the level of household debt and indebtedness 
gap and identify the contribution of individual covariates and the economic environment at 
different quantiles of the unconditional distributions.  
1.4 Data 
This thesis is based on a unique household panel dataset collected from Thailand and Vietnam 
as part of the project “Vulnerability in Southeast Asia” – a long-term research project funded 
by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The initial survey was conducted in 2007 in six 
provinces in Northeastern Thailand and the North Central Coast and Central Highland of 
Vietnam. Since then, the survey has collected data annually until 2011 with exception of a 
one-year gap in 2009. In 2011, data was collected only from one province in each country. 
The six provinces; Buriram, Ubon Ratchathani and Nakhon Phanom from Thailand, Ha Tinh, 
Thua Thien Hue and Dac Lac from Vietnam, were purposively selected, targeting rural 
households that are either living in poverty or are vulnerable to fall into poverty, to achieve 
the overall goal of the project (Hardeweg, Klasen & Waibel, 2012).  
The sample households were then selected from the six provinces using a three stage cluster 
sampling design. In the first stage, sub-districts in Thailand and communes in Vietnam were 
selected using a systematic random sampling based on a probability proportional to the size of 
the population. In the second stage, two villages were selected from the sampled sub-districts 
with a probability proportional to the size of the population. In the last stage, 10 households 
were selected from each sampled villages from a household lists ordered by household size 
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using a systematic random sampling technique that gave each household an equal chance of 
being selected. In total, approximately 2200 households were sampled in each country at the 
end. The rate of attrition was low over the four waves that only 5.8% of the households 
covered in the first survey were not in the 2011 survey. Overall, the carefully sampled 
households are representative of rural households in northeastern Thailand and North Central 
Coast and Central Highland of Vietnam.   
In the first and second essay, we restricted our sample to 1582 households in the two 
province that were observed in each of the four waves, specifically 914 households from 
Ubon Ratchathani and 668 households from Thua Thien Hue, as the econometric models used 
in the essays require the panel to be balanced. In the third essay, we further restricted our 
sample to 914 households from Ubon Ratchathani in Thailand and focused on analyzing the 
over-indebtedness of rural households in Thailand and the role of multiple borrowing. We 
decided to refocus our analysis only on Thai rural households because the first two essays 
showed that there is a major cross-country difference in the prevalence of debt problems 
among rural households in the two countries and the relationship between multiple borrowing 
and over-indebtedness which could not be explained and addressed with the empirical 
analysis in the first and second essay. Instead in the fourth essay, we address this issue by 
identifying the factors that underlie these observed cross-country differences in credit market 
participation, level of household debt holding and over-indebtedness between rural 
households in Thailand and Vietnam. This essay used the 2008 cross-section data of around 
4300 households from all six provinces in Thailand and Vietnam.  
All four essays make use of the detailed information collected on households borrowing, loan 
defaults and arrears along with a full set of household level data such as households 
demographics, social and economic characteristics and special modules on risks and shocks. 
This rich information gathered by the survey facilitates the use of objective indicators of over-
indebtedness and multiple borrowing. Throughout the thesis, four common objective 
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indicators of over-indebtedness are used: default and arrear, debt-service ratio, debt to income 
ratio and debt to asset ratio. Based on the default indicator, a household is considered to be 
over-indebted when a household has reported at least one default or arrear on one of their loan 
commitments in the previous year (Disney, Bridges & Gathergood, 2008). The debt-service 
ratio indicator is calculated as the ratio of annual debt repayment obligation to annual 
household income. Based on the debt-service ratio indicator, a household is considered to be 
over-indebted when its debt repayment in relation to income surpasses a certain threshold, 
commonly set at 40% or 50% (Muthitacharoen et al., 2015; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). The 
debt to income and debt to asset ratios measure household’s level of indebtedness by linking 
household’s total outstanding debt amount with the total annual household income or the total 
value of household asset including the house value, respectively. These indicators capture 
different aspect of over-indebtedness and financial vulnerability of households as established 
by literature (Disney et al., 2008; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). To date, there is no consensus on 
which indicator best captures over-indebtedness. Hence, we follow the literature in using 
multiple indicators that best reflect the structural and life cycle conditions of a household 
(Disney et al., 2008; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). As regards multiple borrowing, a household is 
identified as a multiple borrower when a household has multiple active loans outstanding 
simultaneously regardless of the source of the loan. 
One of the strengths of this study is its reliance on this rich panel dataset from emerging 
market economies in Asia where the debt burden disproportionately falls on the rural poor. 
Given that very little is known about the prevalence of over-indebtedness among the rural 
poor in Asia, research that focuses on assessing their financial situation remains vital. In this 
regrade, using this micro data has facilitated a richer evaluation of the factors that contribute 
to rural household’s over-indebtedness and its persistency.  
However, there are certain limitations to the data that need to be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results. First, the data only records a short debt repayment and default history 
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of households, which is used in the first three essays to estimate persistency of over-
indebtedness and the dynamic interdependency between multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness. In a short panel data setting, it is difficult to consistently estimate the 
persistence of such intertemporal choices due to the correlation between the time-invariant 
unobserved household heterogeneity and the covariates of interest (Bartolucci & Pigini, 
2017). To estimate consistent parameters that best capture inter-temporal choice behaviors, 
one needs to properly address the correlation between the unobserved household-specific 
effects and covariates using econometric approaches as the ones developed by Heckman 
(1981) (used in the first essay) and Wooldridge (2005) (used in the second and third essay). 
Second, given that we calculate the indicators of over-indebtedness using self-reported data, 
the extent of it among rural households in Thailand and Vietnam might be underestimated. 
Since households who face severe debt repayment problems might be reluctant to disclose 
sincerely and accurately, the extent of their indebtedness.   
Thirdly, although the data has some information on the purpose of loans, however it is not 
very detailed. While the data possesses information on the three most important uses of each 
loan proceeds, however it is not sufficient to determine the amount of debt, households used 
for productive or unproductive purposes and their incentive for multiple borrowing. This has 
constrained the study from further looking into whether the purpose of loan determines the 
two financial outcomes and the relationship between them. Fourthly, the data does not 
indicate the nature of the loans obtained by the surveyed households. The loans recorded in 
our dataset were not differentiated into group liability loans or individual liability loans. In 
theory, the nature of the loans could determine the debt repayment outcome of households 
(Gine & Karlan, 2006). However, we could not address this in our analysis due to data 
limitations. Fifth, the data on arrears and default history of households lacks information on 
duration of arrears that could be used to assess if households are in arrears on structural bases. 
Finally, the quantification of the amount of debt repayment per year was difficult because 
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respondents found the borrowing questions, such as the terms of loans, too complicated and in 
some cases could not quantify the amount of loan already repaid and the remaining 
outstanding debt.  This was especially complicated for informal loans, since loans taken from 
family members usually do not have properly defined terms.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, the dataset presents a rich pool of 
information on households borrowing behavior coupled with a full set of household and 
village level data, which was sufficient to analyze the problem of over-indebtedness among 
rural households in Thailand and Vietnam, which have been previously overlooked in earlier 
studies.  
1.5 Results 
First, the results from the first essay show that a considerable share of rural households both 
in Thailand and Vietnam are over-indebted. Second, the estimates on the true state 
dependence effect of over-indebtedness indicate that over-indebtedness is a persistent 
problem for rural households in Thailand. This is however not the case for rural households in 
Vietnam, where the persistence of over-indebtedness is explained by unobserved household 
heterogeneity. Third, several of the household characteristics contribute to rural households’ 
over-indebtedness and its persistency, as suggested by the life cycle theory. For instance, 
households with male, middle-aged, and higher-educated household heads are found to be 
more likely to experience over-indebtedness than those with female, younger and less-
educated household heads in both countries. An interesting finding is also that the probability 
of over-indebtedness is positively associated with a household’s poverty status in terms of low 
level of income as well as with experiencing adverse shocks to income and expenses. This 
implies that while microcredit is being supported as poverty reduction strategy, it might have 
an adverse impact on rural poor household’s wellbeing, make them more vulnerable to shocks 
and push them further into poverty and debt trap. Furthermore, results show that rural 
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households that have optimistic financial expectation face a higher risk of falling into over-
indebtedness. Forth, in line with the behavioral theories, the results indicate that individual 
willingness to take risk and overoptimistic financial expectations contribute to rural 
households over-indebtedness in Thailand. Finally, our finding also confirm that rural 
households’ subjective wealth assessment and relative social standing significantly influences 
their probability of experiencing over-indebtedness both in Thailand and Vietnam. 
The results from the second and third essay indicate that rural households both in Thailand 
and Vietnam take multiple loans from several sources. The rural households adopt multiple 
borrowing practices in response to adverse shocks. Consistent with the new institutional 
economic theories, the rural households that adopted multiple borrowing practices in Thailand 
were found to be more likely to be over-indebted. However, the results do not confirm the 
revers effect that over-indebted households use multiple loans to refinance ultimately 
unpayable debt and become trapped in debt cycles, as suggested by behavioral economic 
theories. This finding is in line with the literature that views multiple borrowing as a financial 
management tool used by rural households, which still carries a higher risk of over-
indebtedness (Wampfler et al., 2014; Guha & Chowdhury, 2013; Casini, 2015). In contrast to 
Thailand, adopting multiple borrowing practices did not lead Vietnamese rural households 
into over-indebtedness. In addition, the overall findings of the first and second essays reveal 
cross-country differences in the extent of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing besides 
the relationship between them. We show in the fourth essay that these cross-country 
differences are mainly explained by differences in cultural, institutional and economic 
environments between the two countries.  
The findings from fourth essay explain the observed cross-country difference in rural 
households borrowing behavior and the financial vulnerability they face. First, the results 
show higher prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness among rural households in Thailand 
than in Vietnam. Second, the Thai rural households that participate in the credit market also 
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hold larger amounts of debt and face higher level of indebtedness than the Vietnamese rural 
households. Third, these observed differences arise mainly due to dissimilarity in the cultural, 
institutional and economic environment that rural households of similar characteristics face in 
the two countries. Fourth, the cultural, institutional and economic environment in Thailand is 
found to be particularly more lenient to the economically disadvantaged rural households 
holding high amounts of debt as compared to what their counterparts face in Vietnam. Finally, 
the differences in debt holding and level of indebtedness is more pronounced along the debt 
distribution, and the higher gap observed at the top of the debt distribution is largely 
explained by differences in the cultural, institutional and economic environment. 
1.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The rural financial markets in Asia have developed substantially and played a key role in 
economic development and poverty reduction. However, the recently growing problem of 
rural household’s over-indebtedness in Asia is threatening this promising progress towards 
poverty alleviation. At the same time, while financial inclusion of the rural poor is being 
highly promoted in developing and emerging market economies to meet the new sustainable 
development goals, the deepening financial inclusion, particularly the credit outreach to the 
rural poor, might further exacerbate the problem of rural household’s over-indebtedness and 
poverty, unless steps are taken to mitigate the adverse impact of microcredit.  
Within this context, this thesis explores rural households’ risk of over-indebtedness and 
financial vulnerability in Thailand and Vietnam. The empirical evidences presented in the 
thesis provide some novel insights and several policy implications for microcredit programs 
that serve the rural poor in developing and emerging market economies in this regard.    
First, the persistence of over-indebtedness found among rural households in Thailand 
indicates that microcredit programs that are meant to improve the wellbeing of poor rural 
households can lead certain types of households into a “debt trap”. The rural poor that 
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experience adverse income shocks especially seem to face higher risk of over-indebtedness. 
Hence, we recommend that highly and persistently indebted households should be rather 
served by specifically designed poverty reduction programs such as cash transfer programs. 
Furthermore, the governments of developing and emerging market economies need to 
effectively implement the client protection principles for microfinance to ensure microcredit 
products do not further impoverish the already poor clients through over-indebtedness. These 
principles include making sure that financial institutions: (i) appropriately design and deliver 
their microcredit products according to the client’s needs, (ii) prevent over-indebtedness of 
clients by carefully screening the clients ability to repay debt without becoming over-indebted 
and sharing credit information on their clients, (iii) help clients to make an informed decision 
by clearly communicating information on pricing, terms and conditions of credit products, 
and (iv) set prices, terms and conditions of credit products in an affordable way to the clients 
(Forster, Lahaye & McKee, 2009). 
Second, the significant association found between over-indebtedness and behavioral biases 
suggests that although financial literacy education is important, it is insufficient to solve the 
problem of over-indebtedness. Also, with the primary interest of credit agents being selling 
more microcredit products, they are unlikely to improve the decision making of borrowers. 
Hence our recommendation that government advisory services should integrate financial 
portfolios in their extension portfolio and offer independent advice in order to empower poor 
rural households for better financial decision making. This may serve as a first step to 
overcome the existing “culture of indebtedness”. 
Third, the existence of an intertemporal effect of multiple borrowing on rural household’s risk 
of over-indebtedness strongly suggests that, regulatory agencies and public and private 
financial institutions should implement measures that make it more difficult for micro-
borrowers to take multiple loans. Furthermore, the dynamic effect of multiple borrowing on 
over-indebtedness advocates that a major entry point to prevent over-indebtedness is to have 
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better control of multiple borrowing. Such measures include, for example, increasing 
information sharing among lending institutions on the credit history and total credit 
obligations of borrowers, universal reporting to the national credit bureau, and improving the 
financial literacy of households. 
Forth, the findings that multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness are often a result of various 
types of shocks that are largely beyond the control of rural households demands that more 
effective insurance mechanisms must be implemented in rural Thailand and Vietnam and 
countries with similar conditions. 
Fifth, the findings show that the observed cross-country difference in borrowing behavior and 
over-indebtedness of rural household in Thailand and Vietnam is mainly explained by 
differences in the cultural, institutional and economic environment that rural households of 
similar characteristics face in the two countries. The higher debt holding observed among 
rural households in Thailand, especially at the top of the debt distribution is explained by lax 
economic environment than by endowment effects. Although the results show a strong link 
between the economic environment and accumulation of debt by rural households, the 
specific mechanisms through which the economic environment contributes to rural 
household’s over-indebtedness are not investigated in this thesis. Furthermore, since the 
results are derived from counterfactual decomposition analysis that relies on associational 
inference, it does not provide a causal explanation of the observed difference between the two 
countries. Therefore, it is difficult to draw a specific policy conclusion.    
In conclusion, while microcredit remains a central element of rural development policies, the 
unlimited growth of microcredit markets could make rural households more financially 
vulnerable.   
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1.7 Future Research  
The theoretical and empirical analyses carried out in this thesis raise several issues in need of 
further research.  
This thesis analyzed the problem of rural household’s over-indebtedness and financial 
vulnerability in Thailand and Vietnam mainly focused on the factors that determine such 
financial outcomes only from borrower’s perspective. All the supply side factors 
(Vogelgesang, 2003; Gonzalez, 2008; Schicks, 2013) that might contribute to rural 
household’s over-indebtedness were not analyzed in this thesis due to data limitations. Hence, 
this thesis is limited in providing specific recommendations to financial institution serving the 
rural poor. While the results of the thesis present several unique insights to financial 
institutions and policy makers on ways to protect the rural poor from further impoverishment 
through over-indebtedness, an in-depth analysis of the supply side factors is needed to 
determine the major policy entry points for preventing over-indebtedness and effectively 
implementing regulations for financial institutions that serve the rural poor. Further research 
on the supply side factors would need to consider the behavior of lenders, terms and 
conditions of loans from lenders, type of loan contracts, information asymmetry and 
competition in microcredit markets, type, structure and organization of the financial 
institutions, the incentive system of lenders for loan officers, and the governance structure for 
the financial institutions.  
In addition, the results of this thesis show the ability of the new institutional economic 
theories, behavioral economic theories and social comparisons theories to serve as framework 
in analyzing the observed over-indebtedness problem among rural households in Thailand and 
Vietnam. Drawing insights from these theories, several behavioral and social factors that 
might lead rural households to fall into over-indebtedness have been tested. The results 
confirmed that behavioral biases and subjective social relative standing do play a role in rural 
household’s over-indebtedness. However, this thesis was not able to directly test other 
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behavioral and social factors that potentially affect rural household’s risk of over-
indebtedness. In particular, time preference of households which is emphasized by both 
institutional and behavioral models on microfinance could not be tested due to data limitation. 
Both theories hypothesize that multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness occur due to 
present-biased and time-inconsistent preferences of households who hyperbolically discount 
the burden of debt repayment problems in the future (McIntosh and Wydick, 2007; Arnold 
and Booker, 2013). Other social factors such as the culture of indebtedness and households 
attitude towards debt which are expected to be associated with the risk of over-indebtedness 
in Thailand (Siripanyawat et al., 2010) could not also be covered in this thesis. Although the 
thesis could not reflect all of these factors in the analysis, it was able to take into account their 
consequence in the empirical analysis.      
Furthermore, the cultural, institutional and economic environment in Thailand is found to be 
particularly more lenient to the economically disadvantaged rural households holding high 
amounts of debt as compared to what their counterparts face in Vietnam. However, these 
results need to be cautiously interpreted since the analysis is based on a cross-section data and 
a household survey data limited to certain regions in the two countries. Furthermore, the essay 
could not investigate the specific mechanisms through which the economic environment 
contributes to rural household’s over-indebtedness since it is a two country study. To gain an 
insight into cross-country variation in rural household debt and explore country-level factors 
that explain this variation, future research should extend the analysis to a region-wide study in 
Asia wherein all the mechanisms that reflect the effect of the institutional and economic 
environment on rural household debt can be directly evaluated. To do so, future data 
collection also should focus on the additional important dimensions of the financial markets in 
rural areas, including accessibility of certain credit products, legal enforcement of contracts, 
the depth of information available about borrowers and credit conditions (Bover et al., 2016).  
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Finally, while the results of this thesis indicate the need for combining microcredit products 
with micro-insurance schemes to prevent rural households from taking on more loans as a 
shock coping strategy, the effectiveness of such interventions and their potential benefit is not 
well known. Hence, there is an urgent need for further research on the effect of additionally 
providing micro-insurance schemes with microcredit products on such financial outcomes.    
1.8 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized in five chapters, with each chapter presenting one essay with the 
exception of chapter 1, which provides an introduction and summary of the thesis. Table 1.1 
below shows the histry of the four essays included in the thesis.  
Chapter 2 presents the first essay “Over-indebtedness and Its Persistence among Rural 
Households in Thailand and Vietnam” that was submitted to the Journal of Asian Economics. 
A previous version of this essay has been presented at the International Conference of the 
Courant Research Centre "Poverty, Equity, and Growth in Developing and Transition 
Countries" and the Ibero-America Institute of Economic Research in 2014. 
Chapter 3 presents the second essay “The Interrelated Dynamics of Multiple Borrowing and 
Over-indebtedness among Rural Households in Thailand and Vietnam” that was published as 
proceedings of the 29th Triennial Conference of the International Conference of Agricultural 
Economists in 2015 (ICAE-2015). A previous version of this essay has been presented at the 
PEGNet Conference in 2014. 
Chapter 4 presents the third essay “Borrowing from “Pui” to pay “Pom”: Multiple borrowing 
and over-indebtedness in rural Thailand” that was published in the World Development 
journal. This paper was presented at the 9th International Conference of the Asian Society of 
Agricultural Economists in 2017. 
Chapter 5 presents the fourth essay “Exploring Differences in Rural Household Debt 
between Thailand and Vietnam: Economic Environment versus Household Characteristics”. 
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This essay has been presented at the Thailand and Vietnam Socio-Economic Panel (TVSEP) 
data use workshop in 2017. 
Table 1.1: Overview of Essays in this Thesis 
 
Title Authors Presented/ Submitted/ published 
Chapter 2 
Over-indebtedness and its 
Persistence among Rural 
Households in Thailand 
and Vietnam 
B. B. Chichaibelu 
and H. Waibel 
 
Submitted to: Journal of Asian 
Economics 2017 
 
Presented at : 
 
International Conference of the 
Courant Research Center 
"Poverty, Equity, and Growth in 
Developing and Transition 
Countries" and the Ibero-America 
Institute of Economic Research 
July 2 - 4, 2014, Göttingen, 
Germany 
 
Chapter 3 
The Interrelated 
Dynamics of Multiple 
Borrowing and Over-
indebtedness among Rural 
Households in Thailand 
and Vietnam 
B. B. Chichaibelu 
and H. Waibel 
 
Published as a conference 
proceedings in the   
ICAE Conference 2015; August 9-
14, Milan, Italy 
 
Previous version presented at:  
PEGNet Conference 2014; 
September 18-19, Lusaka, Zambia 
 
Chapter 4 
Borrowing from “Pui” to 
pay “Pom”: Multiple 
Borrowing and Over-
indebtedness in rural 
Thailand 
B. B. Chichaibelu 
and H. Waibel 
 
Published in: World Development 
2017  
 
Presented at : 
ASAE International Conference in 
2017; January 11-13, Bangkok, 
Thailand 
 
Chapter 5 
Exploring Differences in 
Rural Household Debt 
between Thailand and 
Vietnam: Economic 
Environment versus 
Household Characteristics 
B. B. Chichaibelu 
and H. Waibel 
Presented at : 
TVSEP data use workshop 2017; 
March 15, Hannover, Germany 
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Abstract  
Using default and debt-service ratio indicators of over-indebtedness, this study analyzes the 
determinants of household over-indebtedness and its persistence in the context of micro-
borrowers in emerging and developing countries’ microcredit market. The persistence of 
over-indebtedness was tested by means of a Heckman random effects dynamic probit model 
controlling for the effect of households’ socioeconomic, demographic and behavioral 
characteristics. The results for Thailand show that past experience of over-indebtedness 
increases the probability of experiencing the same conditions in the future. However this 
could not be confirmed for Vietnam. In addition, other factors significantly influence the 
probability of experiencing over-indebtedness in both countries. These include being poor and 
experiencing negative shocks, as well as behavioral variables, such as optimistic future 
financial expectations, overoptimistic financial forecast errors, risk attitude and social 
comparison.   
Keywords: Microcredit, household over-indebtedness, persistence of over-indebtedness, 
random effects dynamic probit model, Thailand, Vietnam.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Financial debt is a major problem of poor households in developing countries. Many countries, 
including Nicaragua, Morocco, Pakistan and India, have experienced financial crises, often as 
a consequence of the rapid expansion of the microfinance industry (Chen et al., 2010; 
Lascelles, & Mendelson, 2012). These repayment crises have been marked by massive client 
over-indebtedness, rapidly growing client defaults, and in India, default-related suicides 
(Chen et al., 2010; Lützenkirchen et al., 2012 and Bateman and Chang, 2012). 
Research on micro-borrowers’ over-indebtedness in Ghana (Schicks, 2013), Cambodia (Liv, 
2013), Thailand (Siripanyawat, Sawangngoenyuang & Thungkasemvathana, 2010) and 
Bangladesh (Khandker, Faruqee & Samad, 2013) have shown that poor households often 
borrow high amounts relative to their income level. For the poor, over-indebtedness usually 
means economic and social exclusion and increased risk of poverty (Bateman & Chang, 2012; 
Schicks, 2013). Thus, understanding the factors that can lead to over-indebtedness is 
important to design better microcredit policies in developing countries.  
This study contributes to the empirical analysis of over-indebtedness in rural microcredit 
markets in Thailand and Vietnam. We first discuss the definition of over-indebtedness. In this 
paper, we consider a household to be over-indebted if there is one default or arrear on a loan 
commitment, and we evaluate the extent of household over-indebtedness in both countries. 
Secondly, we analyze the influence of household-level characteristics, including demographic 
and economic household characteristics, on the probability of over-indebtedness. Thirdly, we 
analyze behavioral biases that cause households to make suboptimal and unsustainable 
borrowing decisions as a possible cause of over-indebtedness. Fourthly, exploiting the panel 
nature of our unique dataset, we contribute to the literature by analyzing the persistence of 
over-indebtedness, which, so far, has not been covered widely in related literature.    
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Using four waves of panel data from approximately 1600 rural households in two provinces in 
Thailand and Vietnam, namely, Ubon Ratchathani and Thua Thien-Hue, respectively, we 
estimate a household’s probability of experiencing over-indebtedness using Heckman’s 
random effects dynamic probit model (Stewart, 2007; Stewart, 2006).  
Our main findings are as follows: First, there is evidence of a true state dependence of over-
indebtedness both in terms of default and debt-service ratio indicators after controlling for 
observed and unobserved differences in household characteristics in Thai province. This is not 
the case in Vietnam, where the persistence of over-indebtedness is explained by unobserved 
household heterogeneity. In both countries, the probability of over-indebtedness was 
positively related to a household’s poverty status in terms of low level of income, as well as 
adverse income shocks. Finally, household decision makers who are optimistic about their 
financial situation in the future and those who consider themselves being of low social 
standing were also more likely to be over-indebted.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 briefly presents information 
about the rural credit market of Thailand and Vietnam, putting it within the context of more-
advanced microcredit markets in other developing countries. Section 2.3 provides an 
introduction to the existing approaches in defining and measuring over-indebtedness and 
undertakes a review of relevant theories that can help explain households’ borrowing behavior. 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss the data and present descriptive results on the incidence and 
extent of households’ over-indebtedness and its persistence in both countries. Section 2.6 
illustrates the econometric framework in further detail. Section 2.7 presents the model results, 
and section 2.8 concludes. 
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2.2 Rural Credit Markets in Thailand and Vietnam 
To provide the rural poor with access to affordable credit, both Thailand and Vietnam have 
established specialized financial institutions and credit programs. In Thailand, the most 
notable microfinance institutions are the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) and the Village Fund (VF). In Vietnam, they are the Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) 
and the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD). Similar to rural 
credit markets in developing countries, other semi-formal and informal microfinance 
institutions exist (King, 2008; Menkhoff, Neuberger & Rungruxsirivorn, 2012).  
The microfinance and micro-lending institutions of Thailand and Vietnam have some notable 
features that distinguish them from the typical microfinance institutions of other South and 
Southeast Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India and Cambodia. During the past two 
decades, Thailand and Vietnam have shown high economic growth and have achieved 
impressive poverty reduction rates.  In part, this is attributable to the development of the rural 
microcredit market, which has facilitated investment in agriculture and rural small-scale 
enterprises. In particular, the governments of both countries have introduced state-run or 
government regulated policy interventions along with the financial institutions to facilitate 
large growth-oriented enterprises that are relatively sophisticated, innovation-driven and 
technologically intensive (Bateman & Chang, 2012; Bateman, 2013).  
The financial system and institutions of Thailand and Vietnam are quite similar, especially in 
the level of government involvement in the sector and enforcement of regulations. However, 
they differ in financial depth, credit outreach and the range of credit programs introduced in 
rural areas. While the Vietnamese government began to introduce and support formal 
financial intermediaries in rural areas such as VBARD and VBSP around the early 1990s 
(Dufhues, Heidhues, & Buchenrieder, 2004), the Thai government introduced such financial 
institutions as early as the mid-1970s by supporting homegrown non-bank financial 
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institutions and promoting the BAAC into a rural development bank (Menkhoff & 
Suwanaporn, 2007; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). The institutions introduced by the 
Thai government have enhanced access to financial services, particularly for households in 
the non-municipal areas of Thailand. However, some argue that such government 
interventions in Thailand have shifted poor households’ attitudes towards indebtedness. 
Siripanyawat et al. (2010) argue that some households have begun to perceive being indebted 
as a norm and deem not paying back their loan on time acceptable because it was funded by 
the government. This line of argument is also in conformity with results found in a recent 
study by Kaboski and Townsend (2011). They found that instead of investing in income 
generating activities in response to the introduction of a “million baht village fund”, 
households increased their borrowing and consumption almost equally. They also found that, 
compared to a direct transfer program, a large-scale microfinance program is less beneficial 
for some households because they have to cover the interest cost. Defaulting households will 
face an even larger debt-service ratio because they will continue to have larger interest 
payments. In contrast, Vietnam’s rural credit market shows better performance in terms of a 
high level of loan repayment. For instance, the ratio of loans in arrears to total outstanding 
loans to farmers was 0.98% for VBARD in Vietnam, while it was 13.5% for BAAC in 
Thailand in 2001 (Okae, 2009). The sound performance of Vietnam’s rural financial 
institutions and the low level of default have been explained by the strong reliance of the 
financial institutions on the customary rules of behavior in rural communities. The fact that 
the whole rural community participates in social activities together and assumes the role of a 
loan monitoring system puts pressure on households to repay their debt on time in order to 
avoid economic and social sanctions from others (Okae, 2009). Therefore, one can expect 
household over-indebtedness to be a greater problem among Thai households than among 
Vietnamese households.  
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2.3 Theoretical Background and Literature Review  
2.3.1 Defining and measuring household over-indebtedness 
To date, there is no commonly accepted definition of household over-indebtedness. Generally, 
two major concepts of over-indebtedness can be specified in the literature, namely, subjective 
and objective (see table A1 in the appendix for the list of common indicators).  
Subjective definitions of over-indebtedness are based on the notion that households are able to 
judge their financial situation. Schicks (2014) considers a household’s struggle and sacrifice 
related to repaying debt, including reducing spending on food consumption, taking children 
out of school, taking additional jobs and increasing working hours. However, the limitation of 
using such subjective measures is that they can be biased, as they depend on the decision 
maker’s attitude, such as optimism or pessimism, in addition to the problem of insufficient 
financial literacy (Betti et al., 2007; Schicks & Rosenberg, 2011; Keese, 2012; D’Alessio & 
Iezzi, 2013). Hence, for the purpose of comparing households between countries, subjective 
indicators are not useful. 
Objective definitions of over-indebtedness include financial measures such as debt-to-income 
ratio, debt-service ratio, debt-to-asset ratio, default and arrears, net wealth and number of 
loans (Betti et al., 2007; Schicks, 2013; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). These measures have been 
used individually (May & Tudela, 2005; Haas, 2006; Giarda, 2013) or as multiple indicators 
simultaneously (Brown, Garino & Taylor, 2008; Stamp, 2009; Anderloni, Bacchiocchi & 
Vandone, 2012), both by formal financial institutions and in scientific studies. However, there 
are some limitations as well.  The first limitation of the objective indicators is that they can 
underestimate the problem of over-indebtedness, as they only look at the actual non-
repayment of debt and do not consider households that sacrifice their basic needs for debt 
repayment, which is not uncommon for borrowers in developing countries (Betti et al., 2007; 
Schicks & Rosenburg, 2011). The second limitation relates to the difficulty of determining the 
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critical level of indebtedness. As noted by Betti et al. (2007), it is difficult to define an 
optimal level of indebtedness, as it varies depending on the household’s characteristics, 
especially its demographic status. Despite these difficulties, empirical studies on over-
indebtedness have found that debt-ratio-based objective indicators can generally explain the 
debt burden as subjectively perceived by the household as well as default and arrears (Rinaldi 
& Sanchis-Arellano, 2006; Keese, 2012; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013).  
Considering the limitations of the indicators discussed above, it becomes clear that finding a 
single optimal measure that captures every aspect of over-indebtedness is not possible (Betti 
et al., 2007; Schicks & Rosenburg, 2011; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). However, each indicator 
taken separately can capture different aspects of over-indebtedness (Gumy, 2007; Disney, 
Bridges & Gathergood, 2008; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). Therefore, some studies use a 
combination of subjective and objective indicators (Gumy, 2007; Anioła & Gołaś, 2012). The 
problem, however, in using several indicators is that the genuinely over-indebted households 
may not be identified, as most households will be considered over-indebted by at least one of 
the indicators. Hence, Disney et al. (2008) suggest that when using objective and subjective 
indicators, one should choose those that best reflect the structural and life cycle conditions of 
a household.  
2.3.2 Identifying the drivers of over-indebtedness 
While outcome indicators of over-indebtedness are an empirical issue and cannot easily be 
defined from a theoretical perspective, there are theoretical explanations identifying the 
factors that cause households to get into over-indebtedness. While there are supply and 
demand side factors in this study, we focus on the borrowers’ side.  
From the borrowers’ perspective, there are three models:  
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The first is the life-cycle-permanent-income model of Modigliani (1966) and Friedman (1957) 
that considers indebtedness to be an optimization strategy subject to the household’s life 
cycle. The hypothesis is that households borrow money to transfer consumption from periods 
of high income to periods of low income. Usually, at the early stage of a household’s life 
cycle, consumption smoothing is undertaken as a means to maximize lifetime utility. The 
amount of borrowing will depend on the path of expected earnings over time. Therefore, a 
high level of indebtedness relative to income or assets at early stages of a household’s life 
cycle does not necessarily suggest that the household is over-indebted (Betti et al., 2007). The 
life cycle model can be extended by incorporating uncertainty as a result of negative adverse 
shocks due to market imperfection and uncertainty (Betti et al., 2007). Uncertainty can thus 
lead to over-indebtedness (Gumy, 2007). For example, Gonzalez (2008) found that 
unexpected adverse shocks played a major role in the Bolivian household over-indebtedness 
crisis that occurred during the period 1999 to 2002. Similarly, Schicks (2014) found that 
unexpected shocks significantly increased the likelihood of over-indebtedness of micro-
borrowers in Ghana. Another form of uncertainty is households optimistic expectation of 
future income, which can lead to over-indebtedness, as spending and borrowing decisions can 
be based on misguided expectations (Brown et al. 2005). Brown et al. (2005) present a 
theoretical framework where optimistic financial expectation positively determines the 
amount of outstanding debt and the growth of debt. In their model, households maximize 
expected lifetime utility by smoothing consumption through borrowing in anticipation of 
better income in the future. Evidence from their empirical analysis that used a panel data set 
from the UK also suggests that financial expectations are important determinants of 
household debt (Brown et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2008). 
The second model that can explain over-indebtedness is derived from behavioral theory. It 
can be shown that behavioral “biases” and “heuristics” can lead to a distortion of a 
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household’s assessment of the probabilities of financial events. Consequently, there is a 
significant deviation from the optimal strategy that maximizes expected lifetime utility 
(Livingstone & Lunt, 1992; Lea, Webley & Walker, 1995; Betti et al., 2007; Meier & 
Sprenger, 2010). Heuristics such as “bounds” of rationality can increase households’ 
likelihood of accumulating excessive amounts of debt compared to their earnings (Kilborn, 
2005). An example from Finland illustrates this. Using Finnish household panel survey data 
for the period 1994 to 2009, Hyytinen and Putkuri (2012) show how overoptimistic behavior 
of households with high forecast errors significantly increased the probability of over-
indebtedness. Additionally, two interconnected behavioral factors can affect borrowing 
behavior: risk-taking (risk loving instead of risk aversion) and present-biasedness in time 
preference (Betti et al., 2007; Norum, 2008; Brown, Garino & Taylor, 2013). Firstly, 
households that engage in risk-taking behavior are more likely to be present-biased in their 
time-preferences, which makes their consumption and spending decisions unsustainable in the 
face of adverse events (Betti et al., 2007; Norum, 2008). Secondly, according to the life cycle 
hypothesis, households borrow to finance their increase in current consumption based on 
repayment from future earnings. Because future earnings are directly influenced by the risk-
taking behavior of households, their ability to repay their debt is also subject to households’ 
risk preferences. Brown et al. (2013) explored this relationship using the U.S. household-level 
panel survey of income dynamics from 1984 to 2007. He found that households with a lower 
degree of risk aversion had higher levels of accumulated debt. Hence, following these 
behavioral theories, overoptimistic and risk-taking households are expected to face higher risk 
of over-indebtedness.  
The third model that can explain over-indebtedness comprises subjective wealth assessment 
and social comparison theory. Households that compare themselves with wealthier 
households in their social circle and perceive their own social standing to be lower tend to 
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overspend relative to their level of income and thus borrow more in an attempt to catch up 
with their peers (Livingstone & Lunt, 1992; Lea et al., 1995; Cynamon & Fazzari, 2008). A 
recent empirical study using the Dutch population-wide survey showed that perceived higher 
average income in a social circle not only drives households to borrow more but also leads to 
a financial debt burden after controlling for common household debt-determining factors such 
as demographics, wealth, region and time fixed effects. This effect of perceived social relative 
standing was actually found to be stronger for households that perceive their income to be 
below the average income of their social circle (Georgarakos, Haliassos & Pasini, 2014). 
Finally, though not explored in the context of microcredit markets of developing countries, 
empirical studies that examine different types of financial problems, such as housing payment 
problems (Böheim & Rene, 2000; May & Tudela, 2005), debt problems or financial 
difficulties (Stamp, 2009), financial hardship (Brown, Ghosh & Taylor, 2014) and financial 
distress (Giarda, 2013), have found household over-indebtedness to be highly persistent. The 
persistence of over-indebtedness indicates that the conditional probability of a household 
experiencing over-indebtedness in the future is a function of its past experience of over-
indebtedness. This persistence may, however, emerge due to two potential explanations, either 
from true state dependence or from observed and unobserved household heterogeneity. In the 
case of true state dependence, current experience of over-indebtedness directly affects the 
household’s resources and as well as its preferences and behavior, and therefore, it increases 
households’ propensity to experience it in the future. Alternatively, persistence may arise 
from household heterogeneity in their propensities to experience over-indebtedness in all 
periods (Heckman, 1981a; Hsiao, 2003). An empirical study of Italian households in financial 
distress showed that true state dependence explains the greater part of households’ probability 
of experiencing financial distress in the future after controlling for both observed and 
unobserved household heterogeneity (Giarda, 2013). 
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2.4 Data Description  
We use data on 1582 rural households in Thailand and Vietnam from the “Vulnerability in 
Southeast Asia” project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the period 
2007 to 2011. The survey has been conducted annually with the exception of a one-year gap 
in 2009. The survey has collected data from 2200 rural households from three provinces in 
Northeastern Thailand and another 2200 rural households from three provinces in the North 
Central Coast and Central Highland of Vietnam (Hardeweg, Klasen & Waibel, 2012). To 
meet the general objective of the project, the six provinces—Buriram, Ubon Ratchathani and 
Nakhon Phanom from Thailand and Ha Tinh, Thua Thien Hue and Dac Lac from Vietnam—
were selected to target rural households that are either poor or are at risk of falling into 
poverty. After selecting the provinces, approximately 220 villages were selected using a 
systematic random sampling based on a probability proportional to the size of the population. 
Finally, 10 households were sampled in each village by again using a systematic random 
sample with equal probability from household lists ordered by household size.  
For the aim of our analysis, we selected two provinces, Ubon Ratchathani in Thailand and 
Thua Thien Hue in Vietnam. In these two provinces, we have four survey waves: 2007, 2008, 
2010 and 2011. We restrict our sample to the 1582 households that were observed in each of 
the four waves, as the econometric model used in this study requires the panel to be balanced.  
This allows us to better evaluate the persistence of over-indebtedness. Hence, we have a data 
set with a total sample size of 6328 observations in two countries. Our data set contains 
detailed information on households’ borrowing, loan defaults and arrears, along with a full set 
of household-level data such as demographics and social and economic characteristics, as is 
common in standard household surveys. These detailed data on the financial situation of the 
households in our data facilitate the use of objective indicators of over-indebtedness. Based 
on the data available from the survey, we follow Disney et al. (2008) in using the default and 
 45 
 
arrear indicators (henceforth referred to as default), as discussed in section 2.2. Hence, we 
define those households as over-indebted that report at least one default or arrear on one of 
their loan commitments in the previous year. The survey posed the question: ‘During the past 
twelve months, have you ever defaulted on or failed to pay back a loan on time?’  
However, the default indicator is limited in that it underestimates the extent of rural 
households’ over-indebtedness. Because rural households borrow from multiple sources as a 
way of managing their debt and go to great lengths to avoid debt repayment problems by 
significantly sacrificing on their basic needs, the default indicator conceals the problem of 
over-indebtedness until it reaches a critical level and materializes as a default or arrear 
(Schicks & Rosenberg, 2011; Schicks, 2014).  
Therefore, we additionally use the debt-service ratio (DSR) indicator as an outcome variable.  
The DSR indicator is defined as the proportion of annual gross income that a household must 
devote to service its annual debt obligation (ECB, 2013). Based on the DSR indicator, a 
household is considered over-indebted when its annual debt repayment obligation in relation 
to income surpasses a certain threshold, commonly set at 40% or 50% (Disney et al., 2008 & 
D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013; Muthitacharoen, Nuntramas & Chotewattanakul, 2015; Banbula, 
Kotula, Przeworska, & Strzelecki, 2016). We follow these recent studies and identify a 
household whose annual debt repayment requires more than 50% of its annual income as 
over-indebted. Hence, a household whose annual debt repayment requires more than 50% of 
its annual income is identified as over-indebted. 
2.5 Descriptive Results 
In this section, we show the degree of over-indebtedness of our sample households using 
different indicators. Table 2.1 presents the distribution of indebted and over-indebted 
households in Ubon Ratchathani and Thua Thien Hue over the four-year period. Between 80 
and 89% of the Thai households and 63 to 76% of the Vietnamese households had taken at 
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least one loan.   In Thailand, indebted households had a median outstanding debt of 
approximately 2,491 US$ and 1033 US$ (both values in PPP (2005)) in Vietnam. While we 
find a steadily increasing proportion of indebted households in Vietnam, the share of indebted 
households in Thailand fluctuates over the years.  
The extent of over-indebtedness among both Thai and Vietnamese households over the four-
year period is different when taking the indicators “default” and “debt-service ratio”. For the 
default indicator, on average, approximately 8% of the Thai households and 9% of the 
Vietnamese households were over-indebted. For the DSR indicator, on average, 
approximately 34% of Thai households and 12% of Vietnamese households were over-
indebted. In terms of the DSR indicator, in both countries, over-indebtedness increased 
initially from 2007 to 2008 and declined in 2010 from a relatively higher incidence in the 
previous periods, followed by an increase in 2011. On the other hand, based on the default 
indicator, over-indebtedness declined in both countries but then rose slightly in 2011. Overall, 
we find a slightly higher default rate among Vietnamese households than the Thai households, 
while it is opposite for the DSR indicator. This contrasting result is not surprising when 
compared to findings in the literature (e.g., Disney et al., 2008; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). 
Table 2.1: The Extent of Households’ Indebtedness and Over-Indebtedness in Thailand and Vietnam 
Country 
and 
Wave ID 
Number of 
households 
Indebted 
households 
Over-indebted households according to different 
indicators (Percentage of total households) 
Over-indebted 
households 
according to 
different indicators 
(Percentage of 
indebted 
households) 
Default DSR Default DSR  
Thailand 
2007 914 86 13 40 15 46 
2008 914 89 10 48 11 54 
2010 914 79 03 18 03 23 
2011 914 84 05 30 06 35 
Vietnam 
2007 668 63 11 16 17 25 
2008 668 68 11 11 16 17 
2010 668 70 06 09 08 12 
2011 668 76 07 12 10 15 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011  
Using the 2011 data, table 2.2 and table 2.3 summarize some basic statistical parameters 
(mean or percentage) of variables that, based on theoretical considerations (section 2.4), may 
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influence over-indebtedness for Thailand and Vietnam, respectively. In addition, the 
characteristics of over-indebted and non-over-indebted households are tested for significant 
differences using both default payment and the debt-service ratio.  Table 2.2 shows results for 
Thailand. It can be seen that the variables where significant differences are found differ by 
indicator except for the savings variable.  For some variables, e.g., education, the expected 
differences are found. In Vietnam (table 2.3), basically the same pattern can be observed. The 
only congruence with regard to significant differences between the two over-indebtedness 
indicators is the 3
rd
 income quintile. Again, some of the differences between the two groups of 
households are significant, as expected, such as household size, savings, age, occupation of 
household head and unexpected shocks to income, as well as behavioral variables, such as a 
household’s forecast error on future income and risk attitude. Also, the social comparison is 
significantly different between the two groups depending on the over-indebtedness indicator 
chosen. 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Thai Sample using the Latest Data (2011) 
Variable N 
Mean or 
percent 
Default 
Chi2 or t-
test 
DSR   
Chi2 or 
t-test 
Over-
indebted 
Not over-
indebted 
Over-
indebted 
Not over-
indebted 
Female HHH 288 32 5 95 0.08 27 73 1.59 
Marital status 721 79 5 95 0.80 30 70 0.51 
Number of children 692 1.41 1.72 1.39 -1.91** 1.44 1.39 -0.64 
Household size - 5.61 6.02 5.58 -1.20 5.57 5.62 0.30 
Land tenure status 157 17 6 94 0.33 69 31 0.09 
Savings (dummy) 735 82 4 96 8.64*** 31 69 7.67** 
Age of HHH 
group 
Below 35 10 1 20 80 
21.72*** 
20 80 
2.74 
35 - 44 137 15 3 97 29 71 
45 - 54 250 27 8 92 29 71 
55 - 64 261 29 6 94 33 67 
65  and above 256 28 1 99 27 73 
Education of 
HHH Group 
Illiterate and 
primary 
education 
787 86 4 96 
3.09 
28 72 
9.65** Secondary 
education 
98 11 8 92 31 69 
Higher 
Education 
29 3 7 93 55 45 
Occupation of 
HHH 
In-active 140 15 3 97 
1.56 
25 75 
2.29 
Agricultural 506 56 5 95 31 69 
Off-farm 93 10 5 95 30 70 
Self-employed 175 19 6 94 28 72 
Income quintile 
Quintile 1 131 14 6 94 
1.99 
45 56 
41.5*** 
Quintile 2 166 18 6 94 38 62 
Quintile 3 180 20 5 95 36 64 
Quintile 4 209 23 4 96 20 80 
Quintile 5 228 25 3 96 20 80 
Shocks 
Unexpected 
shock to 
expenses 
504 55 6 94 3.17* 30 70 0.20 
Expected shocks 
to expenses 
122 13 6 94 0.26 30 70 0.0001 
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Unexpected 
Shocks to 
income 
633 69 6 94 2.29 32 68 5.56** 
Future expectation 
of income (five 
years) 
Better 590 66 5 95 
1.00 
32 68 
6.21** Same 186 21 6 94 23 77 
Worse 115 13 3 96 27 73 
Risk attitude 
(based on 0 to 10 
Likert scale) 
Risk averse 330 36 5 95 
1.73 
25 75 
7.25** 
Risk neutral 306 34 4 96 31 69 
Risk taker 274 30 6 94 34 66 
Over-optimism 
(Forecast errors) 
Pessimistic  208 23 5 95 
3.94 
26 74 
6.21 
No forecast 
error 
385 42 3 97 33 67 
prudentially 
optimistic 
189 21 7 93 31 69 
non-prudentially 
optimistic 
132 14 6 94 77 23 
Subjective 
wellbeing 
compared to the 
villagers  
Better off 131 14 2 98 
9.93** 
34 66 
2.36 
Same 635 70 4 96 30 70 
Worse off 143 16 10 90 25 75 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2011. 
 
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Vietnamese sample using the latest data (2011) 
Variable N 
Mean or 
percent 
Default  
Chi2 or t-
test 
DSR   
Chi2 or 
t-test 
Over-
indebted 
Not over-
indebted 
Over-
indebted 
Not over-
indebted 
Female HHH 138 21 5 95 1.31 9 91 0.86 
Ethnicity (Non-Kinh) 163 24 9 91 1.05 14 86 1.19 
Marital status 547 82 8 92 4.30** 12 88 1.08 
Number of children 524 1.77 2.20 1.73 -2.29** 1.79 1.76 -0.153 
Household size - 5.62 6.16 5.58 -1.68** 5.76 5.60 -0.58 
Land tenure status 151 23 11 89 4.02** 13 87 0.15 
Savings (dummy)  68 6 94 4.22** 11 89 0.10 
Age of HHH 
group 
Below 35 59 9 5 95 
10.63*** 
8 92 
4.26 
35 - 44 167 25 12 88 13 87 
45 - 54 193 29 8 92 12 88 
55 - 64 110 16 5 95 15 85 
65  and above 139 21 3 97 7 92 
Education of 
HHH Group 
Illiterate and 
primary 
education 
406 61 8 92 
2.39 
12 88 
0.59 Secondary 
education 
234 35 7 93 12 88 
Higher 
Education 
28 4 0 100 7 93 
Occupation of 
HHH 
In-active 44 7 2 98 
7.33* 
11 89 
2.19 
Agricultural 402 60 9 91 13 87 
Off-farm 68 10 1 99 12 88 
Self-employed 154 23 6 98 8 92 
Income quintile 
Quintile 1 91 14 2 98 
20.09*** 
25 75 
39.1*** 
Quintile 2 112 17 13 87 21 79 
Quintile 3 123 18 8 92 10 89 
Quintile 4 147 22 12 88 8 92 
Quintile 5 195 29 3 97 4 96 
Shocks 
Unexpected 
shock to 
expenses 
367 55 8 92 0.10 13 87 1.5 
Expected shocks 
to expenses 
60 9 5 95 0.52 7 93 1.60 
Unexpected 
Shocks to 
income 
439 66 10 90 11.40*** 13 87 1.45 
Future expectation 
of income (five 
years) 
Better 400 62 7 93 
2.66 
12 88 
1.07 Same 167 26 10 90 10 90 
Worse 75 12 4 96 13 87 
Risk attitude 
(based on 0 to 10 
Likert scale) 
Risk averse 250 38 9 91 
7.75** 
12 98 
0.043 Risk neutral 159 24 11 89 11 99 
Risk taker 255 38 4 96 12 98 
Over-optimism 
(Forecast errors) 
Pessimistic  138 21 12 88 
7.48* 
9 91 
2.43 No forecast 
error 
265 40 7 93 12 88 
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prudentially 
optimistic 
128 19 4 96 15 85 
non-prudentially 
optimistic 
137 20 7 93 12 88 
Subjective 
wellbeing 
compared to the 
villagers 
Better off 128 19 4 96 
16.5*** 
9 91 
4.39 
Same 306 46 5 95 10 90 
Worse off 230 35 13 87 15 85 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2011. 
To illustrate the dynamics of over-indebtedness and the transition probabilities, in tables 2.4 
and 2.5, we exploit the panel dimension of our dataset. Table 2.4 and table 2.5 provide 
information on the persistency of over-indebtedness and the aggregate state dependence effect 
in Thailand and Vietnam using the two indicators. In conformity with the literature, the 
percentage of households in both countries that experience over-indebtedness in at least one 
year over the four waves is higher than the cross-sectional incidence of over-indebtedness. In 
particular, for the default indicator, 22% of Thai households and 24% of Vietnamese 
households were over-indebted in at least one year as compared to an average of 8% and 9% 
over the four years. Moreover, the DSR indicator shows that 68% of the Thai households and 
34% of the Vietnamese households had been over-indebted at least once over the four waves. 
Considering all four waves, approximately 6% of the households in Thailand were always 
over-indebted based on the DSR indicator. This suggests that there is a steady entry in and out 
of over-indebtedness, which means a low probability that a household faces over-
indebtedness continuously.  
Table 2.4: Number of Years in Over-Indebtedness Based on Default and Arrears and Debt-Service Ratio  
Country Number of Years Default DSR  
Thailand 
0 78 32 
1 16 26 
2 5 23 
3 1 13 
4 0 6 
Vietnam 
0 76 66 
1 16 23 
2 6 9 
3 2 2 
4 0 0 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
Nevertheless, households that experienced over-indebtedness in the past are more likely to be 
over-indebted in the next period. Table 2.5 presents the transition matrix of over-indebtedness 
and shows that between 18% and 42% of the Thai households and 16% to 30% of the 
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households in Vietnam persisted in being over-indebted based on the two indicators. 
Approximately 2% and 4% of Thai and Vietnamese households that were not over-indebted in 
the previous periods became over-indebted the next period, while 81% and 70% of the over-
indebted households in the previous period got out of it in the next period. This pattern 
suggests that the chance of escaping over-indebtedness is higher than the probability of 
getting into it. However, persistency of over-indebtedness is higher for Thai households for 
the DSR indicator, while it is the opposite for the default indicator, although the difference on 
the latter is small.  
Table 2.5: Probability of Experiencing Over-Indebtedness in Current Year, Conditional on Households’ 
Past Experience of Over-Indebtedness 
Over-indebtedness indicators Year t-1 
Year t 
Thailand Vietnam 
No Yes No Yes 
Default No 97.36 2.64 95.87 4.13 
Default Yes 81.63 18.37 70.27 29.73 
Debt-service ratio No 88.72 11.28 91.71 8.29 
Debt-service ratio Yes 58.33 41.67 83.78 16.22 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
However, one must be cautions in the interpretation of these results. Conditional probabilities 
cannot be taken at face value, because the results could be driven either by the observed or 
unobserved heterogeneity of households, and these are not controlled for in the transition 
matrix. While the description of the over-indebtedness situation provides a first entry to the 
problem, the tables and tests do not show any causal relationship. To distinguish between 
these two effects, a dynamic modeling approach is needed, which will be explained in the 
next section.  
2.6 An Econometric Model of Over-Indebtedness Transitions  
To model over-indebtedness transitions between two consecutive years 𝑡 − 1  and 𝑡  and 
identify factors that influence a household’s probability of becoming over-indebted, we used a 
random effects dynamic probit model. There are three parts to this dynamic model: the 
determination of over-indebtedness status in period 𝑡, the determination of over-indebtedness 
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status in period 𝑡 − 1 (to account for the initial conditions problem), and the correlation of 
unobserved heterogeneity influencing these processes. Together, these three components 
characterize the determinants of over-indebtedness persistence and over-indebtedness entry 
rates.    
In practice, separating these three components is not straightforward, as it requires the 
treatment of the (endogenous) initial conditions problem and unobserved persistent household 
heterogeneity (Heckman, 1981a; Chay & Hyslop, 2014). The random effects dynamic probit 
model solves both problems and allows the average effect of the true state dependence to be 
estimated. The endogeneity of initial conditions is solved by following several approaches, 
such as Orme’s (2001) two steps procedure, Wooldrige’s (2005) conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator, or the most popular approach proposed by Heckman (1981b), which 
involves specifying a reduced-form linear approximation for the first-year households’ over-
indebtedness status. The model also controls for the persistent unobserved household 
heterogeneity in transition probabilities by introducing the household time-invariant effect. 
We adapt Stewart’s (2005) dynamic model specification for unemployment, which follows 
the approach proposed by Heckman, and we formulate our dynamic model for household 
over-indebtedness as follows. 
2.6.1 Random Effects Dynamic Probit Model  
For a household 𝑖, the propensity to be over-indebted at time 𝑡 is expressed in terms of latent 
variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  as follows. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 > 0)  (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇) (1) 
In equation (1), 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a vector of explanatory variables and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1  is the lagged dependent 
variable, which stands for the over-indebtedness status of households in the previous period. 
The residual 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an unobservable time and household-varying error term assumed to follow 
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𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). The scalar 𝜀𝑖  is the (unobserved) household-specific time-invariant effect, which 
determines households’ tendency to be over-indebted. It accounts for household 
characteristics such as debt perception, time preference and the like that are not observed in 
our data. The observed binary variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡, which indicates the over-indebtedness status of 
household 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1…𝑁 in period 𝑡, 𝑡 = 1…𝑇, is related to the latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  in equation 
(1) by the following relationship:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ < 0
         (2) 
Furthermore, because the composite error term, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, will be correlated over time 
even if 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is not serially correlated, we adopt the household-specific random effects’ notion 
that the pairwise correlations between the composite errors of any two different periods are 
equal.  
𝜌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝜀𝑖𝑠) =
𝜎𝛼
2
𝜎𝛼
2+𝜎𝑢
2    𝑡, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑇; 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠  (3) 
In contrast to the standard uncorrelated random effects model, we follow Stewart (2006) and 
the mainstream literature in adopting Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) to allow for 
possible correlation between the unobserved household characteristics (𝜀𝑖) and the observed 
household characteristics  (𝑥𝑖𝑡) by assuming that 
𝜀𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′
𝑎 + 𝛼𝑖                 (4) 
where 𝛼𝑖  is distributed as 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and is assumed to be independent of 𝑥𝑖𝑡  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  for all 
households and time periods. Here, 𝑥𝑖
′
 is the mean of each household characteristic within the 
vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 over the time period, which in terms of estimation implies that we add time average 
variables to the vector of the explanatory variables. This method ensures that the household-
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specific differences, 𝛼𝑖 , left at the end are not correlated with observed household 
characteristics. Adding that to equation 1, we can rewrite our model as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑥𝑖
′
𝑎 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 > 0) (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇) (5) 
To consistently estimate such a model, we need to make additional assumptions concerning 
the relationship of the initial observations, 𝑦𝑖1, and the unobserved time-invariant household 
effect. We could assume that the initial conditions are either exogenous or are correlated with 
the unobserved household-specific effect, 𝛼𝑖. The exogeneity assumption is valid only if the 
stochastic process that generates the outcome is serially independent and if a truly new 
process is observed at the beginning of the sample (Hsiao, 2003). In that case, the standard 
random effects probit model can be used by splitting up the likelihood into two factors and 
maximizing the joint probability for 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇 without taking the first year into account. 
However, here the process of household over-indebtedness is most likely not to be observed 
for each household from the beginning, and hence, the initial conditions are most likely to be 
correlated with 𝛼𝑖. Therefore, the estimation of simple models such as the standard random 
effects probit model will overestimate the state dependence.    
As discussed above, though other methods have been developed to handle the endogeneity 
problem of the initial conditions, such as Orme (2001) and Wooldridge (2005), we follow the 
one proposed by Heckman (1981b) as our main model and solve the initial conditions 
problem by specifying a reduced-form linear approximation for the first year as: 
𝑦𝑖1 = 1(𝑧𝑖1
′ 𝜋 + 𝜂𝑖 > 0)        (6) 
Where 𝑧𝑖1 includes 𝑥𝑖1, exogenous pre-sample variables and the vector of exogenous factors’ 
means, and 𝜂𝑖  is assumed to be distributed as standard normal and correlated with 𝛼𝑖  but 
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uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡  for 𝑡 ≥ 2 . As described by Stewart (2006), using an orthogonal 
projection, such correlation can be rewritten as: 
 𝜂𝑖 = 𝜃𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖1         (7) 
Where 𝑢𝑖1 is independent of 𝛼𝑖 and satisfies the 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) assumption as for 𝑡 ≥ 2. Moreover, 
the potential differences between the error variance of the initial period and the following 
periods will be captured by 𝜃. Thus, combining equations (5) and (6), the linearized reduced 
form for the latent variable for the first period can be written as: 
 𝑦𝑖1
∗ = 𝑧𝑖1
′ 𝜋 + 𝜃𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖1    (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁)    (8) 
The correlation of the household-specific effect presented in equations (6) and (7) suggests 
that to consistently estimate the model parameters, we need a joint probability modeling 
approach for the initial period equation and the structural equation. Therefore, with the 
variance of the residual 𝑢𝑖𝑡 normalized to be one, the joint probability of being over-indebted 
for household 𝑖,  given the unobserved household-specific time-invariant effect, 𝛼𝑖 , using 
Heckman’s approach is (see Stewart, 2007 and 2006): 
 𝑝𝑖𝑡(𝛼
∗) = {
Ф[(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜎𝛼𝛼
∗)(2𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 1)] 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ≥ 2
Ф[(𝑧𝑖1
′ 𝜋 + 𝜃𝜎𝛼 𝛼
∗)(2𝑦𝑖1 − 1)] 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ≥ 1
   (9) 
The model parameters are therefore estimated by maximizing the following likelihood 
function. 
∏∫α∗
i
{Ф = [(zi1
′ π + θσα α
∗)(2yi1 − 1)]∏Ф
T
t=2
[(yit−1γ + xit
′ β + σαα
∗)(2yit − 1)]} dF(α
∗)(10) 
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Where 𝐹 is the distribution function of  𝛼∗ = √𝜆 (1 − 𝜆)⁄  and can be integrated out using 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Stewart, 2006). The model can be estimated using Mark Stewart’s 
program module redprob in Stata. 
 2.6.2 Measuring the Persistence of Household Over-Indebtedness  
To measure the persistence of household over-indebtedness, the transition probabilities and 
the associated average partial effect (APE) and predicted probability ratio (PPR) are 
calculated by conditioning on the over-indebtedness status at 𝑡 − 1 . First, following the 
method by Stewart (2005), the persistence rate and entry rate of over-indebtedness are 
calculated for each household in the sample based on estimates of counterfactual outcome 
probabilities, taking the over-indebtedness status at 𝑡 − 1 as fixed at 0 and fixed at 1 and then 
averaging each probability over all households as follows:  
p̂1 =
1
N
∑ ФNi=1 {(x
′
β̂ + γ̂j + xi
′
â)(1 − λ̂)
1
2⁄ }, p̂0 =
1
N
∑ ФNi=1 {(x
′
β̂ + xi
′
â)(1 − λ̂)
1
2⁄ } (11) 
Secondly, the associated average partial effect is calculated by taking the difference between 
these two probabilities (APE = ?̂?1 − ?̂?0 ), while the predicted probability ratio is calculated 
by taking their ratio (𝑃𝑃𝑅 = ?̂?1 ?̂?0⁄ ).     
 2.6.3 Model Specification  
As discussed earlier, we identify over-indebted households using two indicator variables that 
take on the value one to indicate the state of being over-indebted in a given year t, specifically 
using default and DSR indicators. Based on the two indicators, we run four different 
specifications of the random effects dynamic probit model for each country separately. Except 
for the ethnic minority dummy variable included in the regression for Vietnam, we use the 
same sets of explanatory variables for both countries in each model, including the lag 
dependent variable. Year dummies are included in each specification to control for time trend. 
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In the initial period of each model, we additionally include pre-sample dummy variables such 
as whether the previous location of a household head was rural or urban and whether the 
household head was educated in a rural or urban area.  
In the first model specification, using each indicator for Thailand and Vietnam, we regress the 
basic set of household-level variables, including age (household head aged below 35, 35 - 44, 
45 - 54, 55 - 64, 65 and above), gender, household head level of education (primary, 
secondary and higher education), marital status, number of children, household size, land 
rental status, main occupation of household head (inactive, agricultural, off-farm employed 
and self-employed), income quintiles and type of shock households experienced (unexpected 
shock to expenses, expected shocks to expenses and unexpected shocks to income) in the first 
specification along with the status of over-indebtedness in the previous period. These groups 
of variables generally capture the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the 
household and their effect on over-indebtedness.  
In the second specification, we add dummy variables for the future financial expectation of 
households (better, same and worse) and their risk attitudes (risk averse, risk neutral, risk 
takers). Household’s future financial expectation dummy variables were constructed using the 
question “Do you think your household will be better off next year?” The risk attitude of the 
household was based on a Likert scale response of 0 “unwilling to take risk” to 10 “fully 
prepared to take risk” for a question “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to 
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risk?” Then, based on the Likert scale, we grouped the 
households into the three categories and omitted the risk takers as the comparison group. 
In the third specification, instead of the future financial expectation of the households, we 
included the overoptimistic future financial expectation or household forecast error to 
determine whether over-indebtedness is influenced by the actual positive financial expectation 
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or by the overoptimistic forecast error instead. The future financial forecast error dummy 
variables were quantified using the difference between a household’s financial expectation for 
period 𝑡 and the subsequent realization at period 𝑡 + 1 following the method of Hyytinen and 
Putkuri (2012). Specifically, it was based on the questions “Do you think your household is 
better off than last year?” and “Do you think your household will be better off next year?” 
The response categories for both questions were “Much better off”, “Better off”, “Same”, 
“Worse off” and “Much worse off”. Household’s responses to these two questions were then 
matched to quantify the forecast errors and to group the households accordingly. Following 
Hyytinen and Putkuri (2012), we grouped the households into four groups: pessimistic 
forecast error, no forecast error, prudentially optimistic forecast error and non-prudentially 
optimistic forecast error. Households that made a prudentially optimistic forecast error are 
those that performed financially worse than they expected in the previous year but whose 
financial situation still did not actually worsen, whereas households that made a non-
prudentially optimistic forecast error are those that actually performed worse financially in 
addition to facing negative surprise compared to what they expected.  
In the fourth specification, we added households’ future financial expectation and forecast 
error together with households’ subjective relative standing in the social circle (subjective 
perception of households’ wellbeing in comparison to villagers: better, same and worse) to 
examine the effect of all of these behavioral factors on over-indebtedness. Specifically, after 
controlling for all other household characteristics, if significant, the effect of the subjective 
perception of households’ wellbeing in comparison to their villagers on over-indebtedness 
captures the social comparison effect, where households that perceive their wellbeing to be 
lower than that of other households in their village will borrow more and accumulate a higher 
level of debt to seek social status, thereby over-indebting themselves.  
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In this study, the reference category was selected in such a way that it represents the situation 
of rural households with the oldest higher-educated and single household male head whose 
main income source is self-employment in a small-scale enterprise earning high income and 
having less risk aversion and a non-prudentially overoptimistic financial expectation.  
2.7 Model results  
2.7.1 Persistence of households’ over-indebtedness in Thailand and Vietnam 
The results of Heckman’s random effects dynamic probit model are reported for Thailand in 
table 2.6 and for Vietnam in table 2.7.
1
 As discussed above, these tables present four 
specifications of the empirical model of equation (5) for each indicator, namely, the default 
and DSR indicators. The evidence presented in table 2.6 confirms our prior expectation that 
the past experience of over-indebtedness positively increases the likelihood of experiencing 
over-indebtedness in the future for Thai households, regardless of the indicator used. After 
controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity, the true state dependence effect is 
statistically significant for Thai households in all model specifications, as indicated by a 
statistically significant positive coefficient on the lagged dummy variable of over-
indebtedness.
2
  
                                                      
1 Several robustness checks were performed to check for the robustness of the true state 
dependence effect. We first estimated the random effects dynamic probit mode following 
Orme’s (2001) two step procedure and Wooldrige’s (2005) conditional maximum likelihood 
approaches. Then, we estimated a random effects dynamic probit model with autocorrelated 
errors using Stewart’s (2006) Stata command redpace to check for serial correlation. 
2 The result from the robustness checks showed very similar results, with slight differences 
from the estimated coefficients. For instance, for the fourth model’s specification of the 
default indicator, the estimated coefficients of the true state dependence effect were 0.628 for 
Wooldrige’s model, 0.651 for Orme’s model and 0.649 for Heckman’s model. The result from 
the model with autocorrelated errors also confirmed that our result is robust to serial 
correlation.  
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According to the APE reported under the fourth specification in table 2.6, Thai households 
that default on a loan at 𝑡 − 1 face a default risk that is approximately 10 percentage points 
higher than the risk of households that do not default on a loan at 𝑡 − 1. Given their observed 
and unobserved sets of characteristics, households that did not default on a loan at 𝑡 − 1 
would be 3 times more likely to default on a loan in period 𝑡 had they defaulted on a loan at 
𝑡 − 1, according to the predicted probability ratio. Similarly for the DSR indicator, Thai 
households that were over-indebted at 𝑡 − 1  face a risk of over-indebtedness that is 
approximately 8 percentage points higher than that of households that were not over-indebted 
at 𝑡 − 1. In terms of the DSR indicator, households would be 1.4 times as likely to be over-
indebted had they been over-indebted at 𝑡 − 1  (see the fourth specification in table 2.6).  
Furthermore, the average partial effect of the true state dependence effect based on these two 
indicators reveals that the degree of persistence of defaulting on a loan is higher compared to 
the degree of persistence of a household’s debt service burden in Thailand.  
Table 2.6: Random Effects Dynamic Probit Estimation for Thai Household’s Probability of Over-
Indebtedness (Heckman’s Estimator) 
variables 
Structural equation 
Default  DSR  
Model (1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model (3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Over-indebted last year 
(lagged status of default or 
DSR indicators) 
0.524** 0.547** 0.504** 0.649** 0.228** 0.293** 0.232** 0.302** 
 
(2.97) (2.89) (2.83) (3.62) (2.43) (2.99) (2.47) (3.06) 
Age of HH head below 35 0.483* 0.387 0.506* 0.425 0.0911 0.131 0.0529 0.127 
 
(1.69) (1.29) (1.73) (1.47) (0.34) (0.49) (0.20) (0.47) 
Age of HH head 35-44 0.153 -0.0196 0.157 -0.0344 0.356** 0.282* 0.303** 0.279* 
 
(0.82) (-0.09) (0.82) (-0.17) (2.45) (1.89) (2.08) (1.86) 
Age of HH head 45-54 0.514** 0.451** 0.531** 0.440** 0.307** 0.283** 0.271** 0.290** 
 
(3.46) (2.81) (3.46) (2.81) (2.53) (2.27) (2.23) (2.32) 
Age of HH head 55-64 0.386** 0.327** 0.408** 0.303** 0.282** 0.234** 0.256** 0.261** 
 
(2.66) (2.09) (2.73) (1.96) (2.44) (1.98) (2.21) (2.20) 
Female HH head -0.157 -0.171 -0.185 -0.220* -0.191* -0.137 -0.182* -0.153 
 
(-1.36) (-1.32) (-1.55) (-1.74) (-1.81) (-1.29) (-1.73) (-1.43) 
No of Children (0-14) -0.00636 0.0108 -0.000455 0.0231 -0.0472 -0.0437 -0.0494 -0.0413 
 
(-0.12) (0.18) (-0.01) (0.39) (-0.93) (-0.85) (-0.97) (-0.80) 
Household size 0.0652** 0.0454 0.0654** 0.0405 0.0535** 0.0434 0.0509** 0.0380 
 
(2.49) (1.47) (2.43) (1.34) (2.10) (1.64) (1.99) (1.42) 
Married HH head -0.130 -0.142 -0.159 -0.138 0.00776 -0.00238 0.0119 -0.00362 
 
(-0.95) (-0.95) (-1.13) (-0.95) (0.06) (-0.02) (0.10) (-0.03) 
Illiterate and primary 
education 
-0.267 -0.279 -0.283 -0.361 -0.951** -0.880** -0.937** -0.905** 
 
(-0.94) (-0.93) (-0.97) (-1.26) (-3.66) (-3.39) (-3.62) (-3.48) 
Secondary education -0.430 -0.507* -0.459* -0.651** -1.326** -1.197** -1.307** -1.220** 
 
(-1.61) (-1.80) (-1.68) (-2.39) (-5.43) (-4.89) (-5.36) (-4.95) 
Land rental status 0.116 0.0543 0.120 0.0548 0.0580 0.0422 0.0627 0.0717 
 
(1.12) (0.47) (1.14) (0.48) (0.69) (0.49) (0.74) (0.82) 
HH that have savings -0.256** -0.192 -0.243** -0.118 0.240** 0.167* 0.248** 0.137 
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(-2.29) (-1.55) (-2.13) (-0.95) (2.54) (1.70) (2.62) (1.38) 
Income quintile 1 0.308** 0.279* 0.288* 0.137 1.548** 1.446** 1.565** 1.465** 
 
(2.00) (1.68) (1.83) (0.82) (10.91) (10.03) (10.94) (9.97) 
Income quintile 2 0.298** 0.239 0.301* 0.112 1.039** 0.946** 1.056** 0.957** 
 
(1.96) (1.47) (1.95) (0.69) (8.14) (7.26) (8.21) (7.26) 
Income quintile 3 0.108 0.0240 0.116 -0.0423 0.784** 0.772** 0.805** 0.758** 
 
(0.69) (0.14) (0.73) (-0.25) (6.39) (6.09) (6.52) (5.94) 
Income quintile 4 0.155 0.0358 0.151 
-
0.000327 
0.161 0.120 0.168 0.118 
 
(1.03) (0.22) (0.99) (-0.00) (1.39) (1.02) (1.44) (0.99) 
Agricultural HH -0.0381 0.0576 -0.0334 -0.00199 0.0692 0.00704 0.0697 -0.00331 
 
(-0.24) (0.33) (-0.20) (-0.01) (0.54) (0.05) (0.54) (-0.03) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.0993 0.141 0.102 0.0657 -0.0547 -0.0657 -0.0417 -0.0828 
 
(0.56) (0.73) (0.57) (0.35) (-0.38) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-0.57) 
Inactive HH 0.0248 0.0813 0.0246 -0.0177 0.0847 0.0606 0.0785 0.0684 
 
(0.12) (0.36) (0.12) (-0.08) (0.51) (0.36) (0.47) (0.40) 
Unexpected shocks to 
expenses 
0.155* 0.154 0.159* 0.147 -0.0310 -0.0126 -0.0273 -0.00357 
 
(1.68) (1.53) (1.69) (1.49) (-0.44) (-0.17) (-0.39) (-0.05) 
Expected shocks to 
expenses 
0.166 0.195 0.170 0.155 0.115 0.0826 0.114 0.0972 
 
(1.26) (1.37) (1.27) (1.09) (1.02) (0.71) (1.02) (0.83) 
Unexpected shocks to 
income 
0.172* 0.140 0.177* 0.158 0.122* 0.132* 0.121 0.127* 
 
(1.77) (1.33) (1.78) (1.51) (1.66) (1.74) (1.64) (1.66) 
Future exception of income 
(Same)  
-0.0397 
 
-0.0223 
 
-0.158* 
 
-0.142 
  
(-0.33) 
 
(-0.18) 
 
(-1.80) 
 
(-1.53) 
Future exception of income 
(Worse)  
-0.119 
 
-0.115 
 
-0.0441 
 
-0.0202 
  
(-0.76) 
 
(-0.69) 
 
(-0.39) 
 
(-0.17) 
Risk averse 
 
0.0278 0.0447 0.00342 
 
-0.262** -0.279** -0.264** 
  
(0.23) (0.38) (0.03) 
 
(-2.88) (-3.17) (-2.87) 
Risk neutral 
 
-0.148 -0.106 -0.158 
 
-0.0863 -0.118 -0.0930 
  
(-1.19) (-0.91) (-1.28) 
 
(-0.98) (-1.38) (-1.05) 
Pessimistic forecast error 
  
-0.245* -0.200 
  
-0.120 -0.158 
   
(-1.70) (-1.24) 
  
(-1.05) (-1.26) 
No forecast error 
  
-0.305** -0.260* 
  
-0.0758 -0.100 
   
(-2.28) (-1.81) 
  
(-0.72) (-0.91) 
Prudentially optimistic 
forecast error   
-0.177 -0.113 
  
-0.0676 -0.118 
   
(-1.21) (-0.71) 
  
(-0.58) (-0.95) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers 
(Better) 
   
-0.719** 
   
0.110 
    
(-3.86) 
   
(0.81) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers 
(Same) 
   
-0.489** 
   
0.208* 
    
(-3.95) 
   
(1.93) 
2010 -0.659** -0.696** -0.676** -0.652** -1.116** -1.071** -1.141** -1.078** 
 
(-4.91) (-4.77) (-5.00) (-4.66) (-12.92) (-11.79) (-13.07) (-11.72) 
2011 -0.340** -0.396** -0.367** -0.379** -0.505** -0.476** -0.523** -0.472** 
 
(-2.83) (-2.97) (-3.00) (-2.94) (-6.12) (-5.47) (-6.28) (-5.40) 
Constant -1.817** -1.563** -1.574** -0.682 -0.397 -0.152 -0.171 -0.144 
 
(-4.76) (-3.76) (-3.85) (-1.56) (-1.19) (-0.44) (-0.49) (-0.39) 
ρ 0.094 0.131 0.121 0.059 0.432*** 0.371*** 0.429*** 0.366*** 
 (0.111) (0.118) (0.107) (0.099) (0.050) (0.057) (0.050) (0.057) 
𝜃 6.479 3.417 4.035 5.843 1.166*** 1.368*** 1.151*** 1.386*** 
 (20.398) (4.800) (6.341) (17.156) (0.219) (0.321) (0.218) (0.332) 
Log-likelihood -830.347 -725.907 -825.49 -695.821 -1861.396 -1629.439 -1853.764 -1607.985 
LR test: rho=0   chi2(1) 12.49*** 140.9*** 12.51*** 108.6*** 347.88*** 429.9*** 116.16*** 455.24*** 
Wald test 95.46*** 83.60*** 95.99*** 141.2*** 120.07*** 311.7*** 352.34*** 312.57*** 
Predicted prob. ?̂?0 0.055 0.045 0.050 0.053 0.217 0.229 0.218 0.236 
Predicted prob. ?̂?1 0.137 0.123 0.125 0.154 0.284 0.319 0.285  0.329 
AEP: ?̂?1 − ?̂?0 0.082 0.078 0.075 0.101 0.067 0.090 0.067 0.093 
PPR: ?̂?1 ?̂?0⁄  2.51 2.73 2.50 2,90 1.30 1.39 1.30 1.39 
Number of observations 3646 3646 3646 3646 3646 3646 3646 3646 
***  1%, **  5%, *  10% levels of significance 
Notes: 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Initial condition equation estimates excluded for brevity. 
3. ?̂?0, ?̂?1: predicted probabilities of households’ over-indebtedness at 𝑡 given over-indebtedness status at 𝑡 −  1, respectively. 
4. APE: average partial effect; PPR: predicted probability ratio. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
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Additionally, the estimate of the unobserved individual effects (ρ) confirms the unobserved 
household’s heterogeneity effects on the likelihood of experiencing over-indebtedness, with 
the log likelihood ratio test of 455.24 at a significance level of 0.1% (see the estimates based 
on the DSR indicator in the fourth column of table 2.6). This estimate implies that 
approximately 37% of the composite variance of households’ over-indebtedness is explained 
by unobserved household-specific characteristics. The magnitude of this parameter further 
indicates the importance of the unobserved household heterogeneity in the analysis of 
households’ over-indebtedness, and it stresses the suitability of panel data in such studies.  
The significant estimate of 𝜃 indicates that the exogeneity assumption of the initial condition 
can be rejected in this case. Compared with the random effects estimator, which considers the 
initial conditions to be exogenous, Heckman’s estimator reduces the true state dependence 
effect of over-indebtedness by approximately a half and nearly doubles the estimate of ρ, as it 
controls for the endogeneity of the initial conditions. After scaling the coefficient of the true 
state dependence effect of the over-indebtedness estimate by multiplying it with √(1 − ρ), 
the standard random effects probit model results in a coefficient of 0.54, while the Heckman 
estimator results in 0.228 (see the first model specification in table 2.6 under the DSR 
indicator). The coefficient further increases to 0.906 for the pooled probit estimator, even 
though we do not present these results in the paper, for of brevity. On the other hand, it should 
be noted that the exogeneity of the initial conditions is not rejected in the model specifications 
for the default indicator.  
In contrast to the findings for Thailand, the estimates of the corresponding random effects 
dynamic probit model for Vietnamese households reveal that the conditional probability of 
experiencing over-indebtedness in the future does not depend on the probability of having 
experienced over-indebtedness in the previous periods (see table 2.7). Instead, approximately 
20 to 40% of the composite variance of household’s over-indebtedness is explained by 
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unobserved household heterogeneity after controlling for the endogeneity of the initial 
conditions. However, the results of the random effects probit models, which assume 
exogenous initial conditions, overestimated the true state dependence effect, suggesting that 
the Vietnamese households experience over-indebtedness persistently. The results also 
estimated a lower unobserved household heterogeneity effect.  
Table 2.7: Random effects dynamic probit estimation for Vietnamese households’ probability of over-
indebtedness (Heckman’s estimator) 
variables 
Structural equation 
Default  DSR  
Model 
(1) 
Model (2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Over-indebted last year 
(lagged status of default or 
DSR indicators) 
0.191 0.177 0.208 0.264 0.0805 0.108 0.0989 0.103 
 
(0.92) (0.77) (1.01) (1.14) (0.51) (0.62) (0.62) (0.58) 
Age of HH head below 35 0.0267 0.0669 -0.0157 -0.0206 0.121 0.0511 0.112 0.0459 
 
(0.10) (0.21) (-0.06) (-0.07) (0.54) (0.21) (0.49) (0.19) 
Age of HH head 35-44 0.164 0.217 0.181 0.156 0.406** 0.327 0.399** 0.329 
 
(0.75) (0.80) (0.83) (0.60) (2.08) (1.53) (2.03) (1.52) 
Age of HH head 45-54 0.0250 0.111 0.0432 0.111 0.291 0.185 0.289 0.201 
 
(0.12) (0.45) (0.21) (0.46) (1.58) (0.94) (1.56) (1.01) 
Age of HH head 55-64 -0.0379 0.109 -0.0305 0.132 0.533** 0.417** 0.528** 0.407** 
 
(-0.17) (0.43) (-0.14) (0.53) (2.78) (2.06) (2.75) (1.99) 
Female HH head -0.0762 -0.0344 -0.0977 -0.0739 -0.0260 -0.0179 -0.0127 -0.0163 
 
(-0.34) (-0.13) (-0.44) (-0.30) (-0.14) (-0.09) (-0.07) (-0.08) 
No of Children (0-14) -0.0276 -0.0385 -0.0315 -0.0500 -0.0694 -0.100* -0.0731 -0.101* 
 
(-0.46) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.72) (-1.26) (-1.70) (-1.32) (-1.68) 
Household size 0.103** 0.125** 0.107** 0.123** 0.0782** 0.107** 0.0788** 0.107** 
 
(2.66) (2.77) (2.79) (2.83) (2.38) (3.09) (2.39) (3.08) 
Married HH head 0.189 0.239 0.176 0.255 0.326 0.281 0.327 0.282 
 
(0.78) (0.85) (0.73) (0.93) (1.57) (1.27) (1.58) (1.27) 
Ethnic minorities (Non-Kinh) -0.133 -0.229 -0.150 -0.275 -0.0939 -0.0993 -0.0642 -0.0939 
 
(-0.85) (-1.19) (-0.95) (-1.47) (-0.70) (-0.69) (-0.48) (-0.64) 
Illiterate HH 0.179 0.210 0.132 0.117 -0.384** -0.333* -0.378** -0.336* 
 
(0.96) (0.95) (0.71) (0.55) (-2.15) (-1.74) (-2.10) (-1.74) 
Primary education -0.0830 -0.0949 -0.126 -0.116 -0.0678 -0.0408 -0.0613 -0.0464 
 
(-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.89) (-0.73) (-0.57) (-0.32) (-0.52) (-0.36) 
Land rental status 0.0504 -0.0241 0.0615 -0.0318 0.186 0.137 0.192 0.141 
 
(0.33) (-0.13) (0.40) (-0.18) (1.42) (0.97) (1.46) (0.99) 
HH that have savings -0.0816 0.0380 -0.0328 0.111 0.176 0.204 0.171 0.214 
 
(-0.58) (0.23) (-0.23) (0.68) (1.49) (1.58) (1.42) (1.62) 
Income quintile 1 0.773** 0.765** 0.725** 0.649** 1.850** 1.836** 1.851** 1.834** 
 
(3.34) (2.90) (3.11) (2.43) (8.54) (7.91) (8.49) (7.75) 
Income quintile 2 0.802** 0.841** 0.777** 0.707** 1.168** 1.250** 1.145** 1.222** 
 
(3.65) (3.40) (3.51) (2.83) (6.16) (6.24) (6.02) (5.99) 
Income quintile 3 0.624** 0.617** 0.603** 0.563** 0.678** 0.583** 0.684** 0.559** 
 
(3.02) (2.67) (2.91) (2.44) (3.75) (3.07) (3.76) (2.91) 
Income quintile 4 0.538** 0.600** 0.538** 0.546** 0.260 0.299 0.246 0.274 
 
(2.67) (2.68) (2.65) (2.42) (1.47) (1.62) (1.38) (1.47) 
Agricultural HH 0.264 0.181 0.290 0.177 -0.394** -0.412** -0.423** -0.438** 
 
(1.07) (0.64) (1.17) (0.64) (-2.20) (-2.09) (-2.35) (-2.19) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.264 0.224 0.268 0.170 -0.346* -0.274 -0.359* -0.304 
 
(1.01) (0.74) (1.02) (0.58) (-1.82) (-1.33) (-1.88) (-1.44) 
Inactive HH 0.217 0.0352 0.250 0.0791 -0.121 0.0228 -0.122 -0.00296 
 
(0.63) (0.08) (0.72) (0.19) (-0.45) (0.08) (-0.45) (-0.01) 
Unexpected shocks to 
expenses 
0.130 0.244* 0.129 0.203 0.155 0.140 0.155 0.141 
 
(1.15) (1.84) (1.14) (1.57) (1.57) (1.30) (1.57) (1.30) 
Expected shocks to expenses -0.309 -0.220 -0.313 -0.252 0.219 0.0914 0.209 0.0878 
 
(-1.35) (-0.89) (-1.39) (-1.04) (1.37) (0.52) (1.29) (0.50) 
Unexpected shocks to income 0.314** 0.371** 0.318** 0.364** -0.0353 -0.0381 -0.0360 -0.0462 
 
(2.35) (2.39) (2.37) (2.39) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.38) 
Future exception of income 
(Same)  
-0.0534 
 
-0.120 
 
-0.169 
 
-0.137 
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(-0.36) 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(-1.35) 
 
(-1.04) 
Future exception of income 
(Worse)  
-0.0105 
 
-0.248 
 
-0.449** 
 
-0.427* 
  
(-0.04) 
 
(-0.96) 
 
(-2.08) 
 
(-1.86) 
Risk averse 
 
0.157 0.152 0.0845 
 
0.0716 0.0472 0.0827 
  
(1.04) (1.19) (0.56) 
 
(0.57) (0.41) (0.64) 
Risk neutral 
 
-0.0927 -0.109 -0.131 
 
0.0911 0.149 0.0934 
  
(-0.53) (-0.70) (-0.74) 
 
(0.66) (1.14) (0.67) 
Pessimistic forecast error 
  
0.253 0.392** 
  
-0.0650 0.0527 
   
(1.54) (1.99) 
  
(-0.42) (0.31) 
No forecast error 
  
-0.0600 -0.0153 
  
-0.0448 -0.0957 
   
(-0.42) (-0.09) 
  
(-0.35) (-0.70) 
Prudentially optimistic forecast 
error   
-0.116 0.0247 
  
0.229 0.137 
   
(-0.69) (0.13) 
  
(1.62) (0.87) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers 
(Better) 
   
-0.415* 
   
-0.0554 
    
(-1.89) 
   
(-0.29) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers (Same)    
-0.466** 
   
0.0580 
    
(-3.12) 
   
(0.45) 
2010 -0.405** -0.508** -0.421** -0.515** 0.0844 0.0910 0.0889 0.0898 
 
(-3.09) (-3.30) (-3.15) (-3.34) (0.65) (0.64) (0.68) (0.62) 
2011 -0.253* -0.346** -0.289* -0.408** -0.109 -0.0851 -0.129 -0.0890 
 
(-1.69) (-1.96) (-1.91) (-2.31) (-0.93) (-0.66) (-1.07) (-0.69) 
Constant -3.334** -3.698** -3.352** -3.179** -2.925** -2.872** -2.971** -2.874** 
 
(-6.95) (-6.37) (-6.75) (-5.30) (-7.69) (-6.93) (-7.38) (-6.33) 
ρ 0.355*** 0.407*** 0.341*** 0.349*** 0.261*** 0.227** 0.258*** 0.234** 
 
(0.107) (0.113) (0.108) (0.123) (0.090) (0.101) (0.091) (0.103) 
𝜃 1.042** 1.069** 1.105** 1.082** 1.874* 1.846 1.838* 1.864 
 
(0.107) (0.441) (0.459) (0.512) (1.061) (1.230) (1.047) (1.248) 
Log-likelihood -685.400 -541.639 -669.488 -530.629 -788.536 -666.009 -782.430 -659.904 
LR test: rho=0   chi2(1) 41.61*** 
236.84**
* 
50.41*** 
227.16**
* 
35.03*** 
189.17**
* 
36.05*** 
189.40**
* 
Wald test 58.06*** 52.88*** 66.59*** 67.01*** 
116.44**
* 
103.72**
* 
119.25**
* 
104.77**
* 
Predicted prob. ?̂?0 0.023 0.016 0.025 0.023 0.058 0.061 0.060 0.061 
Predicted prob. ?̂?1 0.037 0.025 0.041 0.042 0.067 0.074 0.071 0.073 
AEP: . ?̂?1 − ?̂?0 0.014 0.009 0.016 0.019 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.012 
PPR: ?̂?1 ?̂?0⁄  1.60 1.56 1.64 1.82 1.15 1.21 1.18 1.19 
Number of observations 2655 2655 2655 2655 2655 2655 2655 2655 
***  1%, **  5%, *  10% levels of significance 
 
Notes: 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Initial condition equation estimates excluded for brevity  
3. ?̂?0, ?̂?1: predicted probabilities of households’ over-indebtedness at 𝑡 given over-indebtedness status at 𝑡 −  1, respectively. 
4. APE: average partial effect; PPR: predicted probability ratio. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
Overall, we find that Vietnamese households experience periods of temporary over-
indebtedness both in terms of default and DSR, whereas for Thai households, the problem of 
being over-indebted persists over time. Although it is surprising to find such differing results 
in terms of the persistency of household’s over-indebtedness for these two countries, which 
follow a fairly similar financial system, the results are in line with the existing literature, 
which suggests a very low level of default and late repayment in Vietnam’s rural credit 
market (Okae, 2009). According to Okae (2009), the rural credit institutions in Vietnam have 
been successful in terms of a high level of loan repayment due to community relationship and 
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social ties. Specifically, the author suggests that the direct monitoring mechanisms of the rural 
communities that are enacted by the members and the potential economic and social sanctions 
on defaulting households from others enforces repayment and therefore results in a low level 
of over-indebtedness among rural communities of Vietnam.  
2.7.2 Determinants of households’ over-indebtedness in Thailand and Vietnam 
The marginal effect of covariates is presented in table 2.8 for Thailand and in table 2.9 for 
Vietnam based on Orme’s random effects dynamic probit model. Among the demographic 
household characteristics, Thai households headed by middle-aged members are more likely 
to be over-indebted compared to those headed by older household heads for all indicators of 
over-indebtedness (see table 2.8). Reducing the age of the household head from the 65 and 
above group to the 45 to 54 group increases the likelihood of experiencing over-indebtedness 
by approximately 4 percentage points (pp) in terms of default and 7 pp in terms of DSR. 
While marital status and the number of children does not matter for Thai households, being a 
male-headed household and having a larger household size significantly increases the 
likelihood of experiencing over-indebtedness, depending on the model specification. 
According to the marginal effects in table 2.8, being a female-headed household reduces the 
likelihood of defaulting on a loan by approximately 2 pp, while it reduces the likelihood of 
being over-indebted by approximately 4 pp in terms of the DSR indicator.  
Table 2.8: Over-Indebtedness Transition Probabilities for Thai Households (Orme’s Estimator) 
variables 
Default  DSR  
Model 
(1) 
Model (2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model (1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model (4) 
Over-indebted last year 
(lagged status of default or 
DSR indicators) 
0.0459** 0.0479** 0.0503** 0.0621** 0.0690** 0.0845** 0.0671** 0.0849** 
 
(2.37) (2.35) (2.54) (2.91) (2.87) (3.30) (2.80) (3.31) 
Age of HH head below 35 0.0402 0.0372 0.0463* 0.0430 0.0158 0.0166 0.00702 0.0100 
 
(1.56) (1.41) (1.77) (1.59) (0.24) (0.25) (0.11) (0.15) 
Age of HH head 35-44 0.00911 0.00289 0.0134 0.000525 0.0786** 0.0646* 0.0704** 0.0599* 
 
(0.55) (0.16) (0.80) (0.03) (2.28) (1.79) (2.02) (1.66) 
Age of HH head 45-54 0.0431** 0.0405** 0.0468** 0.0416** 0.0741** 0.0728** 0.0662** 0.0719** 
 
(3.24) (2.90) (3.44) (2.88) (2.55) (2.41) (2.27) (2.37) 
Age of HH head 55-64 0.0332** 0.0280** 0.0349** 0.0261* 0.0686** 0.0640** 0.0641** 0.0691** 
 
(2.54) (2.05) (2.63) (1.84) (2.47) (2.22) (2.30) (2.39) 
Female HH head -0.0130 -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0191* -0.0463* -0.0370 -0.0431* -0.0415 
 
(-1.26) (-1.39) (-1.47) (-1.66) (-1.88) (-1.47) (-1.75) (-1.64) 
No of Children (0-14) 
-
0.000324 
-0.000346 
-
0.000674 
0.000649 -0.0112 -0.0104 -0.0107 -0.00880 
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(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.14) (0.12) (-0.94) (-0.86) (-0.90) (-0.71) 
Household size 
0.00549*
* 
0.00457* 
0.00582*
* 
0.00432 0.0120** 0.0116* 0.0116* 0.0101 
 
(2.31) (1.68) (2.44) (1.54) (1.99) (1.81) (1.91) (1.58) 
Married HH head -0.00889 -0.0111 -0.0116 -0.00979 -0.000162 0.000435 
-
0.000795 
-0.00275 
 
(-0.73) (-0.87) (-0.93) (-0.73) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.03) (-0.09) 
Illiterate and primary 
education 
-0.0370 -0.0405 -0.0381 
-
0.0505** 
-0.322** -0.317** -0.333** -0.322** 
 
(-1.53) (-1.64) (-1.56) (-1.97) (-5.77) (-5.48) (-5.91) (-5.57) 
Secondary education -0.0228 -0.0231 -0.0229 -0.0274 -0.227** -0.230** -0.243** -0.238** 
 
(-0.89) (-0.89) (-0.88) (-1.02) (-3.76) (-3.69) (-4.00) (-3.83) 
Land rental status 0.0135 0.00379 0.0111 0.00430 0.0151 0.0126 0.0140 0.0179 
 
(1.44) (0.38) (1.17) (0.41) (0.72) (0.58) (0.67) (0.82) 
HH that have savings 
-
0.0240** 
-0.0175 
-
0.0212** 
-0.0121 0.0700** 0.0499** 0.0652** 0.0418* 
 
(-2.39) (-1.62) (-2.09) (-1.06) (2.99) (2.02) (2.78) (1.67) 
Income quintile 1 0.0286** 0.0246* 0.0239* 0.0134 0.370** 0.367** 0.378** 0.371** 
 
(1.99) (1.66) (1.66) (0.86) (12.59) (12.02) (12.80) (11.95) 
Income quintile 2 0.0280** 0.0229 0.0240* 0.0128 0.247** 0.237** 0.250** 0.238** 
 
(2.00) (1.58) (1.70) (0.84) (8.52) (7.84) (8.62) (7.80) 
Income quintile 3 0.00965 0.00196 0.00775 -0.00525 0.185** 0.188** 0.191** 0.186** 
 
(0.68) (0.13) (0.54) (-0.34) (6.45) (6.26) (6.65) (6.16) 
Income quintile 4 0.0139 0.00573 0.0141 0.00352 0.0340 0.0248 0.0349 0.0228 
 
(1.01) (0.41) (1.02) (0.24) (1.19) (0.83) (1.22) (0.77) 
Agricultural HH -0.00359 0.00377 -0.00142 0.000606 0.0154 0.00614 0.0168 0.00268 
 
(-0.25) (0.25) (-0.10) (0.04) (0.49) (0.19) (0.53) (0.08) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.0100 0.0171 0.00921 0.0132 -0.0154 -0.0200 -0.0129 -0.0250 
 
(0.63) (1.03) (0.58) (0.77) (-0.43) (-0.55) (-0.36) (-0.69) 
Inactive HH 0.000883 0.00752 0.00418 0.00255 0.0202 0.0195 0.0186 0.0184 
 
(0.05) (0.38) (0.22) (0.12) (0.49) (0.46) (0.45) (0.43) 
Unexpected shocks to 
expenses 
0.0156* 0.0148* 0.0112 0.0123 -0.00364 -0.00291 -0.00314 -0.000725 
 
(1.84) (1.67) (1.32) (1.32) (-0.21) (-0.16) (-0.18) (-0.04) 
Expected shocks to 
expenses 
0.0151 0.0141 0.0123 0.00740 0.0307 0.0273 0.0292 0.0336 
 
(1.28) (1.15) (1.03) (0.56) (1.09) (0.94) (1.04) (1.15) 
Unexpected shocks to 
income 
0.0159* 0.0129 0.0135 0.0136 0.0332* 0.0384** 0.0300 0.0375* 
 
(1.80) (1.40) (1.50) (1.41) (1.82) (2.01) (1.64) (1.95) 
Future exception of income 
(Same)  
-0.00174 
 
-0.00329 
 
-0.0414* 
 
-0.0420* 
  
(-0.17) 
 
(-0.30) 
 
(-1.87) 
 
(-1.88) 
Future exception of income 
(Worse)  
-0.00841 
 
-0.0162 
 
-0.0145 
 
-0.0162 
  
(-0.62) 
 
(-1.13) 
 
(-0.51) 
 
(-0.57) 
Risk averse 
 
0.00276 0.00115 -0.00132 
 
-
0.0676** 
-
0.0688** 
-0.0692** 
  
(0.26) (0.11) (-0.12) 
 
(-2.97) (-3.18) (-3.03) 
Risk neutral 
 
-0.0106 -0.0108 -0.0136 
 
-0.0252 -0.0306 -0.0287 
  
(-0.98) (-1.03) (-1.19) 
 
(-1.14) (-1.45) (-1.30) 
Pessimistic forecast error 
  
-0.0245* -0.0164 
  
0.00268 -0.00435 
   
(-1.90) (-1.18) 
  
(0.10) (-0.15) 
No forecast error 
  
-
0.0263** 
-0.0215* 
  
0.0135 0.00827 
   
(-2.35) (-1.77) 
  
(0.54) (0.31) 
Prudentially optimistic 
forecast error   
-
0.0334** 
-
0.0352**   
0.0532** 0.0460 
   
(-2.65) (-2.41) 
  
(2.02) (1.60) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers 
(Better) 
   
-
0.0593**    
0.0232 
    
(-3.33) 
   
(0.68) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers 
(Same) 
   
-
0.0379**    
0.0485* 
    
(-3.26) 
   
(1.80) 
2010 
-
0.0584** 
-0.0611** 
-
0.0592** 
-
0.0614** 
-0.279** -0.275** -0.279** -0.273** 
 
(-5.12) (-4.96) (-5.05) (-4.80) (-14.84) (-13.73) (-14.62) (-13.44) 
2011 
-
0.0320** 
-0.0317** 
-
0.0301** 
-
0.0296** 
-0.127** -0.124** -0.125** -0.122** 
 
(-3.19) (-2.99) (-2.95) (-2.65) (-6.47) (-5.87) (-6.27) (-5.74) 
ui1 0.0254**    
0.139** 
   
 
(3.67) 
   
(8.90) 
   
ui2  
0.0249** 
   
0.129** 
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(3.37) 
   
(7.82) 
  
ui3   
0.0251** 
   
0.140** 
 
   
(3.60) 
   
(8.91) 
 
ui4    
0.0187** 
   
0.127** 
    
(2.40) 
   
(7.75) 
ρ 0.068 0.087 0.041 0.011 0.339 0.285 0.341 0.280 
Log-likelihood -506.45 -450.32 -494.44 -438.40 -1354.64 -1202.01 -1341.81 -1188.39 
Wald test 145.61 128.15 155.02 151.74 389.49 365.18 391.41 365.43 
Number of observation 2742 2441 2731 2420 2742 2441 2731 2420 
***  1%, **  5%, *  10% levels of significance. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
Similarly, Vietnamese households headed by a household member in the 55 to 64 age group 
have a 6 pp higher chance of becoming over-indebted in terms of DSR, whereas the 
probability of default is unrelated to the age of the household head (see table 2.9). Table 2.9 
also shows that a larger household size significantly increases the probability of being over-
indebted. Thus, an increase in household size by one member increases the probability of 
experiencing over-indebtedness by approximately 1 pp in terms of both default and the DSR 
indicator. However, among the Vietnamese households, we do not find any significance 
difference between female- or male-headed households. Such household characteristics as 
ethnicity, marital status and the number of children in a household do not significantly 
influence the probability of experiencing over-indebtedness.  
Table 2.9: Over-Indebtedness Transition Probabilities for Vietnamese Households (Orme’s Estimator) 
variables 
Default  DSR  
Model 
(1) 
Model (2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model (1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model (4) 
Over-indebted last year 
(lagged status of default or 
DSR indicators) 
0.0147 0.0223 0.0146 0.0304 0.0236 0.0167 0.0215 0.0165 
 
(0.75) (1.10) (0.74) (1.38) (1.07) (0.72) (0.98) (0.71) 
Age of HH head below 35 0.00686 0.00924 0.00283 0.00480 0.0136 0.00361 0.0184 0.00602 
 
(0.30) (0.39) (0.12) (0.19) (0.47) (0.12) (0.64) (0.20) 
Age of HH head 35-44 0.0162 0.0214 0.0184 0.0191 0.0542** 0.0427 0.0566** 0.0447* 
 
(0.83) (1.05) (0.93) (0.90) (2.18) (1.63) (2.26) (1.70) 
Age of HH head 45-54 0.00505 0.0115 0.00553 0.0114 0.0412* 0.0306 0.0404* 0.0328 
 
(0.28) (0.62) (0.31) (0.59) (1.77) (1.27) (1.73) (1.36) 
Age of HH head 55-64 -0.00342 0.00617 -0.00369 0.00795 0.0711** 0.0575** 0.0680** 0.0585** 
 
(-0.18) (0.31) (-0.19) (0.39) (2.96) (2.31) (2.81) (2.34) 
Female HH head -0.00686 -0.00702 -0.00626 -0.00948 -0.00233 -0.00573 -0.00390 -0.00627 
 
(-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.32) (-0.47) (-0.10) (-0.24) (-0.16) (-0.26) 
No of Children (0-14) -0.00291 -0.00527 -0.00303 -0.00665 -0.00972 -0.0111 -0.00995 -0.0109 
 
(-0.55) (-0.97) (-0.56) (-1.17) (-1.41) (-1.55) (-1.42) (-1.51) 
Household size 
0.00879*
* 
0.0105** 
0.00924*
* 
0.0110** 0.0102** 0.0125** 0.0104** 0.0127** 
 
(2.49) (2.89) (2.56) (2.97) (2.42) (2.88) (2.45) (2.90) 
Married HH head 0.0172 0.0177 0.0190 0.0224 0.0374 0.0290 0.0406 0.0282 
 
(0.80) (0.82) (0.87) (0.99) (1.42) (1.08) (1.53) (1.04) 
Ethnic minorities (Non-
Kinh) 
-0.0145 -0.0147 -0.0120 -0.0178 -0.00778 -0.0125 -0.0108 -0.0112 
 
(-1.05) (-1.01) (-0.85) (-1.17) (-0.47) (-0.70) (-0.64) (-0.63) 
Illiterate HH 0.0163 0.0130 0.0123 0.00688 -0.0476** -0.0455* -0.0509** -0.0466** 
 
(1.01) (0.80) (0.75) (0.41) (-2.13) (-1.95) (-2.25) (-1.99) 
Primary education -0.00523 -0.00508 -0.00910 -0.00738 -0.0119 -0.00897 -0.0116 -0.0101 
 
(-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.72) (-0.57) (-0.79) (-0.58) (-0.77) (-0.65) 
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Land rental status 0.00513 0.000268 0.00626 0.000770 0.0240 0.0191 0.0222 0.0182 
 
(0.38) (0.02) (0.46) (0.05) (1.40) (1.08) (1.30) (1.03) 
HH that have savings -0.00605 0.00242 -0.00319 0.00927 0.0253 0.0283* 0.0233 0.0297* 
 
(-0.48) (0.19) (-0.25) (0.68) (1.63) (1.74) (1.49) (1.78) 
Income quintile 1 0.0674** 0.0609** 0.0641** 0.0498** 0.235** 0.245** 0.239** 0.245** 
 
(3.07) (2.81) (2.91) (2.24) (9.06) (8.87) (9.06) (8.64) 
Income quintile 2 0.0733** 0.0611** 0.0726** 0.0533** 0.152** 0.164** 0.152** 0.163** 
 
(3.57) (3.09) (3.53) (2.63) (6.34) (6.52) (6.31) (6.36) 
Income quintile 3 0.0576** 0.0493** 0.0569** 0.0458** 0.0890** 0.0805** 0.0876** 0.0790** 
 
(3.02) (2.68) (2.96) (2.41) (3.88) (3.41) (3.82) (3.31) 
Income quintile 4 0.0505** 0.0464** 0.0529** 0.0445** 0.0395* 0.0405* 0.0361 0.0399* 
 
(2.73) (2.59) (2.81) (2.37) (1.73) (1.75) (1.59) (1.70) 
Agricultural HH 0.0266 0.0279 0.0284 0.0270 -0.0545** 
-
0.0615** 
-0.0501** -0.0631** 
 
(1.21) (1.25) (1.27) (1.17) (-2.39) (-2.61) (-2.17) (-2.66) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.0293 0.0285 0.0309 0.0248 -0.0481** -0.0455* -0.0428* -0.0466* 
 
(1.28) (1.21) (1.33) (1.01) (-1.98) (-1.82) (-1.75) (-1.85) 
Inactive HH 0.0206 0.0392 0.0264 0.0394 -0.0185 -0.0100 -0.0134 -0.0134 
 
(0.67) (1.25) (0.85) (1.20) (-0.53) (-0.28) (-0.39) (-0.37) 
Unexpected shocks to 
expenses 
0.0116 0.0164 0.0122 0.0143 0.0184 0.0199 0.0183 0.0198 
 
(1.15) (1.58) (1.18) (1.31) (1.44) (1.48) (1.42) (1.45) 
Expected shocks to expenses -0.0280 -0.0229 -0.0305 -0.0279 0.0267 0.0136 0.0279 0.0125 
 
(-1.36) (-1.15) (-1.46) (-1.31) (1.27) (0.61) (1.34) (0.57) 
Unexpected shocks to 
income 
0.0259** 0.0277** 0.0254** 0.0277** -0.000322 -0.00572 -0.00452 -0.00603 
 
(2.16) (2.25) (2.09) (2.17) (-0.02) (-0.38) (-0.32) (-0.40) 
Future exception of income 
(Same)  
-0.00183 
 
-0.00222 
 
-0.0265* 
 
-0.0262* 
  
(-0.16) 
 
(-0.19) 
 
(-1.68) 
 
(-1.66) 
Future exception of income 
(Worse)  
-0.00109 
 
-0.00825 
 
-
0.0556**  
-0.0560** 
  
(-0.06) 
 
(-0.41) 
 
(-2.09) 
 
(-2.07) 
Risk averse 
 
0.0154 0.0118 0.00933 
 
0.00385 0.00148 0.00511 
  
(1.30) (1.01) (0.75) 
 
(0.24) (0.10) (0.32) 
Risk neutral 
 
-0.00710 -0.0114 -0.0118 
 
0.0131 0.0159 0.0132 
  
(-0.52) (-0.83) (-0.80) 
 
(0.76) (0.96) (0.76) 
Pessimistic forecast error 
  
0.00386 
-
0.000720 
 
 
-0.00323 -0.00739 
   
(0.25) (-0.04) 
  
(-0.16) (-0.35) 
No forecast error 
  
-0.00890 -0.00934 
  
0.00647 0.00507 
   
(-0.69) (-0.69) 
  
(0.40) (0.30) 
Prudentially optimistic 
forecast error   
-0.00952 -0.00449 
  
-0.00969 -0.0181 
   
(-0.70) (-0.31) 
  
(-0.55) (-0.94) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers 
(Better) 
   
-
0.0447**    
-0.00338 
    
(-2.31) 
   
(-0.15) 
Subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to villagers 
(Same) 
   
-
0.0401**    
0.00708 
    
(-2.96) 
   
(0.45) 
2010 
-
0.0345** 
-
0.0463** 
-
0.0383** 
-
0.0513** 
-0.0176 -0.00658 -0.0165 -0.00779 
 
(-2.93) (-3.50) (-3.12) (-3.70) (-1.15) (-0.41) (-1.06) (-0.48) 
2011 -0.0212* 
-
0.0295** 
-0.0221* 
-
0.0361** 
0.00557 0.0144 0.0106 0.0140 
 
(-1.66) (-2.20) (-1.68) (-2.52) (0.33) (0.80) (0.62) (0.78) 
ui1 0.0396**    
0.0465** 
   
 
(4.47) 
   
(4.33) 
   
ui2  
0.0361** 
   
0.0436** 
  
  
(3.93) 
   
(3.90) 
  
ui3   
0.0406** 
   
0.0467** 
 
   
(4.52) 
   
(4.33) 
 
ui4    
0.0333** 
   
0.0428** 
    
(3.50) 
   
(3.79) 
ρ 0.316 0 .331 0.314 0.283 0.166 0.176 0 .195 0.190 
Log-likelihood -486.95 -411.65 -479.12 -405.10 -571.68 -494.23 -560.85 -492.89 
Wald test 82.86 82.65 86.39 94.88 130.73 121.11 128.78 119.07 
Number of observations 2004 1784 1976 1777 2004 1784 1976 1777 
***  1%, **  5%, *  10% levels of significance. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
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In both countries, a lower level of education significantly reduces the likelihood of 
experiencing over-indebtedness. Regardless of the indicator used, the probability of becoming 
over-indebted is positively related to the education level of the household head. A Thai 
household with a lower-educated household head has a 32 pp less chance of accumulating a 
high level of debt relative to its income and a 5 pp less chance of defaulting as compared to 
households with a higher-educated head. For Vietnamese households, this effect is significant 
only when the DSR indicator is used. Thus, families with lower-educated household heads are 
less likely to be over-indebted by approximately 5 pp compared to those with higher-educated 
household heads. This may be contrary to expectations. However, households with lower 
education levels face more-severe credit constraints and, therefore, have less opportunity to 
over-borrow. For instance, in Thailand, Siripanyawat et al. (2010) found that households with 
an undergraduate degree or higher education had the tendency to accumulate higher amounts 
of debt due to greater access to the formal sources of loans. Nonetheless, the fact that the 
effect of education becomes mainly insignificant in the case of the default model suggests that 
households with higher education are more likely to accumulate higher amounts of debt given 
their prospects of earning more income in the future, but not to extent that they would be 
defaulting.  
We also find that in Thailand, a household head’s major occupation does not significantly 
affect the probability of being over-indebted.  This is the case for both indicators. In Vietnam, 
households with small-scale enterprises are more likely to be over-indebted, albeit only in 
terms of the debt-service-ratio indicator.   These suggests that while there is no difference 
between the occupation groups in terms of default indicator, which can be considered a more 
severe threat to household welfare, households with self-employment are more vulnerable to 
adverse economic shocks, which increase their debt burden.  
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Consistent with many literatures, in both countries, income strongly impacts the probability of 
becoming over-indebted. For Thailand’s default indicator, the first and second income 
quintiles are significant, i.e., the likelihood of becoming over-indebted increases by 
approximately 3 pp for both quintiles.  In Vietnam, the income effect is significant throughout 
the quintiles for the full model (see table 2.9), with 4.9, 5.3, 4.5 and 4.4 pp from the first to 
fourth quintiles, respectively.  Level of income is indeed the main factor responsible for loan 
defaults as well as for the DSR indicator, where the effect is even stronger.  For instance, 
being in the poorest income group in Thailand increases the probability by 37 pp and in 
Vietnam by 25 pp.  
Furthermore, while household savings is positively related to over-indebtedness in terms of 
the DSR indicator in both countries, the effect becomes insignificant and takes on a negative 
sign when we consider the probability of default, perhaps because households keep some 
precautionary savings as self-insurance against shocks. Households only draw from their 
savings when the default materializes.  Alternatively, it is also not unusual for micro-lenders 
in microcredit markets of developing countries to require micro-borrowers to open a savings 
account to obtain a loan. For defaulting households, savings are depleted, which is in line with 
existing literature (Anderloni & Vandone, 2008). 
Concerning adverse economic shocks, we find that both unexpected shocks to income and 
expenses have a significant positive effect on households’ over-indebtedness. However, the 
effect of both types of shocks and their significance depends on the indicator used and the 
model specification. For the default indicator, an unexpected shock that leads to higher 
household expenses increases the likelihood of default by approximately 1 pp for Thai 
households, while these effects are not significant in Vietnam. These effects also become 
insignificant for Thai households when we control for all the behavioral factors and for 
households’ subjective relative social standing. For Thai households, we find that unexpected 
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shocks to income increase the likelihood of being over-indebted by approximately 1.5 and 3.8 
pp in terms of default and DSR indicators, respectively. In Vietnam, it significantly increases 
the likelihood of default by approximately 2.7 pp.        
As hypothesized, we also find that in both countries, future financial expectation significantly 
influences the probability of being over-indebted in terms of the DSR indicator after 
controlling for overoptimistic financial forecast errors and other household characteristics. 
Households with an optimistic financial expectation were more likely to be over-indebted 
compared to those that expect their financial situation either to stay the same or change for the 
worse, even after controlling for the accuracy of their expectation. For instance, in Vietnam, 
households with a pessimistic financial expectation were less likely to be over-indebted by 
approximately 5 pp, and Thai households that expected the same future financial situation in 
five years were less likely to be over-indebted by approximately 4 pp. In fact, households’ 
financial forecast error is not significantly related to over-indebtedness in terms of the DSR 
indictor. In line with existing literature, this result suggests that a household’s optimistic 
future financial expectation itself, not its accuracy, is what makes it more likely to be over-
indebted (Brown et al., 2005).   
In contrast, we find that a Thai household’s probability of defaulting on a loan is significantly 
related to making financial forecast errors instead of their future financial expectations. As 
presented in table 2.8, households with non-prudently overoptimistic financial forecast errors 
are more likely to default on a loan compared to those who make pessimistic, no or prudently 
overoptimistic forecast errors. For instance, compared to the reference group, those that make 
pessimistic financial forecast errors are less likely to default on a loan by approximately 2.4 
pp, while those that make no forecast error and prudently overoptimistic forecast errors are 
2.6 pp (3.3 pp) less likely to default. In sum, the results support the notion that an 
overoptimistic future financial expectation co-varies positively with the probability of default 
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in Thailand, while for Vietnam, financial forecast error is not at all significantly related to 
over-indebtedness, regardless of the indicator used.  
We also find that, in line with earlier findings, the household head’s attitude towards risk 
significantly influences the probability of experiencing over-indebtedness for Thai households 
in terms of the DSR ratio. In Thailand, households that revealed a higher level of risk aversion 
were less likely to be over-indebted than those that revealed a higher level of risk tolerance. 
On the other hand, we find no significant reduction in the likelihood of experiencing over-
indebtedness for the risk-averse households in Vietnam across all model specifications and 
indicators (see table 2.9). Furthermore, in terms of default, we also do not find any significant 
effect of the household head’s attitudes towards risk on over-indebtedness. Nonetheless, our 
results for Thai households in terms of the DSR indicator confirm the results of Brown et al. 
(2013), who also found an inverse relationship between the amount of debt households 
accumulate and their attitude towards risk. On the other hand, the insignificance of the 
relationship between the household head’s risk attitude and the likelihood of defaulting in 
Thailand suggests that risk attitude can only explain the accumulation of debt to a certain 
degree. Risk can lead to a higher debt service burden, but it cannot explain such extreme 
situation where households ultimately default on their debt. This argument is also supported 
by the results in the aforementioned study, which finds that the influence of the risk attitude of 
households in the U.S. diminishes as their debt burden increases. This paper states that the 
effect of risk attitude is clearly less explanatory and insignificant, especially for the group of 
households that accumulated the highest level of unsecured debt. Finally, the magnitude of 
this effect remained the same and was significant for all the specifications, including the 
model where we include all of the household behavioral factors.  
Likewise, the results presented in tables 2.8 and 2.9 further confirm that subjective relative 
social standing significantly influences households’ probability of experiencing over-
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indebtedness in terms of the default indicator both for Thai and Vietnamese households. 
Specifically, households that perceive their subjective relative social standing to be worse 
than that of other households in their village were more likely to default or reschedule 
payment on a loan. Households that perceived their relative subjective wellbeing to be either 
better or the same as other villagers were less likely to default on a loan by approximately 6 
and 4 pp among the Thai households and by approximately 4.5 and 4 pp among the 
Vietnamese households. It should also be noted that this effect is robust to the inclusion of the 
household’s future financial expectation and their forecast error. Georgarakos et al. (2014), 
who have found similar results in the context of developed countries, explain that social 
comparison can affect the borrowing decision of households through different channels. First, 
households can obtain financial information, such as the possibility of and procedure for 
getting a loan through direct consultation with those they consider to be in a better financial 
position than them. Second, households can be introduced to the culture of indebtedness, 
looking at the borrowing decision of their well-to-do peers. Third, such households tend to 
spend more trying to keep up with the living standard of the other villagers. Finally, these 
households could spend more than what is optimal if they expect to borrow directly from their 
peers in case of an adverse shock.  
2.8 Summary and Conclusion 
Based on a unique panel dataset for the period 2007 to 2011 from Thailand and Vietnam, this 
paper provides empirical evidence about the factors that can lead households into over-
indebtedness. Using three theoretical models, i.e., the standard life cycle model, a behavioral 
model and a social comparison model, we estimated the probability of a household 
experiencing over-indebtedness, and its persistence.  
Our results suggest that a clear association exists between experiencing over-indebtedness and 
several of the household characteristics included in the life cycle model. In both countries, the 
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probability of experiencing over-indebtedness is higher for larger households with male, 
middle-aged and higher-educated household heads. Furthermore, low income levels, income 
shocks and optimistic financial expectations of household heads are significant factors 
contributing to over-indebtedness. However, factors such as ethnicity (Vietnam), number of 
children, marital status and occupation of household heads (Thailand) are not statistically 
significant.   
The behavioral model confirms for Thailand that individual willingness to take risk and 
overoptimistic financial expectations can lead to over-indebtedness, while these coefficients 
are insignificant in the Vietnam model. 
In the social comparison model, we find that households that consider their wellbeing to be 
below that of other households in the village have a higher likelihood of being over-indebted. 
Furthermore, in all three models (Thailand), we find that a household’s history of over-
indebtedness is a significant factor in explaining current over-indebtedness. Generally, our 
findings are in line with the results of the few empirical studies conducted so far in a range of 
countries.  
Our results have several policy implications for microcredit programs for the rural poor.  
First, microcredit programs that are meant to improve the wellbeing of poor rural households 
can lead certain types of households into a “debt trap”. Hence, governments should effectively 
implement regulations that force financial institutions to better tailor their microcredit 
products to the needs of their clients. This should include improving the practice of sharing 
information among lending institutions on borrowers’ credit history by regularly reporting to 
the National Credit Bureau.   
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Second, because of the close association we found between over-indebtedness and poverty, 
we recommend that highly and persistently indebted households should be served by 
specifically designed poverty reduction programs such as cash transfer programs.  
Third, the significant effect of negative shocks as a cause of over-indebtedness in both 
countries suggests that microcredit institutions should combine microcredit products with 
insurance schemes in order to reduce the need to take on more loans as a shock coping 
strategy.   
Finally, the significant association between over-indebtedness and behavioral biases tells us 
that although financial literacy education is important, it is insufficient to solve the problem of 
over-indebtedness. Also, credit agents are unlikely to improve the decision making of 
borrowers, as their main interest is selling microcredit products. Therefore, we recommend 
that government advisory services should integrate financial portfolios in their extension 
portfolio and offer independent advice in order to empower poor rural households in financial 
decision making. This may serve as a first step to overcome the existing “culture of 
indebtedness”. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: List of common indicators of over-indebtedness 
 Indicator Source 
Subjective (qualitative) 
Perception of debt burden Disney et al., 2008; Keese, 2012; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013  
Struggle and sacrifice related to 
repaying debt 
Schicks, 2014 
Financial difficulty Betti et al., 2007 
Objective (quantitative) 
Debt-service ratio  D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013; Khandker et al., 2013 
Debt to income ratio Betti et al., 2007 
Debt to asset ratio Betti et al., 2007; Khandker et al., 2013 
Default Betti et al., 2007 
Arrear  Disney et al., 2008; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013 
Net wealth Giarda, 2013 
Number of credit commitments 
>4 
D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013 
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Abstract  
Does multiple borrowing lead micro-borrowers into over-indebtedness?  Do over-
indebted micro-borrowers take loans to refinance existing loans that are ultimately 
unpayable and get trapped in a vicious circle of debt? Using a longitudinal household 
survey data, this study addresses such questions by examining the dynamic 
interdependency between over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing in the context of 
micro-borrowers in Thailand and Vietnam. Specifically, the trues state dependence and 
cross-state dependence effects of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing are tested 
using the dynamic random effect bivariate probit model while controlling for observed 
and unobserved household heterogeneity. Results suggest that taking multiple 
borrowing simultaneously does positively influence household’s risk of becoming 
over-indebted in Thailand, while in Vietnam it has no significant influence on 
household’s risk of over-indebtedness. Additionally, though households reported of 
taking multiple loans to repay back old debts both in Thailand and Vietnam, the 
empirical results do not show a significant cross-state dependence effect of over-
indebtedness on multiple borrowing.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 In the last three decades, the microfinance industry has witnessed a substantial growth 
accompanied by a high incidence of multiple borrowing among its clients in developing and 
emerging market economies. On one hand, multiple borrowing, simply defined as taking 
multiple loans from multiple sources simultaneously, is considered to be a common and 
optimal cash flow management strategy of low-income households in developing countries. 
Low-income households take multiple loans from multiple sources to (1) smoothen their cash 
flow on regular bases (2) acquire larger loans than a micro-lender offers when creditworthy, 
(3) manage inflexible loan repayment schedules of microfinance institutions when faced with 
unexpected adverse shocks (Chen et al., 2010; Schicks & Rosenberg, 2011; Guérin, 2012; 
Wampfler et. al., 2014). On the other hand, multiple borrowing is becoming increasingly 
perceived as a symptom of household’s over-indebtedness. Through multiple borrowing, 
households can (1) increase the amount of loan that they can borrow and accumulate more 
debt than they can repay, (2) simply refinance or turn-over existing loans that are ultimately 
unpayable and enter into a vicious circle of debt and dependency, (3) easily default on a loan 
from one micro-lender while still keeping their borrowing relationship with other micro-
lenders and meeting their financial needs elsewhere (Chen et al., 2010; Schicks & Rosenberg, 
2011).  
The empirical evidence on the relationship between multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness has also been conflicting. Some studies find a positive correlation between 
multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness (Vogelgesang, 2003; Mpogole et al., 2012), while 
others do not observe any relation (Krishnaswamy, 2007; Gonzalez, 2008; Schicks, 2014). 
 82 
 
Furthermore, as most of the studies are exploratory research based on cross-section and 
qualitative data, they have merely established an evidence of the correlation between multiple 
borrowing and over-indebtedness than an unambiguous causal relationship. Though cross-
section data is useful for many purposes, such data is insufficient to analyze the dynamics of 
over-indebtedness and its dynamic interdependency with multiple borrowing, as the latter is 
likely to be an endogenous factor of over-indebtedness.  
Therefore, this research aims at understanding the dynamic interdependency between multiple 
borrowing and households’ over-indebtedness in the context of developing countries 
microcredit market by posing the following key questions: Do households who previously 
take multiple loans become over-indebted in the future? Do over-indebted households take on 
more loans to repay back other debts? Is the positive correlation between over-indebtedness 
and multiple borrowing found in the exploratory research due to genuine interdependence or 
due to spurious correlation? 
Using a four wave panel data for around 1600 rural households from two provinces in 
Thailand and Vietnam, we analyze the dynamic interdependency between multiple borrowing 
and household’s over-indebtedness using the dynamic bivariate probit model which controls 
for unobserved household heterogeneity and the endogeneity of initial conditions. Results 
suggest that, in overheated microcredit markets such as Thailand, taking multiple loans from 
several sources does increase households’ likelihood of experiencing over-indebtedness in the 
future. Hence, policy makers and industry stakeholders should give more attention to multiple 
borrowing and also take stapes to protect microcredit borrowers from taking on multiple loans 
and accumulating more debt than they can repay. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
The increasing incidence of multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness among microcredit 
borrowers of developing countries has attracted a growing interest among academics and 
come to be a major concern for industry stakeholders. Unfortunately, however, empirical 
literature that looks to assess the actual impact of multiple borrowing from the perspective of 
borrowers and literature covering the theoretical framework for multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness remain very limited. Most of the academic literature has mainly focused on 
assessing the impact of microcredit on borrowers’ wellbeing (Morvant-Roux et al., 2014) 
leaving the subject of multiple borrowing and its impact on over-indebtedness nearly 
untouched and limited to a few case studies (Vogelgesang, 2003; McIntosh et al., 2005; 
Krishnaswamy, 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Schicks & Rosenberg, 2011; Khandker et al., 2013). 
In what follows, we review the theoretical literature on the impact of competition among 
microfinance institutions on repayment performance and default in the context of microcredit 
markets of developing countries to indirectly infer the effect of multiple borrowing on over-
indebtedness and motivate our study theoretically.  
A growing theoretical literature on microfinance competition shows that competition among 
micro-lenders leads to an increase in borrowers’ over-indebtedness and default. One 
mechanism through which competition increases over-indebtedness and the default risk of 
borrowers is through multiple borrowing (Vogelgesang, 2003; McIntosh & Wydick, 2005; 
Casini, 2010; Guha & Chowdhury, 2013). In competitive microcredit markets where there is a 
problem of information asymmetry, borrowers can easily take multiple loans concealing their 
actual level of indebtedness. This makes proper risk assessment and pricing of 
uncollateralized lending difficult for lenders and ultimately lead to borrowers over-
indebtedness and default (Casini, 2010; Guha & Chowdhury, 2013).  
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In microcredit markets where the poor are provided with uncollateralized loans, information 
asymmetry over borrowers’ credit history is an important factor which influences enforcement 
costs, reputation effects, multiple borrowing and repayment performance (Hoff & Stiglitz, 
1997; McIntosh et al., 2005). Lenders overcome the problem of asymmetric information, 
simply defined as a situation where lenders lack both positive (information on total 
indebtedness of borrowers including whether borrowers have debts from other sources) and 
negative (information on defaulters) information on borrowers (McIntosh et al., 2005), and its 
effect on repayment performance by relying on inside reputation mechanisms (Vogelgesang, 
2003) and dynamic incentives (McIntosh & Wydick, 2005) emanating from a reciprocal 
borrower-lender relationships (Casini, 2010; Chen et al., 2010). On the borrower’s side, the 
expected future benefit of a continued access to credit from a lender creates a dynamic 
incentive and makes them repay their loan even when it is collateral-free (Hoff & Stiglitz, 
1997). This also creates an inside reputation mechanism where borrowers who repay on time 
and keep a long-term relationship with a lender get a better condition for their loans. At the 
same time, lenders also depend on borrowers’ timely repayment to avoid losses. This mutual 
interdependent borrower-lender relationship that ensures both parties discipline in the markets 
can, however, be gradually undermined as the levels of multiple borrowing increases in a 
competitive and crowded market (Casini, 2010; Chen et al., 2010). Such instances allow 
borrowers to increase their level of indebtedness and also default on a loan with one micro-
lender while still keeping their borrowing relationship with other micro-lenders and meeting 
their financial needs elsewhere (Chen et al., 2010). 
Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) highlight this limitation of the reputation effect in their theoretical 
model. Borrowers’ incentive to default on a loan increases with increasing number of lenders 
in a market as one lender’s reputation effect alone does not generate dynamic repayment 
incentives when borrowers have the choice to switch from one lender to another in a market 
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where there is no negative borrower information sharing. In general, their results suggest that 
a system of negative borrower information sharing should be in place to strengthen the 
dynamic incentives effect and prevent multiple borrowing. However, a system of negative 
borrower information sharing alone is not enough to strengthen dynamic incentives and 
reduce the incentives for multiple borrowing and default. The strength of the dynamic 
incentive effect on repayment and multiple borrowing is also influenced by borrowers’ 
present value of the continued future access to credit form a lender and positive borrower 
information asymmetry (McIntosh & Wydick, 2005).    
According to the theoretical model of McIntosh and Wydick (2005), dynamic incentives or in 
other words borrowers’ present value of the continued access to credit form a lender in the 
future are negatively related to borrowers’ rate of time preference. Impatient borrowers with 
high rate of time preference take multiple loans to get a larger loan size. They increase their 
loan size by borrowing multiple loans from different sources while lowering their overall 
borrowing cost by taking smaller loans separately and creating a false impression for lenders 
that they are borrowing only a fraction of their actual total borrowings (McIntosh & Wydick, 
2005). Since in this case money is fungible, multiple loans could be used for a more risky 
investment (Casini, 2010) or a consumption purpose (Guha & Chowdhury, 2013) without 
lenders awareness. In general, when there is an information asymmetry over borrowers’ 
indebtedness among competing lenders, such instances of multiple borrowing lead to an 
increase in total borrowing and indebtedness and ultimately raise borrowers expected default 
rate for the following reasons. Firstly, since multiple borrowing reduces overall borrowing 
costs of borrowers, total borrowing and indebtedness increases. Secondly, borrowers’ risk of 
default on a loan increases because the true probability of repayment no longer depends only 
on one lender’s own lending but also on other unknown amount of loan borrowed from 
elsewhere (McIntosh & Wydick, 2005). An important implication of their result is the need 
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for a central system of information sharing for both positive and negative borrowers’ credit 
history.  
Contrary to the theoretical reductive conceptualization of multiple borrowing as problem that 
results in over-indebtedness due to information asymmetry in microcredit markets, a recent 
theoretical study by Guha and Chowdhury (2014) shows that multiple borrowing does not 
necessarily reflect increased indebtedness and identified a positive aspect of multiple 
borrowing. Households take multiple borrowing for various reasons that are not related to 
over-indebtedness. For instance, households may take multiple loans to access a range of 
complementary credit products (Chen et al., 2010; Guérin, 2012; Wampfler et. al., 2014), to 
expand and diversify their social networks and reduce dependency on one credit source while 
maintaining creditworthiness with several credit sources (Guérin, 2012) or to cover expenses 
when faced with unexpected shocks (Schicks & Rosenberg, 2011). Guha and Chowdhury’s 
(2014) theoretical framework shows this complex reality of poor households financial 
management strategy using an example where poor borrowers take multiple loans from 
different sources without increasing overall borrowers indebtedness. Additionally, their 
results shows the potential positive effect of multiple borrowing where due to scarce fund 
available to micro-lenders leads them to coordinate and provide complementary credit 
products that are conditional on having a credit contract with another lender to fill in the large 
capital needed for a technological intensive project of the poor. In this case, with the presence 
of multiple borrowing, competition among micro-lenders will have a positive effect on 
borrower targeting and encourage lending to the poor. 
Empirical studies which have looked at multiple borrowing and its effect on over-
indebtedness also find evidences for both of the alternative views reflected in the theoretical 
literature. Though the endogeneity problem of multiple borrowing is not addressed in these 
empirical studies, few of them have found a positive correlation between multiple borrowing 
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and over-indebtedness. For instance, a qualitative exploratory study of the incidence of 
multiple borrowing in Bangladesh by Chaudhury and Matin, (2002) found a high level of 
multiple borrowing affecting all income groups equally while in terms of repayment 
performance households in the low income group were doing worse than the high income 
groups. This study also found that multiple borrowing was mainly distress driven even if 
some households also took loans in response to opportunities to invest in businesses. This 
indicates that the additional loans which are not used for productive purposes can potentially 
result in repayment problems. By the same token, a study by Vogelgesang (2003) which 
analyzes the effect of rapidly growing supply of microcredit and increasing competition in 
Bolivia affirmed that higher levels of indebtedness where many micro-borrowers 
simultaneously take multiple loans from several sources, corresponds with increasing 
competition and supply. Borrowers that took multiple loans from several sources at the same 
time were also found to be more likely to default than others. Moreover, late payments on a 
previous loan or on a prior instalment of a current loan were found to be highly significant 
predictors of defaulting on a loan in the future.  
Supporting the alternative view of multiple borrowing, other empirical studies have found that 
multiple borrowing does not necessarily reflect households’ struggle with debt repayment or 
over-indebtedness. For instance, an empirical study by Gonzalez (2008) on households’ over-
indebtedness in the portfolios of microfinance institutions found that over-indebtedness in 
Bolivia was not associated with multiple borrowing and that households can become over-
indebted just with one loan. Similarly, a study of micro-borrowers in Ghana showed that a 
high level of over-indebtedness occurred in an environment with a low level of multiple 
borrowing contradicting the notion of preventing over-indebtedness by reducing multiple 
borrowing and using credit bureaus (Schicks, 2014). Finally, using a longitudinal household 
survey data from Bangladesh, Khandker et al. (2013) found that while multiple borrowing 
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increased over-indebtedness in the short run, it reduced over-indebtedness in the long run by 
influencing the debt to asset ratio favorably. This reflects that multiple borrowing helped 
borrowers in Bangladesh to increase their assets more than their debt in the long run. 
In sum, this study aims at illuminating this ambiguity surrounding the effect of multiple 
borrowing on households’ over-indebtedness by empirically testing the assumption that taking 
multiple loans from several sources simultaneously leads households to accumulate excessive 
amount of debt and eventually become over-indebted. 
3.3 Data Description and Indicators 
As already discussed, we use data on 1582 rural households in Thailand and Vietnam from 
the “Vulnerability in Southeast Asia” - project funded by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG) for the period 2007 to 2011. The survey has been conducted annually with the 
exception of one-year gap between 2008 and 2010. The survey has collected data from 2200 
rural households from three provinces in Northeastern Thailand and another 2200 rural 
households from three provinces in the North Central Coast and Central Highland of Vietnam 
(Hardeweg, et al., 2012). The six provinces, namely Buriram, Ubon Ratchathani and Nakhon 
Phanom from Thailand, Ha Tinh, Thua Thien Hue and Dac Lac from Vietnam, were 
purposively selected targeting rural households either poor or those who are at risk of falling 
into poverty to meet the general objective of the project. After selecting the provinces, around 
220 villages were selected using a systematic random sampling based on a probability 
proportional to the size of the population. Finally, 10 households were sampled in each village 
by using again a systematic random sample with equal probability from household lists 
ordered by household size. Over the four waves, the attrition rate was very low that 4,205 
households were interviewed in 2010 in the six provinces and 1588 households were 
interviewed in 2011 taking two provinces from the two countries.  
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For the aim of our analysis, we focus on the two provinces, Ubon Ratchathani in Thailand and 
Thua Thien Hue in Vietnam, which were surveyed over the four waves, as it gives us longer 
observation to evaluate the dynamic interdependence of multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness. Furthermore, we restrict our sample to the 1582 households which were 
observed in each of the four waves, specifically 914 households from Ubon Ratchathani and 
668 households from Thua Thien Hue, as the econometric model used in this study requires 
the panel to be balanced. Hence, we have data set with a total sample size of 6328 observation 
in two countries. In particular, our data contains detailed information on households 
borrowing, loan defaults and arrears along with a full set of household level data such as 
households demographics, social and economic characteristics that is common in standard 
household surveys. This detailed data on financial situation of households allows us to 
quantify most of the common objective indicators of over-indebtedness used in the existing 
literature and indicators of multiple borrowing discussed below.  
Multiple borrowing can be defined as the practice of borrowing from different sources 
simultaneously (CGAP, 2012). However, that is a narrow definition of multiple borrowing as 
multiple borrowing can also take other several forms. According to Wampfler et. al. (2014), 
households take multiple loans from one financial institution, several financial institutions or 
both formal and informal credit sources simultaneously. Though it is not the usual type of 
multiple borrowing, households could take different microcredit products such as investment 
loans, education loans, working capital loans and the like from the same financial institution. 
Alternatively, they may take a loan from one lender to repay other outstanding loan from a 
different lender which inevitably leads to a debt build up, impoverishment and greater 
vulnerability. Finally, households may also take multiple loans from both formal and informal 
credit sources either as a substitution strategy for expensive sources, to overcome limitations 
of the formal credit supply or to serve different needs of households, for example using 
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informal sources for household expenditure while using the formal sources for investment 
purposes (Chen et al., 2010; Wampfler et. al., 2014). Taking all of these forms into account, a 
household is identified as a multiple borrower if the household has multiple active loans 
outstanding simultaneously regardless of the source of the loan.  
Though a growing attention has been recently devoted to households’ over-indebtedness in 
the microfinance and household finance literature, defining over-indebtedness is still not an 
easy task since there is no commonly accepted definition of household over-indebtedness yet. 
This lack of conceptual consensus on what constitutes over-indebtedness and how it ought to 
be measured is evident from the number of expressions, definitions and indicators that the 
academic literature uses to describe and measure it. For instance, May and Tudela (2005), 
who use financial difficulty to refer to over-indebtedness define it as a situation where 
“households’ flow of income is insufficient to meet their mortgage payments without placing 
excessive burden on the household”. Another study by Haas (2006), which emphasizes the 
link between poverty and over-indebtedness, interprets over-indebtedness as a situation where 
insufficient income makes household unable to repay back their debt in spite of reducing their 
living standard to pay back their debts. Del Rio and Young (2008), who instead use the 
subjective perception of households to define over-indebtedness, identify households who 
consider their unsecured debt to be a burden as over-indebted. Alternatively, a study by 
Disney et al., (2008) which uses households current arrear as an indicator, classify households 
as over-indebted “when they fall into arrears on at least one credit commitment”. Using 
another quantitative indicator, a recent study in Italy identified those households who have 
negative or slightly positive net wealth to be over-indebted (Giarda, 2013). The study by 
Schicks (2014), which focuses on over-indebtedness of microfinance clients’ from a customer 
protection point of view and takes borrowers experience into account, defines over-
indebtedness as a situation where a household “is continuously struggling to meet repayment 
 91 
 
deadlines and structurally has to make unduly high sacrifices related to his/her loan 
obligations”.  
Apparently, there is also a lack of distinction between the actual definition and indicator of 
over-indebtedness. At times, the studies explain the indicator used to measure over-
indebtedness as a definition and end up inaccurately classifying households into the over-
indebted and non-over-indebted groups (Schicks, 2010). Nevertheless, the indicators used to 
measure over-indebtedness both in developed and developing country context can be 
categorized into three models: the administrative model, the objective model and the 
subjective model (Betti et al., 2007). The administrative model considers legally bankrupt 
households as over-indebted relying on official or legal procedures of bankruptcy that is 
specific to a country. The objective indicators such as debt-to-income ratio, debt-service-cost 
ratio and debt-to-asset ratio which are based on quantitative data (Schicks, 2010; D’Alessio & 
Iezzi, 2013) compare either the stock or flow of debt to household income or assets and 
classify households whose ratio is above a threshold as over-indebted. Finally, the subjective 
indicators classify households as over-indebted based on subjective data which reflects the 
household perception of either their debt situation or as in the study by Schicks, (2014) the 
struggle and sacrifice related to their debt commitments. 
However, all of the over-indebtedness indicators mentioned above have certain limitations. 
The administrative indicators are limited by the fact that they only consider households who 
actually go through bankruptcy and default but not those who face sever debt burden and still 
manage to pay their debt by taking extreme measures. Additionally, its dependency on the 
judicial system of each country limits its usefulness for comparative studies such us ours. The 
objective indicators, especially the debt-ratio indicators’ major limitation relates to the 
difficulty of determining the critical level or threshold of indebtedness above which a 
household will be identified as over-indebted. The difficulty arises due to the fact that the 
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optimal level of indebtedness varies based on the household’s stage of the life cycle and 
household specific characteristics. As a result, there can be no single optimal level of 
indebtedness and, therefore, a threshold which can be used to identify households over-
indebtedness. Finally, as the subjective indicators are based on subjective data their limitation 
relates to the fact that what each household perceives as being excessive and burdensome may 
be affected by their subjective biases (Betti et al., 2007; Schicks & Rosenberg, 2011; 
D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). Hence, their usefulness in the context of comparing household 
over-indebtedness in between countries is limited.  
Considering these limitations of the indicators mentioned above, finding a single optimal 
measure that captures every aspect of over-indebtedness is difficult (for a detailed discussion 
on limitations of the over-indebtedness indicators, see Betti et al., 2007; Schicks & 
Rosenburg, 2011; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). Though all agree that there is no single optimal 
measure that captures true over-indebtedness, recent studies of over-indebtedness have tended 
to converge on a common set of indicators (D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). One of these common 
set of indicators of over-indebtedness is the debt-servicing-cost. The debt-service-cost 
indicator identifies households with high level of debt burden as over-indebted by setting a 
critical level or a threshold on debt repayments relative to income above which are thought to 
represent a high debt burden for households (D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). We also apply the 
debt-service-cost indicator with a 50 percent threshold commonly used in several studies 
(Disney et al., 2008; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). Hence, a household whose debt repayment per 
year takes more than 50 percent of income is identified as over-indebted. Though not yet used 
in a developing country context, these indicator has been applied in several studies that focus 
on developed consumer credit markets (Disney et al., 2008; Anioła & Gołaś, 2012; Keese, 
2012; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013). 
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3.4 The Relationship between Multiple Borrowing and Over-indebtedness 
in Thailand and Vietnam: Descriptive Results 
Based on the indicators discussed above, table 3.1 presents the distribution of multiple 
borrowing and over-indebted households in Ubon Ratchathani in Thailand and Thua Thien 
Hue in Vietnam over the five years period. The table reveals a high level of incidence of 
indebtedness in both countries, whereby 80 to 89 percent of the Thai households and 63 to 76 
percent of the Vietnamese households had at least taken one loan in our sample over the four 
waves. From the indebted households, 76% of the Thai households and 42% of the 
Vietnamese households had multiple borrowing while around 40% of the Thai households 
and 17% of the Vietnamese households were over-indebted on average over the period of 
2007 to 2011. Taking both formal and informal sources of loan into consideration, around 
62% of the Thai households and 32% of the Vietnamese households were cross-indebted 
among the indebted households. Over the five years period, the trends of both multiple 
borrowing and over-indebtedness initially increase and decline in 2010 from a relatively 
higher incidence in the previous periods and then again increase to a higher level in 2011 in 
Thailand, while in Vietnam the incidence of over-indebtedness declined and multiple 
borrowing increased more steadily and reached to a highest level in 2011. Comparing the 
extent of multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness between Thailand and Vietnam, table 3.1 
suggests a higher level of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing among Thai households 
than Vietnamese households respectively.  
Table 3.1: The Extent of Indebtedness, Over-Indebtedness and Multiple Borrowing among Households in 
Thailand and Vietnam from 2007 to 2011 
Country 
and 
Wave ID 
Indebted 
households 
(percent) 
Over-indebted, multiple borrowing and cross-indebted 
households (Percentage to total households) 
Over-indebted multiple borrowing and cross-
indebted household (Percentage to indebted 
households) 
Over-indebted 
Multiple 
borrowing 
Cross-indebted 
Over-indebted 
Multiple 
borrowing 
Cross-
indebted 
Thailand    
(914 HH) 
2007 86 40 65 59 46 75 69 
2008 89 48 79 65 54 88 72 
2010 79 18 50 40 23 64 50 
2011 84 30 65 49 35 78 58 
Vietnam      
(668 HH) 
2007 63 16 24 19 25 38 29 
2008 68 11 25 20 17 37 29 
2010 70 09 26 19 12 37 28 
2011 76 12 44 33 15 58 43 
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Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
Focusing on the degree of multiple borrowing, we found that households had parallel credit 
contracts ranging from 2 to 14 in Thailand and 2 to 9 in Vietnam. On average, indebted 
households were repaying on 2.94 and 1.68 credit contracts in Thailand and Vietnam 
respectively. Furthermore, having more than 3 credit contracts was very common that around 
42% of the households in Thailand and 11% of the households in Vietnam had 3 or more 
active loans on average over the four waves (see figure 3.1). As can be seen from figure 3.2, it 
is also evident that the problem of over-indebtedness is more frequent among multiple 
borrowing households. The percentage of over-indebted households increases with higher 
number of loans. For instance, among Thai households with a single loan, only 19% are over-
indebted compared to 74% of those who have six or more loans. Similarly, out of the 
Vietnamese households with a single loan, only 12% are over-indebted compared to 43% of 
those who have six or more loans. Such results have lead few recent studies to suggest using 
multiple borrowing as a proxy or an objective indicator for over-indebtedness (Disney et al., 
2008; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013; Schicks, 2014).   
Figure 3.1: Multiple Borrowings: Percentage of Households by the Number of Credit 
Contracts in Thailand and Vietnam, from 2007 to 2011 
 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
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Figure 3.2: Multiple Borrowing and Over-Indebtedness in Thailand and Vietnam 
 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
However, as can be seen in table 3.2, we find that the degree of overlap between multiple 
borrowing and over-indebtedness is quite imperfect both in Thailand and Vietnam over the 
period of 2007 to 2011. Out of the total households who had multiple borrowing, only 46% 
and 24% of them were over-indebted in Thailand and Vietnam. And from the over-indebted 
households, 89% and 61% of them had multiple borrowing in Thailand and Vietnam. This 
finding is however not surprising since households could also be over-indebted with a single 
loan or since taking multiple loans could be a perfectly manageable cash flow management 
strategy of households (Schicks & Rosenburg, 2011). Nevertheless, it is important to disprove 
the notion that multiple borrowing is just another way of measuring over-indebtedness before 
we begin to investigate their interdependency.  
Table 3.2: The Degree of Overlap Between Over-Indebtedness and Multiple Borrowing Over the Period of 
Five Years (2007 to 2011) 
Country 
  Multiple borrowing Over-indebtedness 
  No Yes No Yes 
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Over-
indebtedness 
No 89 54 - - 
Yes 11 46 - - 
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No - - 48 11 
Yes - - 52 89 
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Vietnam 
Over-
indebtedness 
No 93 76 - - 
Yes 7 24 - - 
Multiple 
borrowing 
No - - 75 39 
Yes - - 25 61 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
According to Devicienti and Poggi (2010), one way of doing that is to use a nonlinear Wald 
proportionality test on the coefficients of two separate probit models, one for over-
indebtedness using the debt-service-cost indicator and the other for multiple borrowing. If the 
two indicators are measuring the same underlying concept, then the coefficients of the two 
models will be the scaled versions of each other. Following Devicienti and Poggi (2010), we 
run two separate static probit models for multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness for each 
year and each country and carried out a nonlinear Wald test. The models included such 
explanatory variables as gender, age, education and marital status of the household head, 
household size, income quintile groups, type of occupation and shocks. In each case, the 
nonlinear Wald test rejected the null hypothesis that multiple borrowing is an alternative way 
of measuring over-indebtedness at least at the 5% level of statistical significance.   
Having disproved the notion that multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness are simply 
alternative ways of measuring the same underlying concept, one important question that 
remains to be answered is whether the probability of experiencing over-indebtedness in period 
𝑡 positively correlates with the probability of experiencing over-indebtedness in period 𝑡 + 1 
and having multiple borrowing 𝑡 + 1? To answer such questions and examine households’ 
dynamic experience of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing and the transition and 
cross-transitions probabilities from the two states, we shift our emphasis to the panel 
dimension of our dataset. Using the indicators discussed in the previous section, table 3.3 and 
3.4, provide information on the persistency of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing in 
the Thailand and Vietnam. In conformity with the literature, the percentage of households in 
both countries who experience over-indebtedness and have multiple borrowing in at least one 
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year over the four waves are higher than the cross-sectional incidence of over-indebtedness 
and multiple borrowing. In particular, 78% of Thai households and 34% of Vietnamese 
households in our sample were over-indebted in at least one year as compared to an average 
of 40% and 17% over the four years. And in the case of multiple borrowing, around 86% of 
Thai households and 60% of Vietnamese households in our sample had taken multiple loans 
simultaneously in at least one year as compared to an average of 62% and 32% over the four 
years. Considering all of the four waves, while around 6% and 39% of the Thai households 
were always over-indebted and had multiple borrowing respectively, only one household was 
always over-indebted and around 5% of the Vietnamese households had multiple borrowing 
over the four periods. These results suggest that over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing are 
more persistent for the Thai households than for the Vietnamese households. Nevertheless, it 
is evident that there is a steady entry into and out of the state of over-indebtedness and 
multiple borrowing so that the same households do not face over-indebtedness and multiple 
borrowing continuously in both countries. 
Table 3.3: Number of Years in Over-Indebtedness and Multiple Borrowing 
Country 
Number 
of Years 
Over-
indebted 
Multiple 
borrowing  
Thailand 
0 32 14 
1 26 11 
2 23 16 
3 13 20 
4 6 39 
Vietnam 
0 66 40 
1 23 25 
2 9 17 
3 2 13 
4 0 5 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
Though households do not face over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing continuously over 
the four periods, households who experience over-indebtedness or have multiple borrowing in 
the past seem to be more likely of experiencing over-indebtedness in the next period both in 
Thailand and Vietnam. As can be seen in table 3.4 under columns 4 and 6, the conditional 
probability of being over-indebted in the current period for a Thai household given that the 
household was not over-indebted in the previous period is 23% as compared to a 48% 
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conditional probability of being over-indebted in the current period given that the household 
was over-indebted in the previous period. Similarly, for a Vietnamese household the 
conditional probability of being over-indebted in the current year is 9% if the household was 
not over-indebted in the previous period, but the conditional probability will increase to 22% 
for those who were over-indebted in the previous period. The conditional probability of 
having multiple borrowing also shows a possible state dependence for both Thai and 
Vietnamese households with a higher jump (from 36% to 80% for Thailand and from 22% to 
61% for Vietnam) in the probability of having multiple borrowing for the households who had 
multiple borrowing in the previous period. 
Table 3.4: Probability of Experiencing Over-Indebtedness in Current Year, Conditional on Household’s 
Past Experience of Over-Indebtedness and Multiple Borrowing Status 
Indicators Year 𝑡 − 1 
Year 𝑡 
Thailand Vietnam 
No Yes No Yes 
Over-indebted (Over-indebted 𝑡 − 1) 
No 77 23 91 9 
Yes 52 48 78 22 
Multiple borrowing (Multiple borrowing  
𝑡 − 1) 
No 67 36 78 22 
Yes 20 80 39 61 
Over-indebted (Multiple borrowing  𝑡 − 1) 
No 83 17 92 8 
Yes 60 40 81 19 
Multiple borrowing (Over-indebted 𝑡 − 1) 
No 43 57 71 29 
Yes 22 78 52 48 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
In terms of the cross-state dependence between over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing, 
table 3.4 also shows a positive relationship between the previous states of multiple borrowing 
and over-indebtedness and the current state of the other. Specifically, while the probability of 
being over-indebted in the current year is 17% for the Thai households who did not have 
multiple borrowing in the previous period, it increases to 40% for those who had multiple 
borrowing in the previous period. For the Vietnamese households it follows the same pattern 
in that the conditional probability of being over-indebted is as twice as likely for the 
households who had multiple borrowing in the previous period. Likewise, the conditional 
probability of having multiple borrowing simultaneously in the current year is higher for 
households who were over-indebted in the previous period compared to those who were not 
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for both Thai and Vietnamese households. These results suggest that there is likely to be a 
positive cross-state dependence effect between multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness. 
However, the observed persistence of over-indebtedness showed in table 3.5 could be to some 
degree or even entirely due to household heterogeneity. For instance, the fourth row in table 
3.6 shows that the (unconditional) probability of being over-indebted is higher for those with 
a younger, male, married and more educated household heads and who are among the poorest 
income quintile groups in Thailand. Similarly, the (unconditional) probability of being over-
indebted is higher for Vietnamese households with a younger, male and married household 
heads and for those who are among the poorest income quintile groups. Therefore, even if 
over-indebtedness is truly not structurally persistent for both of the Thai and Vietnamese 
households in our sample, these observed heterogeneities would cause the group of 
households that were over-indebted in the previous period to have a higher aggregate 
probability of being over-indebted at the current period than those who were not over-
indebted.  
Table 3.5: Unconditional and Conditional Probabilities of Over-Indebtedness for Thai Households, from 
2008 to 2011 
 
Households 
(percent) 
Unconditional 
Not over-
indebted at 
t − 1 
Over-
indebted at 
t − 1 
Not a 
multiple 
borrower at 
t − 1 
Multiple 
borrower at 
t − 1 
All 100 31.87 23.20 47.83 16.77 40.17 
Age of HH head 
group 
Below 35 1 37.29 20.59 60 20.83 48.57 
35 - 45 15 34.89 25.72 50 15.63 42.77 
45 - 55 27 34.75 25.66 48.66 18.14 40.91 
55 - 65 29 33.02 22.93 50.36 19.55 40.55 
Above 65 28 25.47 20.22 39.70 14 35.82 
Female headed 
HH (%) 
Male 78 33.12 24.98 47.30 19.10 40.08 
Female 32 29.17 19.55 49.11 12.61 40.39 
Married HH 
head 
Single 21 28.18 18.05 50.27 12.24 39.76 
Married 79 32.87 24.69 47.25 18.29 40.27 
Education of HH 
head groups 
Illiterate and primary 
education 
86 30.90 21.99 47.48 15.94 39.52 
Secondary education 11 33.92 27.32 45.63 18.67 39.34 
Higher Education 3 56.34 50 65.52 40 65.22 
Occupation of 
HHH 
In-active 15 33.59 24.74 48.30 16.96 41.46 
Agricultural 56 31.37 20.69 50.52 13.58 38.95 
Off-farm 10 31.46 23.03 47.93 19.05 39.03 
Self-employed 19 26.11 19.73 42.86 15.34 35.48 
Income quintile 
Quintile 1 14 49.61 37.04 70.83 23.94 67.66 
Quintile 2 18 38.77 30.51 53.16 18.13 50.91 
Quintile 3 20 31.50 25.17 42.19 13.30 41.06 
Quintile 4 23 20.07 12.34 36.41 9.84 25.26 
Quintile 5 25 22.01 13.76 37.02 17.84 23.94 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
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Table 3.6: Unconditional and Conditional Probabilities of Over-Indebtedness for Vietnamese Households, 
from 2008 to 2011 
 
Households 
(percent) 
Unconditional 
Not over-
indebted at 
t − 1 
Over-
indebted at 
t − 1 
Not a 
multiple 
borrower at 
t − 1 
Multiple 
borrower at 
t − 1 
All 100 10.48 8.94 21.94 7.70 18.91 
Age of HH head 
group 
Below 35 9 10.46 8.78 20.59 7.43 27.03 
35 - 45 25 11.95 9.85 25.71 7.92 21.12 
45 - 55 29 9.56 8.15 22.64 7.35 14.72 
55 - 65 16 14.57 12.30 26 9.95 27.16 
Above 65 21 6.63 6.63 6.67 6.53 7.27 
Female headed 
HH (%) 
Male 79 10.75 9.24 21.65 7.81 18.82 
Female 21 9.42 7.82 23.26 7.31 19.44 
Married HH 
head 
Single 17 8.96 7.74 19.44 6.60 20.69 
Married 83 10.80 9.20 22.39 7.96 18.68 
Education of HH 
head groups 
Illiterate  18 7.89 6.21 24.24 15.94 39.52 
Primary education 43 11.81 10.41 21.90 18.67 39.34 
Secondary and 
Higher education 
39 10.19 8.60 21.21 40 65.22 
Occupation of 
HHH 
In-active 7 11.08 9.52 21.79 8.43 19.21 
Agricultural 60 12 8.99 36.36 7.19 22.95 
Off-farm 10 8.57 7.60 17.02 5.31 18.10 
Self-employed 23 9.02 8.18 16.64 9.62 5.56 
Income quintile 
Quintile 1 14 23.40 20.34 46.15 18.91 46.30 
Quintile 2 17 14.29 12.58 23.73 9.76 27.55 
Quintile 3 18 8.31 6.94 18.37 5.03 19.78 
Quintile 4 22 5.63 4.72 13.33 3.62 10.66 
Quintile 5 29 4.40 3.66 11.11 2.79 8.33 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
Furthermore, taking the various characteristics of households into consideration, table 3.5 and 
3.6 present the over-indebtedness probabilities, both unconditional and conditional on being 
over-indebted and having multiple borrowing in the previous period for Thai and Vietnamese 
households in our sample. Comparing the conditional probabilities in column 5 and 6 of table 
3.5 and 3.6 revel that there is a difference between the probabilities of being over-indebted 
conditional on the status of over-indebtedness in the previous period within all subgroups. For 
instance, the conditional probability of being over-indebted for both Thai and Vietnamese 
households that were over-indebted in the previous period are as twice as likely to be over-
indebted compared to the those who were not over-indebted in the previous period (70% as 
compared to 37% for Thai households and 46% as compared to 20% for Vietnam 
households). Likewise, the aggregate cross-persistency that we saw in table 3.4 is also 
confirmed for all of the subgroups of households in Thailand and Vietnam where each 
subgroup is at least twice as likely to be over-indebted if they had a multiple borrowing in the 
previous period compared to those who did not have multiple borrowing previously.  
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Conditional probabilities, however, cannot be taken at face value because the observed 
persistency of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing in both countries could also be 
driven by the unobserved heterogeneity of households which are not controlled for in the 
conditional probability matrixes instead of a genuine state dependence effect. Therefore, we 
use the dynamic random effects bivariate probit model, which will be explained in the 
following section, to distinguish between these two effects by including a number of 
explanatory variables to control for households heterogeneity. 
3.5 An Econometric Model for the Interdependent Dynamics of Multiple 
Borrowing and Over-Indebtedness 
To study the described relationship between multiple borrowing and being over-indebted 
among Thai and Vietnamese households, we use a dynamic random-effect bivariate probit 
model that allows a spillover effect between the two states. This model was selected because 
it allows us to test whether each of the states have a true influence on future values of the 
outcomes — e.g. being a multiple borrower in the past having an effect on current over-
indebtedness. As a first-order Markov chain model, it allows the state dependence of multiple 
borrowing and over-indebtedness and the cross-state dependence effects between the two 
states while allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity and accounting for the initial 
conditions.  
In the next subsection, we first focus on the model specification. Most of the discussion on the 
model follows Devicienti and Poggi (2010), Alessie et al. (2004) and Stewart (2007). We 
adopt Devicienti and Poggi’s (2010) model specification for poverty and social exclusion 
which follows the approach proposed by Wooldridge (2005) in treating the initial conditions 
problem and formulate our dynamic random effect bivariate probit model for interrelated 
dynamics of multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness as follows. 
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3.5.1 Dynamic random-effect bivariate probit model 
For a household 𝑖, the propensity to be over-indebted at time 𝑡 is expressed in terms of latent 
variable 𝑦1𝑖𝑡
∗  as specified in equation (1), while the propensity to have multiple borrowing at 
time 𝑡 is expressed in terms of latent variable 𝑦2𝑖𝑡
∗  as specified in equation (2). 
𝑦1𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥1𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1 + 𝑦1𝑖𝑡−1𝛾11 + 𝑦2𝑖𝑡−1𝛾12 + 𝑐1𝑖 + 𝑢1𝑖𝑡      (1) 
𝑦2𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥2𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2 + 𝑦1𝑖𝑡−1𝛾21 + 𝑦2𝑖𝑡−1𝛾22 + 𝑐2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑖𝑡        (2) 
𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 1[𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0] 𝑗 = 1,2 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇        (3) 
The two binary dependent variables indicate a specific state a household is at, 𝑦1𝑖𝑡 equal to 
one if the household is over-indebted in 𝑡, and zero otherwise; 𝑦2𝑖𝑡 equal to one if household 𝑖 
has multiple borrowing in 𝑡, and zero otherwise. In equation (1) and (2), the vector 𝑥 includes 
the observed explanatory variables such as household’s socio-demographic and economic 
characteristics that are assumed to be strictly exogenous and are kept the same in both 
equations. The vectors 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the analogous parameters to be estimated showing for 
instance how economic factors such as households level of income and shocks influence the 
probability of becoming over-indebted or taking multiple loans. We assume here that, the 
error terms 𝑢1𝑖𝑡 and  𝑢2𝑖𝑡 are serially independent and follow a bivariate normal distribution, 
with zero means, unit variances and cross-equation covariance 𝜌. 𝑐1𝑖  and 𝑐2𝑖  represent the 
unobserved time-invariant household specific random effects which are assumed also to be 
bivariate normal with variances 𝜎𝑐1
2  and 𝜎𝑐2
2  and covariance 𝜎𝑐1𝜎𝑐2𝜌𝑐 . 𝑐1𝑖  and 𝑐2𝑖  capture 
unobserved households characteristics that remain constant over time, like financial literacy, 
debt perception, time preference or household’s ability. We also assume that (𝑐1𝑖 , 𝑐2𝑖) , 
(𝑢1𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢2𝑖𝑡; 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇)  and (𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇)  are independent (implying that 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is strictly 
exogenous). 
An important aspect of the dynamic random effects bivariate probit model is that it explicitly 
accounts for the effect of being at a specific state in year 𝑡 − 1 and the dependence of each 
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state on the previous outcome of the other state, specifically the state dependence and cross-
state dependence effects, by including the lag of the dependent variables, 𝑦1𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑦2𝑖𝑡−1, as 
specified in equation (1) and (2). Hence, the model allows us to establish the casual effect of 
having multiple borrowing in the past on current multiple borrowings and over-indebtedness 
of households and vice versa after accounting for the effect of household’s unobserved 
heterogeneity using the bivariate model specified above. If the unobserved households’ 
heterogeneity is not controlled for, the true state dependence would be overestimated due to 
the spurious state dependence effect. 
To account for the cross-state dependence effect between borrowing from multiple sources 
and over-indebtedness, the model includes cross-lagged variables among the explanatory 
variables: lagged multiple borrowing 𝑦2𝑖𝑡−1 is included in the over-indebtedness equation and 
lagged over-indebtedness 𝑦1𝑖𝑡−1 is included in the multiple borrowing equation. This allows 
as to determine whether the observed correlation between borrowing from multiple sources 
and being over-indebted is due to spurious state dependence, i.e. correlated unobserved 
heterogeneity (𝜌𝑐 ≠ 0), or a true cross-state dependence where 𝛾12 and 𝛾21 are not equal to 
zero given the unobserved heterogeneity.    
However, there are special cases where one would not need the bivariate models specified 
above to identify the interdependency between the two outcomes (Alessie et al., 2004;  
Stewart, 2007). If 𝛾12 = 0, equation (1) for household’s over-indebtedness would exclude the 
lagged dummy for multiple borrowing. Then, equation (1) can be considered by itself and the 
rest of the parameters can be estimated consistently using the standard univariate random-
effect dynamic probit model (Stewart, 2007; Devicienti & Poggi, 2010). Another special case 
where equation (1) can be considered by itself is when 𝛾12 ≠ 0, but the error terms and the 
random effects of equation  (1) and (2) are independent (𝜌 = 𝜌𝑐 = 0). In which case, the 
standard univariate random-effect dynamic probit model can again estimate the parameters 
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consistently treating 𝑦2𝑖𝑡−1 as a weakly exogenous regressor (Stewart, 2007; Devicienti & 
Poggi, 2010). With the exception of such special cases, the joint estimation of the first three 
models is necessary to get consistent estimates of the parameters. 
3.5.2 Initial conditions and estimation 
One important issue in estimating the dynamic random effect bivariate probit model which is 
well established in the literature is the treatment of the initial conditions. The problem of the 
initial conditions arises because the beginning of the observation period does not usually 
coincide with the period where households begin to experience the outcome, in this case 
multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness (Heckman, 1981a). Therefore, to consistently 
estimate such a model, we need to make additional assumptions concerning the relationship of 
the initial observations, 𝑦1𝑖1 and 𝑦2𝑖1, and the unobserved time-invariant household effect. We 
could either assume that the initial conditions are exogenous or correlated with unobserved 
household-specific effect, 𝑐1𝑖  and 𝑐2𝑖 . The exogeneity assumption is valid only if the 
stochastic process that generates the outcomes is serially independent and if a truly new 
process is observed at the beginning of the sample (Hsiao, 2003). In that case, the standard 
random effects bivariate probit model can be used by splitting up the likelihood into four 
factors and maximizing the joint probability for t=2,…,T without taking the first year into 
account. However, here the process of household over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing 
are most likely not observed for each household from the beginning. Therefore, the initial 
observations 𝑦1𝑖1  and 𝑦2𝑖1  are more likely to be endogenous and correlated with the 
unobserved time-invariant household effects, 𝑐1𝑖  and 𝑐2𝑖 . Hence, the estimation of simple 
models such as the standard random effects bivariate probit model will overestimate the state 
dependence. 
To address the problem of initial conditions and estimate the model, we adopt the strategy 
suggested by Devicienti and Poggi (2010) which extends the simple approach proposed by 
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Wooldridge (2005) to the bivariate case. That is, a Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CLM) 
estimator which consider the distribution conditional on the initial values and the observed 
history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables (Wooldrige, 2005). In the case of the 
bivariate probit model, Devicienti and Poggi (2010) specify the individual specific effects 𝑐1𝑖 
and 𝑐2𝑖  given the initial conditions, which in our case are the over-indebtedness initial 
condition 𝑦1𝑖1  and the multiple borrowing initial condition 𝑦2𝑖1 , and the time-constant 
explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖, as follows:  
𝑐1𝑖 = 𝑎10 + 𝑎11𝑦1𝑖1 + 𝑎12𝑦2𝑖1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑎13 + 𝛼1𝑖                (4) 
𝑐2𝑖 = 𝑎20 + 𝑎21𝑦2𝑖1 + 𝑎22𝑦2𝑖1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑎23 + 𝛼2𝑖              (5) 
where 𝑎𝑗0, 𝑎𝑗1, 𝑎𝑗2 and 𝑎𝑗3 (𝑗 = 1, 2) are parameters to be estimated, (𝛼1𝑖 , 𝛼2𝑖) are normally 
distributed with covariance matrix 𝛴𝛼:  
𝛴𝛼 = (
𝜎𝛼1
2     𝜎𝛼1
2 𝜎𝛼2
2 𝜌𝑐
  .               𝜎𝛼2
2  
) 
Inserting equation (4) and (5) in model (1) and (2) gives us:  
𝑦1𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥1𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1 + 𝑦1𝑖𝑡−1𝛾11 + 𝑦2𝑖𝑡−1𝛾12 + 𝑎10 + 𝑎11𝑦1𝑖1 + 𝑎12𝑦2𝑖1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑎13 + 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝑢1𝑖𝑡     (6) 
𝑦2𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥2𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2 + 𝑦1𝑖𝑡−1𝛾21 + 𝑦2𝑖𝑡−1𝛾22 + 𝑎20 + 𝑎21𝑦2𝑖1 + 𝑎22𝑦2𝑖1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑎23 + 𝛼2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑖𝑡  (7) 
Following Devicienti and Poggi (2010), the model parameters are consistently estimated 
using Conditional Maximum Simulated Likelihood methods where a household 𝑖 ’s 
contribution to the likelihood can be specified as follows: 
𝐿𝑤 = ∫ ∫ ∏Ф2(𝑦 1𝑖𝑡𝜇1𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦 2𝑖𝑡𝜇2𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦 1𝑖𝑡  𝑦 2𝑖𝑡  𝜌|𝑦1𝑡−1, 𝑦2𝑡−1…𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑥𝑖  )
𝑇
𝑡=1
+∞
−∞
+∞
−∞
g(𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛴𝛼)𝑑𝛼1𝑖𝑑𝛼2𝑖  (8) 
Where 𝜇1𝑖𝑡 and 𝜇2𝑖𝑡 are the right hand side of equations (6) and (7) without the error terms 
𝑢1𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢2𝑖𝑡, 𝑦 𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 2𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 − 1 for 𝑗 = 1,2 and g(. ) represents the  bivariate normal density. 
Lastly, as the model of Devicienti’s and Poggi’s (2010) treatment of the initial conditions 
follows the approach proposed by Wooldridge (2005), their bivariate model also needs to be 
estimated using a balanced panel data. This usually raises the question of potentially 
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increasing the attrition and sample selection bias in the data. However, Devicienti and Poggi 
(2010) argue that the approach of Wooldridge (2005) rather has an advantage in handling 
attrition and selection problems. Specifically, Wooldridge’s approach allows attrition and 
selection to depend on the initial conditions. Hence, households with different initial over-
indebtedness and multiple borrowing statuses are allowed to have different probabilities for 
missing data. Accordingly, their model also accounts for selection and attrition problem 
without directly modeling them as a function of the initial conditions. In any case, attrition 
bias is not much of a concern in our dataset as the attrition over the four waves was 1.1 
percent.   
3.6 Empirical Results 
In table 3.7, we present the estimation results of the dynamic random effects bivariate probit 
model for the dynamic interdependency between over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing 
which controls for both observed and unobserved household heterogeneity both for Thai and 
Vietnamese households. Using the indicator of multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness 
discussed in section 3.3, we run separate models for Thailand and Vietnam including the same 
set of explanatory variables for both countries in each model in addition to the previous period 
and initial period status of the two dependent variables. The explanatory variables include 
basic set of household level variables including age (household head aged below 34, 34 - 44, 
44 - 54, 54 - 65, 65 and above), gender, household head level of education (primary, 
secondary and higher education), marital status, number of children, household size, main 
occupation of household head (inactive, agricultural, off-farm employed and self-employed), 
income quintiles and type of shock experienced households experienced (unexpected shock to 
expenses, expected shocks to expenses and unexpected shocks to income). Longitudinal 
averages are also included in the model to allow for the correlation between household 
specific effects and the time-varying variables, specifically number of children and household 
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size (See table 3.1 for descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables). Additionally, year 
dummies are included in each equation to control for macro-economic shocks and time trends. 
While there are other factors that drive household over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing, 
we only control for these set of explanatory variables in order to not further complicate the 
model estimation which is already computationally demanding. Furthermore, the focus of the 
study mainly lies on the interrelated dynamics of multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness 
and not on the explanatory variables included in the model. Nevertheless, as the model 
controls for both correlated and uncorrelated household heterogeneity, omitted variable bias 
will not be an issue in the estimation (Devicienti & Poggi, 2010).  
In the next section, we first present the results of the true state dependence and cross-state 
dependences effects of multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness which are indicated by the 
estimates of the lagged indicators of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing. The 
discussion on the cross-state dependence effect between multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness will provide an evidence for whether multiple borrowing enables households to 
accumulate excessive amount of debt and lead them to over-indebtedness in the future or 
whether over-indebted households take additional loan to repay back old debts and fall into 
debt trap. Finally, we will briefly discuss the results of the unobserved household 
heterogeneity and its correlations.  
3.6.1 Over-indebtedness  
Columns (1) and (5) in table 3.7 present results of the over-indebtedness equations. As 
expected, the results reveal that taking multiple borrowing in the past is strongly associated 
with the risk of becoming over-indebted in the future for Thai households as indicated by the 
positive significant effect of the cross lagged multiple borrowing status at 𝑡 − 1  after 
controlling for (correlated) unobserved heterogeneity. Similarly, being over-indebted in the 
previous period positively increases household’s likelihood of becoming over-indebted in the 
 108 
 
future for Thai households as indicated by the positive significant effect of over-indebtedness 
status at 𝑡 − 1 . To assess the magnitude of these effects, the transition probabilities of 
household’s over-indebtedness and the associated average partial effect (APE) and predicted 
probability ratio (PPR) have been calculated for over-indebtedness by conditioning on the 
multiple borrowing status at 𝑡 − 1  and the over-indebtedness status at 𝑡 − 1  for both 
estimations presented in table 3.7. First, the transition probabilities of over-indebtedness were 
calculated for each household in the sample based on estimates of counterfactual outcome 
probabilities taking the multiple borrowing status at 𝑡 − 1 and the over-indebtedness status at 
𝑡 − 1 as fixed at 0 and fixed at 1 and then averaging each probability over all households. 
Secondly, the associated average partial effect was calculated by taking the difference 
between these two probabilities (APE = ?̂?1 − ?̂?0 ), while the predicted probability ratio was 
calculated by taking their ratio (𝑃𝑃𝑅 = ?̂?1 ?̂?0⁄ ) (Stewart, 2007).  
Table 3.7: Dynamic Random Effects Bivariate Probit Model for Thai and Vietnamese Households 
Probability of Being Over-Indebted and Having Multiple Borrowing (Wooldrige’s Estimator)  
 
Thailand Vietnam 
Over-indebtedness Multiple borrowing Over-indebtedness Multiple borrowing 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Multiple borrowing at (𝑡 − 1) 0.507** 0.111 0.944** 0.083 0.151 0.104 0.521** 0.0976 
Over-indebted at (𝑡 − 1) 0.147* 0.092 0.0244 0.096 0.0653 0.127 -0.0098 0.113 
Multiple borrowing status initial 
year (t = 1) 
0.472** 0.106 0.963** 0.083 0.367** 0.106 0.495** 0.0977 
Over-indebted status initial year 
(t = 1) 
0.577** 0.091 0.219** 0.075 0.448** 0.116 0.339** 0.107 
Age of HH head below 35 
-0.145 
0.234 -0.646** 0.226 -0.229 0.181 -0.206 0.158 
Age of HH head 45-54 
-0.0968 
0.118 -0.262** 0.113 -0.0889 0.164 0.0852 0.135 
age of HH head 55-64 
-0.0223 
0.098 -0.440** 0.089 0.146 0.153 -0.0453 0.124 
age of HH head above 65 -0.196 0.094 -0.631** 0.085 -0.299 0.158 -0.382** 0.132 
Female HH head -0.180* 0.083 -0.223** 0.075 0.0729 0.152 -0.00815 0.127 
married HH head -0.0212 0.099 -0.207** 0.088 0.413** 0.170 0.312* 0.144 
No of Children (0-14) -0.00703 0.090 0.0359 0.089 0.150 0.116 0.0102 0.089 
Household size 0.0304 0.074 0.0264 0.071 -0.0557 0.078 0.0162 0.056 
Ilitrate and primary education -1.329** 0.198 0.339 0.186 -0.510** 0.222 -0.286 0.188 
Secondary education -1.041** 0.209 0.412* 0.202 -0.432* 0.217 -0.380* 0.183 
Agricultural HH 0.0940 0.109 0.119 0.104 -0.379** 0.150 0.105 0.127 
Off-farm employed HH 0.00569 0.123 -0.0569 0.117 -0.397** 0.161 0.135 0.135 
Inactive HH 0.136 0.142 0.0951 0.132 -0.102 0.231 0.00423 0.204 
Income quintile 1 1.336** 0.119 -0.197* 0.100 1.686** 0.160 -0.226 0.130 
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Income quintile 2 0.845** 0.107 0.00529 0.097 1.078** 0.154 0.0766 0.116 
Income quintile 3 0.599** 0.103 0.110 0.094 1.078** 0.153 -0.00220 0.108 
Income quintile 4 0.0688 0.100 0.0664 0.091 0.651** 0.154 0.104 0.102 
Unexpected shocks to expenses 0.0151 0.063 -0.00805 0.061 0.100 0.086 0.0861 0.071 
Expected shocks to expenses 0.0540 0.101 -0.166 0.101 0.174 0.143 0.312** 0.118 
Unexpected shocks to income 0.0990 0.066 0.185** 0.064 -0.0516 0.095 0.108 0.077 
Longitudinal average of children 
(0-14) 
0.0136 0.103 -0.0443 0.101 0.146 0.127 0.0715 0.099 
Longitudinal average of 
household size 
-0.127 0.079 0.0419 0.075 -0.217 0.085 -0.0183 0.063 
2008 0.486** 0.086 0.573** 0.087 -0.221* 0.112 -0.712** 0.093 
2010 -0.708** 0.086 -0.939** 0.085 -0.254** 0.105 -0.675** 0.083 
Constant -0.911** 0.270 2.00 0.247 -2.227** 0.339 -0.41 0.284 
ρ 0.502** 0.073   0.462** 0.073   
σc1 0.694** 0.096   0.499** 0.114   
σc2 0.533** 0.118   0.684** 0.083   
ρc 0.762** 2.323   1.544* 0.222   
Log likelihood -2454.22    -1528.74    
APE of multiple borrowing at 
(t − 1): p̂1 − p̂0 
14  28  1.51  20  
PPR multiple borrowing at 
(t − 1): p̂1 p̂0⁄  
1.86  1.53  1.40  2.16  
APE of over-indebtedness at 
(t − 1): p̂1 − p̂0 
4  0.55  0.64  -0.32  
PPR over-indebtedness at (t −
1): p̂1 p̂0⁄  
1.18  1.01  1.15  0.98  
No. of Observations 2742  2742  2004  2004  
***  1%, **  5%, *  10% levels of significance 
Notes: 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. ?̂?0, ?̂?1: predicted probabilities of household’s over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing  at t given over-indebtedness status at t- 1, respectively. 
3. APE: average partial effect; PPR: predicted probability ratio. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2007 to 2011. 
According to the APE of having multiple borrowing at 𝑡 − 1 , Thai households that had 
multiple borrowing at 𝑡 − 1 face a risk of becoming over-indebted in the future by around 14 
percentage points higher than the households that did not have multiple borrowing at  𝑡 − 1. 
Evidently, controlling for observed and unobserved household heterogeneity in the estimation 
reduced the conditional probabilities of experiencing over-indebtedness by about a half 
compared to the raw probabilities reported in the descriptive section for Thai households. 
According to the PPRs, Thai households that did not take multiple borrowings at 𝑡 − 1 would 
be around 2 times more likely to be over-indebted at 𝑡 had they taken multiple loans from 
several sources at the same time at 𝑡 − 1 according to the predicted probability ratio. This 
positive dynamic spillover effect of multiple borrowing suggests that regardless of the 
purpose of taking a multiple loan, be it in response to a distress or opportunity, having 
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multiple borrowings at the same time makes households more likely to face the risk of over-
indebtedness. Similarly, the state dependence effect of over-indebtedness explains an increase 
in the over-indebtedness risk of 4 percentage points for Thai households. Given their observed 
and unobserved set of characteristics, Thai households that were not over-indebted at 𝑡 − 1 
would be 1.2 times more likely to be over-indebted in period 𝑡 had they been over-indebted at 
𝑡 − 1 given their observed and unobserved set of characteristics.  
In contrast to the findings for Thailand, estimates of the corresponding dynamic random-
effects bivariate probit model for Vietnamese households’ reveals that having multiple 
borrowing at  𝑡 − 1 or being over-indebted at 𝑡 − 1 does not significantly affect households’ 
probability of becoming over-indebted in the future.  This result is, however, not so surprising 
as these two countries differ on the level of financial depth, credit outreach and the number of 
credit programs introduced in rural areas. While the Vietnamese government began to 
introduce and support formal financial intermediaries in rural areas such as Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) 
around the early 1990s (Dufhues et al., 2004), the Thai government introduced such financial 
institutions as early as mid-1970s by supporting homegrown non-bank financial institutions 
and promoting the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) into rural 
development bank (Menkhoff & Suwanaporn, 2007; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). 
The institutions introduced by Thai government have enhanced access to financial services 
particularly for households in the non-municipal areas of Thailand. Some argue that such 
government interventions in Thailand have shifted poor households’ attitudes towards 
indebtedness. For instance, Siripanyawat et al. (2010) reports that some households have 
begun to perceive being indebted as a norm and deem not paying back their loan on time 
acceptable as it was funded by the government. In contrast, Vietnam’s rural credit market 
shows a better performance in terms of high level of loan repayment. For instance, the ratio of 
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loans in arrears to total outstanding loans to farmers was 0.98 percent for VBARD in 
Vietnam, while it was 13.5 percent for BAAC in Thailand in 2001 (Okae, 2009). The sound 
performance of the Vietnam’s rural financial institutions and the low level of default have 
been explained by the strong reliance of the financial institutions on the customary rules of 
behavior in rural communities. Especially, the fact that the whole rural community 
participates in social activities together and assume the role of a loan monitoring system, puts 
pressure on households to repay their debt on time in order to avoid economic and social 
sanctions from others (Okae, 2009). Therefore, one can expect household over-indebtedness 
and multiple borrowing to be a bigger problem among Thai households than among 
Vietnamese households.   
Finally, as for the control variables, we find that for Thai households having a male and 
higher educated household head and belonging to lower income groups influences their 
propensity to become over-indebted. While in Vietnam, the risk of facing over-indebtedness 
is influenced by marital and educational status of household head, major source of income and 
households level of income. 
3.6.2 Multiple Borrowing 
As can be seen, from the results of the multiple borrowing equations presented in Columns (2) 
and (6) in table 3.7, we find a positive significant true state dependence effect of multiple 
borrowing for both Thai and Vietnamese households as expected. In terms of the APE 
estimated by the model as explained in the previous section, both Thai and Vietnamese 
households who had taken multiple loans at 𝑡 − 1 were more likely to take multiple loans in 
the future by around 28 and 20 percentage points, respectively, than those households that did 
not have multiple borrowing at 𝑡 − 1. Households that did not take multiple borrowing would 
be around 2 times more likely to take multiple borrowing in period 𝑡 had they had multiple 
borrowing at 𝑡 − 1 in both Thailand and Vietnam. This could mean that certain households in 
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Thailand and Vietnam are either persistently engaged in juggling debt from several sources as 
a way of managing their finances or are cote up in cyclical debt trap where they are simply 
refinancing or turning-over existing loans that are ultimately unpayable. 
Regarding the cross-state dependence effect of over-indebtedness on multiple borrowing, we 
find that being over-indebted in the previous period does not influences households 
probability of taking multiple loans simultaneously in both Thailand and Vietnam. While 
households both in Thailand and Vietnam report of taking additional loans to pay back old 
debts, the result suggests no significant spillover effect from multiple borrowing to over-
indebtedness. This reflects micro-lenders ability to effectively screen risky borrowers in terms 
of repayment capacity and level of indebtedness both in Thailand and Vietnam which 
prevents over-indebted borrowers from taking on additional borrowing once they pass the 
point where they can meet debt service payments without serious difficulty.  
As for the control variables, we find that for Thai households having a male, middle aged and 
higher educated household head and belonging to the higher income groups and facing 
unexpected shocks to income influences their propensity to take multiple borrowing. While in 
Vietnam, household’s probability of taking multiple borrowing is influenced by the age and 
marital status of household head and household’s level of income and facing expected shocks 
to expenses.    
To sum up, the results so far suggest that both multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness to 
be persistent and dynamically interrelated for Thai households but not for Vietnamese 
households. Furthermore, the estimates of the state dependence and cross-state dependence 
effect of both outcomes from the dynamic random effect bivariate model have shown that 
observed raw conditional probabilities and positive correlations between over-indebtedness 
and multiple borrowing is not entirely explained by a true state dependence effect after 
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controlling observed and unobserved households heterogeneity. The next step is to look at the 
persistency of over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing that is unexplained by observed 
households characteristics and true state dependence effect.   
3.6.3 Spurious state dependence effect on the persistency of multiple borrowing 
and over-indebtedness    
The estimated standard deviations of time-invariant household specific random effects and the 
correlations between the time-invariant household specific effects and the error terms of the 
two outcome equations are presented at the bottom of table 3.7. Confirming the significance 
of controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity in our analysis, we find that the 
standard deviations of the household specific random effects are statistically significant at a 5 
percent significance level in both models for Thailand and Vietnam. For both Thai and 
Vietnamese households, we find that variance of household’s unobserved heterogeneity 
significantly explains both household’s probability of becoming over-indebted and 
household’s propensity to take multiple loans simultaneously. This shows that such 
unobserved households characteristics as financial literacy, debt perception or time preference 
might influences either household’s propensity to become over-indebted or take multiple 
loans at the same time and therefore should be controlled for.  
Furthermore, we find that these unobserved factors that drive multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness and the error terms are significantly correlated. Unobserved factors that drive 
multiple borrowing are positively associated with those that drive over-indebtedness in both 
Thailand and Vietnam. Similarly, the error terms of the two equations are positively 
significantly correlated with an estimated coefficient of about 0.5 for Thailand and 0.46 for 
Vietnam. As discussed in section 3.5, the significance of these correlations implies that 
multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness should be jointly estimated. Regarding the 
exogeneity of the initial conditions, the results indicate that the initial conditions of both over-
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indebtedness and multiple borrowing are positively correlated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity and therefore, the exogeneity assumptions of the initial conditions can be 
rejected for both outcomes in both countries’ models.  
3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper studies the dynamics of rural household’s over-indebtedness and the role that 
multiple borrowing plays using data from the Vulnerability in Southeast Asia project in 
Thailand and Vietnam for the period 2007 to 2011. To uncover the true dynamic 
interdependency between multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness, the dynamic random 
effect bivariate probit model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions 
is estimated considering the potential endogeneity of multiple borrowing and over-
indebtedness by allowing for spillover effects and correlation of random effects across 
multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness.  
Results indicate that taking multiple borrowing concurrently increases household’s likelihood 
of facing the risk of over-indebtedness by about 14 percentage points for Thai households. 
Given their observed and unobserved set of characteristics, Thai households that did not take 
multiple borrowings previously would be around 2 times more likely to be over-indebted had 
they taken multiple loans concurrently. By contrast, we find that this effect is not significant 
for Vietnamese households in our sample. Moreover, we do not find a significant dynamic 
spillover effect of over-indebtedness on multiple borrowing in both Thailand and Vietnam. 
This suggests that while multiple borrowing households face a higher risk of over-
indebtedness because multiple borrowing enables them to accumulate excessive amounts of 
debt beyond the point which they would face a serious difficulty in meeting debt service 
payments, over-indebtedness does not lead households to refinance or recycle ultimately 
unpayable debts. The findings also suggest over-indebtedness and multiple borrowing to be 
more of a persistent problem for both households in Thailand and Vietnam which are 
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explained in part by true state dependence effects. Finally, unobserved household 
heterogeneity was also found to be empirically significant, explaining about half of the 
unsystematic variation in the model and signifying that it should be controlled for. The 
significant positive correlation between the unobserved factors driving multiple borrowing 
and over-indebtedness further showed the need for the joint estimation of the two processes.  
Turning to the main policy implication of the study, the result on the spillover effect of 
multiple borrowing on household’s risk of over-indebtedness in Thailand suggests that 
industry stakeholders and policy makers should give more emphasis to the problem of 
multiple borrowing and take measures to protect micro-borrowers from taking multiple loans 
and ultimately becoming over-indebted. To this end, potential measures include cautiously 
lending to households with multiple borrowing, increasing information sharing among 
financial institutions on credit history and repayment performance of borrowers, improving 
financial education of households and financial advice to borrowers of the potential risk of 
multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness. Furthermore, the dynamic spillover effect of 
multiple borrowing on household’s risk of over-indebtedness also reflects that preventive 
measures that focus on reducing multiple borrowing among micro-borrowers can reduce the 
problem of over-indebtedness in the future. Finally, the finding that households take multiple 
borrowing in response to distress (as a response to shocks to income and expenses) in 
Thailand and Vietnam suggests that providing households with alternative risk coping 
mechanisms such as micro-insurance may protect households from taking multiple loans and 
ultimately becoming over-indebted. 
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Abstract  
Household debt in most parts of Asia has grown rapidly and reached unprecedented levels in 
recent years. Although indebtedness levels of most countries in Asia are still well below those 
in more advanced economies, there are significant cross-country variations. Rising 
indebtedness levels among low-income groups and rural households has also emerged as a 
concern for policy makers in the region. This study aims to explore cross-country differences 
in rural household’s credit market participation, level of debt holding and over-indebtedness 
between Thailand and Vietnam. Using a unique rural household survey data from 
“Vulnerability in Southeast Asia” project, it first identifies socio-economic determinants of 
such market outcomes for rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. It then decomposes the 
observed differences into a part that arise due to  configuration of household characteristics or 
a part that arise due to differences in economic environments using three decomposition 
methods. Significant differences are observed in credit market participation rates and level of 
debt holding and indebtedness between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. Rural 
households in Thailand tend to participate more in the credit market and face higher risk of 
over-indebtedness. And those that participate in the credit market hold higher amounts of debt 
and face higher indebtedness levels in Thailand than rural households in Vietnam. These 
observed differences arise mainly due to dissimilarity in the economic environment that rural 
households of similar characteristics face. Particularly, the economically disadvantaged rural 
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households in Thailand are more likely to participate in the credit market and face higher level 
of indebtedness mainly because the economic environment in Thailand is lenient to such 
households holding high amounts of debt as compared to their counterparts in Vietnam. 
Finally, difference in debt holding and indebtedness increases when going along the debt 
distribution and the higher gap observed at the top of the debt distribution is predominantly 
explained by differences in the economic environment.     
 
Keywords: Rural households, Microcredit, Household debt, Household Indebtedness, 
Decomposition Analysis, Thailand, Vietnam  
 
5.1 Introduction  
Financial inclusion has been a major strategy used to achieve inclusive growth and 
development particularly in Asia where a significant progress has been achieved in the last 
decade (Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2014). However, one of the effects of the 
development of the financial sector has been the rapid growth of household debt that reached 
a record high recently in most parts of Asia. For instance in 2014, the ratio of household debt 
to household disposable income reached 141% in Malaysia and 126% in Thailand exceeding 
the levels before the financial crisis and above that of United States. Particularly in Thailand, 
between 2007 and 2014 the ratio of household debt to disposable income increased 
dramatically by 56 percentage points (ADB, 2015; Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), 2016) growing much faster than it did in Korea or the United 
States (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016).  
While household debt growth is a region-wide phenomenon in Asia, significant cross-country 
variations exist in the prevalence of debt, amount of debt holding and indebtedness levels in 
the region (ADB, 2015; OECD, 2016). Besides differences in aggregate indebtedness levels, 
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the types of households that are disposed to high levels of indebtedness might also vary across 
countries in the region. For instance, one concern over household debt in Thailand has been 
that household debt falls disproportionately on agricultural and low-income rural households 
(Muthitacharoen, Nuntramas & Chotewattanakul, 2015; Tambunlertchai, 2015; IMF, 2016). 
High level of indebtedness is particularly considered a problem in northeastern Thailand 
where higher share of the rural population are indebted compared with urban population 
(ADB, 2013; Tambunlertchai, 2015). High debt burden is also more common among 
households in the lowest income quintile that spend 50% of their income to service debt. 
Similarly, indebtedness level among agricultural households tends to be higher compared with 
those of other occupations (IMF, 2016).  
However, cross-country comparison of the prevalence and amount of debt holding in Asia has 
been either impossible due to lack of comparable micro-level data (Aminudin & Tissot, 2015) 
or complicated since such comparisons refer to households that are different in terms of socio-
economic characteristics and economic environment they face depending on their country of 
residence (Christelis, Ehrmann, & Georgarakos, 2015). The measurement of household debt 
in Asia has been in itself a problem given low banking penetration and significant informal 
lending sector outside the banks (ADB, 2015). Hence, little is known about the prevalence, 
the amount of debt holding and the indebtedness levels across countries in the region. 
Although the need for greater use of micro data to assess households’ indebtedness and 
financial stability has been emphasized by industry stakeholders, the assessment of household 
indebtedness in Asia has been mostly on aggregate level using macro data (e.g., Nakornthab, 
2010; ADB, 2015; OECD, 2016). Aggregate level household indebtedness indicators, 
however, hide debt problems and vulnerabilities especially of low-income households 
(Aminudin & Tissot, 2015) and conceal households response to changes in the economic 
environment (Brown & Tayler, 2008). Hence, to assess the vulnerabilities and risk from the 
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rapid growth of household debt in Asia and explore heterogeneity hidden behind aggregate 
level indicators, the analysis of micro data is necessary.  
Previous research on household debt in advanced economies decompose the observed cross-
country differences into a part that arises from differences in configuration of household 
characteristics such as age, education, income, assets and savings and those arising from 
differences in the economic environment (e.g., Christelis, Georgarakos, & Haliassos, 2013; 
Jappelli et al., 2013; Coletta et al., 2014; Wu, Fasianos and Kinsella, 2015; Christelis et al. 
2015; Loschiavo, 2016; Bover et al., 2016). According to Christelis et al. (2015), the 
underlying factors behind cross-country differences in economic environment are differences 
in (1) market characteristics such as the accessibility of certain debt products, (2) legal 
conditions such as legal enforcement of contracts indicated by the time needed to repossess 
collateral, taxation of debt, regulatory loan-to-value ratios at origination and depth of 
information about borrowers (Bover et al., 2016), (3) cultural factors such as social 
acceptance of indebtedness or (4) policies such as macro-prudential or monetary policies.  
In this paper, we add to the literature on household finance by specifically focusing on rural 
households and analyzing cross-country differences in credit market participation, level of 
debt holding and indebtedness in Thailand and Vietnam. Focusing on rural households debt 
situation is particularily critical in these two countries since the population is predominantly 
rural, informal lending still plays an important role and debt burden falls disproportionately 
on the rural poor (particularly in Thailand) (ADB, 2015). We use household survey data of the 
project “Vulnerability in Southeast Asia”, a harmonized rural household survey data in 
Thailand and Vietnam containing detailed information on household debt, loan defaults and 
late payments along with a full set of household level data such as households demographics, 
social and economic characteristics.  
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We decompose the difference in credit market participation, level of household debt holding 
and over-indebtedness using three counterfactual decomposition methods that compare the 
debt situation of rural households in Thailand to those in Vietnam. First, an extension of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method for non-linear models is used to calculate differences 
in prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness. Second, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
method (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) is used to calculate the average differences in 
conditional amount of debt holding and indebtedness. Finally, the RIF-regression method 
proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) is additionally used to decompose the 
conditional amount of debt holding and indebtedness gap across the two countries and 
identify the contribution of individual covariates at different quantiles of the unconditional 
distributions.  
Our results show that there are significant differences in observed credit market participation 
rates and level of debt holding and indebtedness between rural households in Thailand and 
Vietnam. Higher prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness is found among rural households 
in Thailand and those who participate in the credit market also hold relatively larger amounts 
of debt and face higher debt burden. These observed differences arise mainly due to 
dissimilarity in the economic environment that rural households of similar characteristics 
face. The economic environment in Thailand seems to be much more conducive for rural 
households to participate in the credit market and become over-indebted than in Vietnam. 
Particularly for the economically disadvantaged rural households, the economic environment 
in Thailand is more lenient to having high amounts of debt as compared to what their 
counterparts face in Vietnam. Additionally, differences in household structure can also 
explain to some extent the higher level of debt holding observed among rural households in 
Thailand. Finally, the findings from the RIF-regression decomposition analysis reveal that the 
differences in level of debt holdings and indebtedness increases when going along the debt 
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distribution. While differences in household characteristics such as income and wealth 
predominantly explain the higher debt holding observed at bottom of the debt distribution 
among rural households in Thailand, differences in the economic environment explain larger 
portion of the difference especially at the upper tail of the debt distribution. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 briefly discusses the data we 
use. Section 5.3 present descriptive results on the prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness 
and the conditional amount of debt holding and level of indebtedness. Section 5.4 presents the 
decomposition methods used. Section 5.5 and 5.6 outlines the results and provides concluding 
remarks. 
5.2 Data  
We use the 2008 data of rural household in Thailand and Vietnam collected by the project 
“Vulnerability in Southeast Asia” – a long-term research project funded by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG). The survey collected data from around 4200 rural households 
from six provinces in Northeastern Thailand and the North Central Coast and Central 
Highland of Vietnam. The six provinces, namely Buriram, Ubon Ratchathani and Nakhon 
Phanom from Thailand, Ha Tinh, Thua Thien Hue and Dac Lac from Vietnam, were first 
purposively selected targeting rural households that are either poor or face risk of falling into 
poverty to meet the general objective of the project (Hardeweg, Klasen & Waibel, 2012). 
Then, three stage cluster sampling design was implemented to select the sample of 
households. Firstly, sub-districts were randomly selected from strata with probability that is 
proportional to the population density in each province. After selecting the sub-districts, two 
villages were again selected randomly with probability proportional to size. Finally, 10 
households were sampled in each village from a household list ordered by household size 
using a systematic random sampling technique that gave each household equal chance of 
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being selected. Hence, the households in our sample are representative of rural households in 
Northeastern Thailand and the North Central Coast and Central Highland of Vietnam.  
The data contain detailed information on households borrowing, loan defaults and arrears 
along with a full set of household level data such as households demographics, social and 
economic characteristics and special modules on risks and shocks. This detailed data on 
financial situation of households allows us to examine rural households borrowing behavior in 
in the two countries and decompose the differences into their separate underlying factors. In 
total, we compare 2148 rural households in Vietnam with 2136 rural households in Thailand.  
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
5.3.1 Rural households’ debt in Thailand and Vietnam  
Next, we briefly describe the differences in rural households’ credit market participation, 
level of debt holding and indebtedness between the two countries salient in our dataset. Figure 
5.1, presents the raw log of debt distribution by country in 2008. As can be seen, the debt 
distribution for rural households in Vietnam is located to the left of that for rural households 
in Thailand and is thicker at the lower tail, indicating that a higher proportion of rural 
households in Vietnam hold a lower amount of debt compared to rural households in 
Thailand. In contrast, the debt distribution of rural households in Thailand lies to the right of 
those in Vietnam and is thicker in the upper tail, indicating higher level of debt holding 
among rural households in Thailand compared to those in Vietnam at all quintiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 128 
 
Figure 5.1: Raw Distribution of Rural Households’ Debt in Thailand and Vietnam in 
2008 
 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
Table 5.1 shows a comparison of the prevalence of debt and conditional debt amounts (which 
are scaled into PPP 2005 U.S. dollars) of rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. As can 
be seen, the proportion of rural households that have outstanding debt differs across the two 
countries both in 2008 and 2010. The prevalence of outstanding debt among rural households 
in Thailand is considerably larger than those in Vietnam especially in 2008, where more than 
80% of the Thai rural households had debt in contrast to around 66% for Vietnamese rural 
households. Looking at the amount of outstanding debt held conditional on participation at the 
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support of a stimulus introduced by the government (Khandker, Koolwal, Haughton & 
Jitsuchon, 2012). After this period, however, household debt grew rapidly and exceeded the 
levels before the financial crisis and above that of United States in 2014 (ADB, 2015; OECD, 
2016). In contrast, the outstanding debt of rural households in Vietnam has increased between 
2008 and 2010 slightly reducing the gap in debt distribution across the two countries.     
Using four common indicators of over-indebtedness, table 5.1 further illustrates how the 
prevalence of over-indebtedness and level of debt burden vary among rural households across 
the two countries. The first indicator, the debt-service ratio (DSR), gauges the burden 
imposed by debt repayment and is the share of annual gross income that a household must 
devote to service its annual debt repayment (ECB, 2013). The DSR includes both the annual 
interest payment and principal repayment as a debt servicing cost while annual gross income 
includes household’s earnings from all income-generating activities such as crop and 
livestock production, self-employment, off-farm employment, and return on assets (ECB, 
2013). A high debt-service ratio reflects that households can spend less of their income on 
other things than repaying their debt; hence domestic demand will be constrained and the risk 
of default will rise, making access to credit in turn more difficult (Aminudin & Tissot, 2015).  
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Debt Holdings, Debt-Service Ratio, Debt to Income Ratio, Debt to Asset 
Ratio and Default in 2008 and 2010 
  Thailand Vietnam 
  2008 2010 2008 2010 
Outstanding Debt 
Prevalence  0.82 0.74 0.66 0.69 
10th percentile  617 580 471 568 
50th percentile 3205 2926 1812 2270 
90th percentile 20294 16389 6196 8614 
Debt-Service Ratio 
Prevalence>40% 0.43 0.14 0.11 0.10 
10th percentile  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
50th percentile 0.31 0.00 0.02 0.01 
90th percentile 1.63 0.54 0.46 0.40 
Debt to Income Ratio 
10th percentile  0.05 0.06 0.00 0.05 
50th percentile 0.71 0.41 0.37 0.48 
90th percentile 4.59 2.50 1.83 2.42 
Debt to Asset Ratio 
10th percentile  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
50th percentile 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 
90th percentile 0.50 0.40 0.28 0.33 
Default Prevalence 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.07 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008 and 2010. 
Based on the DSR indicator, a household is considered to be over-indebted when its annual 
debt repayment obligation in relation to income surpasses certain threshold, commonly set at 
40% or 50% (OXERA, 2004; Disney, Bridges, & Gathergood, 2008; Bryan, Taylor, & 
Veliziotis, 2010; D’Alessio & Iezzi, 2013; Muthitacharoen et al., 2015; Banbula, Kotula, 
Przeworska, & Strzelecki, 2016). In this study, we use the DSR indicator with a 40 percent 
threshold to identify over-indebted households in Thailand and Vietnam. From the whole 
sample in 2008, about 43% of the rural households in Thailand were over-indebted where as 
11% of those in Vietnam were over-indebted. According to the DSR, the top 10% of rural 
households that had highest DSR in Thailand spent nearly 2 times of their annual income for 
debt service payment, while in Vietnam they spent about half of their annual income. 
Moreover, the debt burden gap between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam increases 
significantly when going along the DSR distribution.  
The other two indictors we use, debt to income and debt to asset ratios (DIR and DAR), on 
the other hand link the total outstanding debt amount with the total annual household income 
or the total value of household asset including the house value, respectively. While the DIR 
reflects the resources that households can use to pay back their debt in the short run, the DAR 
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reflects their debt repayment capacity in the long run without taking the flow of income into 
account (Sierminska, 2014). Hence, high DIR and DAR levels indicate that households would 
not be able to pay back their loans even when they use all their income or liquidate all their 
assets. Pointing in the same direction as the DSR indicator, these indicators also show that the 
level of debt burden among rural household in Thailand is higher compared to those in 
Vietnam and the gap increases when going further along the DIR and DAR distributions (see 
table 5.1). Finally the fourth indicator, default, identifies those households who report default 
or late payment on a loan as over-indebted. According to this indicator, the prevalence of 
over-indebtedness was also higher among rural households in Thailand than those in Vietnam 
in 2008.   
5.3.2 Explanatory Variables   
This section discusses the explanatory variables that are included in the decomposition 
analysis. The explanatory variables include various socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics that determine household’s participation in the credit market and their level of 
indebtedness. The choice of the explanatory variables is largely based on the existing 
literature dealing with households indebtedness in both developing and developed countries, 
including Disney et al. (2008), Brown and Taylor (2008), D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013), Schicks 
(2014), Wu et al. (2015) and Christelis et al. (2015).  
In the decomposition analysis, we control for observed households characteristics such as age 
(household head aged below 39, 40 - 49, 50 - 59, 60 and above; taking 60 and above as the 
case category), gender (female or male household head; taking female as the base category), 
level of education of the household head (illiterate, primary, secondary and higher education; 
taking illiterate as the base category), marital status (married or single; taking single as the 
base category), household size, main occupation of household head (inactive, agricultural, off-
farm employed and self-employed; taking inactive as the base category), household income 
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and wealth quintiles (dummy variables that group households into quintiles according to 
households’ income and wealth quintile distributions in Thailand; taking the first quintile as 
the base category), type of shock households experienced (unexpected shock to expenses, 
expected shocks to expenses and unexpected shocks to income), future financial expectation 
of households (better, same and worst; taking worst as the base category) and their risk 
attitudes (risk averse, risk neutral, risk takers; taking risk takers as the base category). 
Household’s future financial expectation dummy variables were constructed using the 
question “Do you think your household will be better off next year?” The risk attitude of the 
households is based on a Likert scale response of 0 “unwilling to take risk” to 10 “fully 
prepared to take risk” for a question “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take 
risks or do you try to avoid taking risk?”. Then, based on the Likert scale, we grouped the 
households into the three categories. 
Table 5.2 shows a comparison of average characteristics of rural households in Thailand and 
Vietnam. On average, there are more Thai households in the top income, financial and real 
wealth quintiles than the Vietnamese households reflecting that Thai households have higher 
capacity to shoulder more debt than the Vietnamese households. On the contrary, rural 
households in Vietnam are younger and more educated and hence have higher earning 
capacity in the future which might explain a higher willingness to borrow and hold large 
amount of debt. However, Vietnamese rural households are also on average more risk averse 
than the Thai households and hence maybe less willing to hold large amount of debt.   
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Table 5.2: Average Household Characteristics by Country in 2008 and 2010 
 Vietnam Thailand 
Age of HH head below 39 0.214 0.067 
 (0.411) (0.252) 
Age of HH head 40-49 0.306 0.241 
 (0.461) (0.428) 
Age of HH head 50-59 0.235 0.268 
 (0.424) (0.443) 
Age of HH head 60 and above 0.245 0.424 
 (0.430) (0.490) 
Female HH head 0.209 0.335 
 (0.407) (0.472) 
Married HH head 0.852 0.782 
 (0.355) (0.413) 
Household size 5.276 5.490 
 (1.946) (2.210) 
Illiterate 0.113 0.045 
 (0.32) (0.210) 
Primary education 0.317 0.843 
 (0.465) (0.364) 
Secondary education 0.513 0.0936 
 (0.500) (0.292) 
Higher education 0.057 0.0184 
 (0.232) (0.135) 
Agricultural HH 0.665 0.606 
 (0.472) (0.489) 
Self-employed HH 0.0751 0.082 
 (0.264) (0.274) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.209 0.184 
 (0.407) (0.387) 
Inactive HH 0.0509 0.128 
 (0.220) (0.330) 
Income quintile 1 0.307 0.200 
 (0.460) (0.400) 
Income quintile 2 0.234 0.200 
 (0.423) (0.400) 
Income quintile 3 0.183 0.200 
 (0.387) (0.400) 
Income quintile 4 0.169 0.200 
 (0.375) (0.400) 
Income quintile 5 0.107 0.200 
 (0.309) (0.400) 
Financial wealth quintile 1 0.663 0.215 
 (0.47) (0.410) 
Financial wealth quintile 2 0.015 0.185 
 (0.123) (0.388) 
Financial wealth quintile 3 0.0687 0.199 
 (0.253) (0.399) 
Financial wealth quintile 4 0.0993 0.201 
 (0.299) (0.401) 
Financial wealth quintile 5 0.154 0.200 
 (0.361) (0.400) 
Real wealth quintile 1 0.286 0.200 
 (0.450) (0.400) 
Real wealth quintile 2 0.287 0.200 
 (0.452) (0.401) 
Real wealth quintile 3 0.180 0.200 
 (0.384) (0.400) 
Real wealth quintile 4 0.119 0.200 
 (0.323) (0.400) 
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Real wealth quintile 5 0.128 0.200 
 (0.334) (0.400) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.613 0.681 
 (0.487) (0.466) 
Unexpected shocks to expense  0.454 0.372 
 (0.498) (0.483) 
Expected shocks to expense  0.119 0.0966 
 (0.324) (0.295) 
Unexpected shocks to income  0.616 0.406 
 (0.486) (0.491) 
Better future financial expectation 0.506 0.513 
 (0.500) (0.500) 
Same future financial expectation 0.421 0.375 
 (0.494) (0.484) 
Worst future financial expectation 0.073 0.112 
 (0.260) (0.320) 
Risk averse 0.523 0.352 
 (0.500) (0.478) 
Risk neutral 0.197 0.416 
 (0.398) (0.493) 
Risk taker 0.28 0.232 
 (0.450) (0.420) 
Observations 2024 2091 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008 and 2010. 
5.4. Empirical Methodology 
This section outlines the methods we used to decompose the observed difference in debt 
prevalence, debt holdings and over-indebtedness among rural households in Thailand and 
Vietnam, and proceeds in four parts. First, we begin with a discussion on the identification 
strategy and the parameters of interest using the observed log of debt distribution as an 
example to simplify the discussion. We then explain the three decomposition methods used to 
model differences in debt situation at a point in time, namely the non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method (Fairlie 1999), the mean based Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method 
(Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) and the RIF-regression decomposition method (Firpo et al., 
2009). These methods allow the observed differences to be decomposed into a part 
attributable to differences in the configuration of household characteristics (composition or 
endowment effect) and a part attributable to differences in the influence of a given set of 
characteristics due to cross-country differences in cultural, institutional and economic 
environment  (coefficients or structural effect). The discussion on the decomposition methods 
is heavily based on Fortin, Leimieux, and Fripo (2011).  
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5.4.1. Identification Strategy  
All three decomposition methods are based on estimating unconditional counterfactual 
distributions of the dependent variables. For the mutually exclusive groups of Thai rural 
households (T) and Vietnamese rural households (V), we for example observe the log of debt 
for each group (𝑌𝑇 and 𝑌𝑉  respectively).  The unconditional counterfactual distribution is then 
constructed to simulate how the log of debt distribution of rural households in Vietnam would 
be if they had the same configuration of characteristics and faced the same economic 
environment as rural households in Thailand, or conversely, what the log of debt distribution 
of rural households in Thailand would have been if they had the same configuration of 
characteristics and faced the same economic environment as rural households in Vietnam. In 
other words, the observed household debt distribution of Thai rural households provides a 
counterfactual for Vietnamese households, and vice versa. To establish these counterfactual 
distributions, the decomposition methods first examine the relationship between debt outcome 
variables such as log of debt and a set of observed and unobserved household characteristics.  
𝑌𝑐 = 𝜃𝑐(𝑋𝑐 , 𝜀𝑐), 𝑐 ∈  {𝑇, 𝑉} 𝜀𝑐       (1)
 ∆𝑌= 𝑌𝑉 − 𝑌𝑇 = [𝜃𝑉(𝑋𝑉 , 𝜀𝑉)] − [𝜃𝑇(𝑋𝑇 , 𝜀𝑇)]      (2) 
where 𝑋𝑉 and 𝑋𝑇 are vectors of observable characteristics, 𝜃𝑉 and 𝜃𝑇 are the functional forms 
of the log of debt equation and 𝜀𝑉 and 𝜀𝑇 are vectors of unobservable characteristics for the 
Vietnamese and Thai  rural household groups respectively. 
The unconditional counterfactual distribution of the log of debt can then be constructed by 
integrating the conditional distribution of log of debt given a set of observable characteristics 
of Vietnamese rural household over the marginal distribution of observable characteristics of 
the Thai rural household. If the unconditional distribution of log of debt of rural households in 
each country is given by:  
𝐹𝑌𝑐(𝑌) = ∫𝐹𝑌𝑐|𝑋(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥) . 𝑑𝐹𝑋𝑐(𝑋), 𝑐 ∈ {𝑇, 𝑉}     (3) 
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where 𝐹𝑌𝑐|𝑋(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥) is the conditional distribution of log of debt and 𝐹𝑋𝑐(𝑋) is the marginal 
distribution of 𝑋 , the unconditional counterfactual distribution of log of debt can be 
constructed by either replacing the conditional distribution of Vietnamese rural households 
with the corresponding conditional distribution of the Thai rural households or by substituting 
marginal distribution of the observed characteristics. In this study, we use rural households in 
Thailand as the reference group and construct a counterfactual distribution of log of debt, 𝐹𝑌𝑉
𝑐 , 
by replacing 𝐹𝑌𝑉|𝑋(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥) with 𝐹𝑌𝑇|𝑋(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥)  in equation (2) when 𝑐 = 𝑉:  
𝐹𝑌𝑉
𝑐 (𝑌) = ∫𝐹𝑌𝑇|𝑋(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥) . 𝑑𝐹𝑋𝑉(𝑋)      (4) 
The unconditional counterfactual distribution 𝐹𝑌𝑉
𝑐 (𝑌) constitutes the distribution of log of 
debt that would have prevailed among the Vietnamese rural household if the distribution of 
characteristics were similar to the Thai rural household.   
Following equation (1), the total difference in log of debt between rural households in the two 
countries can be written as:   
∆𝑌= ∆𝜃 + ∆𝑋 + ∆𝜀        (5) 
where ∆𝜃 represents cross-country differences in the 𝜃 functions determined by institutional 
and economic environment in the two countries (i), ∆𝑋  represents differences in the 
distribution of observable characteristics of rural households in the two countries (ii), and  ∆𝜀 
represents cross-country differences in the distribution of unobservable characteristics (iii). In 
constructing the unconditional counterfactual distribution of 𝐹𝑌𝑉
𝑐 , replacing the conditional 
distribution of log of debt of the Vietnamese rural households with that of the Thai rural 
households group replaces both 𝜃  and the conditional distribution of 𝜀 . Therefore, cross-
country difference in 𝜃 will be confounded by cross-country differences in the distribution of 
𝜀. In order to separate the cross-country differences in 𝜀 from the cross-country differences in 
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𝜃 (𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋), the following two identification restrictions need to be imposed on the distribution 
of 𝜀 (see Fortin et. al, 2011 for detailed discussion of these assumptions).  
i. First the overlapping support assumption is imposed to ensure that no single 
characteristic can identify to which group the rural households belong to (Fortin et al., 
2011). This assumption rule out cases where observable and unobservable 
characteristics in the debt structural model are different for Thai and Vietnamese rural 
households. 
ii. Second the conditional independence/ignorability assumption is imposed to ensure 
that the conditional distribution of 𝜀 given 𝑋 is the same for rural households in both 
countries and is independent of their country membership (𝜃 ⊥  𝜀|𝑋, 𝑐 = 𝑇, 𝑉). 
Under the overlapping support and conditional independence assumptions, the total difference 
in log of debt between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam, ∆𝑌
𝑣  (where 𝑣 represents a 
distributional statistics of log of debt such as the mean or quantiles), can be separated and 
identified in an aggregate decomposition as: 
∆𝑌
𝑣= ∆𝜃
𝑣 + ∆𝑋
𝑣          (6) 
where ∆𝜃
𝑣= 𝑣(𝐹𝑌𝑉 − 𝐹𝑌𝑉
𝑐 ) captures the part driven by group differences in the log of debt 
structure (structural or coefficient effect) and ∆𝑋
𝑣= 𝑣(𝐹𝑌𝑉
𝑐 − 𝐹𝑌𝑇) captures the part driven by 
group differences in the distribution of the observed characteristics (composition or 
endowment effect). The coefficient and covariate effects can further be decomposed into 
contributions attributable to each characteristic. To perform the detailed decomposition and 
identify the contributions of each characteristic, further assumptions are required. Since these 
assumptions are specific to the decomposition methods, they will be discussed further with 
each estimation procedure explained in the following sub-section. 
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5.4.2 Estimation Procedures 
5.4.2.1 Non-linear Decomposition Method 
To assess the difference in the prevalence of debt, default and over-indebtedness between 
rural households in Thailand and Vietnam, we apply an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method for non-linear models elaborated by Fairlie (1999, 2005). This method 
is especially suitable for calculating gaps for binary variables. This decomposition method 
computes the difference in the probability of holding debt, defaulting on a loan or becoming 
over-indebted between the two countries and quantifies the contribution of group differences 
in the configuration of characteristics and cultural, institutional and economic environment to 
the outcome differential. 
First, a logit model is estimated for the probability of holding debt, defaulting on a loan and 
being over-indebted, 𝑌: 
𝑝𝑐(𝑌) = 𝐹(𝑋𝛽), 𝑐 𝜖 {𝑇, 𝑉}        (7) 
Following Fairlie (1999) the gap in the prevalence rate of debt, default and over-indebtedness 
between rural households in Vietnam and our reference country Thailand can be expressed as: 
?̅?𝑇 − ?̅?𝑉 = [∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
𝑇?̂?𝑉)
𝑁𝑇
𝑁𝑇
𝑖=1 − ∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
𝑉?̂?𝑉)
𝑁𝑉
𝑁𝑉
𝑖=1 ] + [∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
𝑇?̂?𝑇)
𝑁𝑇
𝑁𝑉
𝑖=1 − ∑
𝐹(𝑋𝑖
𝑇?̂?𝑉)
𝑁𝑇
𝑁𝑉
𝑖=1 ]  (8) 
where ?̅?𝑐 is the average probability of holding debt, default and over-indebtedness in country 
𝑐 ,  𝑋𝑐  is a set of average values of the household characteristics in country 𝑐, ?̂?𝑐  is the 
coefficient estimates for country 𝑐, 𝐹 is the cumulative distribution function from a logistic 
distribution and 𝑁𝑐  refers to the sample size in each country.  The first expression in the 
bracket represents the part of the cross-country debt prevalence gap which is driven by 
differences in the covariate effect (explained part), i.e. by differences in the distribution of 𝑋 
between Vietnam and Thailand. The second term captures the part of the cross-country debt 
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prevalence gap that is driven by the coefficient effect (unexplained part), i.e. to differences in 
the group processes determining for instance the decision to participate in the credit market in 
Thailand and Vietnam. This unexplained gap can arise due to differences in cultural 
differences, institutional differences and other unobservable differences in economic 
environment between Thailand and Vietnam. Going forward, we will refer to this effect as the 
“coefficient effect”.     
The covariate effect is the estimate of the total contribution of the whole vector of household 
characteristics to the cross-country gap in prevalence of debt, default and over-indebtedness. 
Using coefficient estimates from a logit regression for a pooled sample, ?̂?∗  to avoid the 
familiar index problem in decomposition methods, the independent contribution of individual 
covariates can be calculated as follows. For example, the independent contribution of real 
wealth, 𝑋𝑅𝑊, and financial expectation, 𝑋𝐹𝐸, to the debt prevalence gap can be expressed as: 
1
𝑁𝑉
∑ 𝐹𝑁
𝑉
𝑖=1 (?̂?
∗ + 𝑋𝑅𝑊𝑖
𝑇 ?̂?𝑅𝑊
∗ + 𝑋𝐹𝐸𝑖
𝑇 ?̂?𝐹𝐸
∗ ) − 𝐹(?̂?∗ + 𝑋𝑅𝑊𝑖
𝑉 ?̂?𝑅𝑊
∗ + 𝑋𝐹𝐸𝑖
𝑇 ?̂?𝐹𝐸
∗ ) (9) 
1
𝑁𝑉
∑ 𝐹𝑁
𝑉
𝑖=1 (?̂?
∗ + 𝑋𝑅𝑊𝑖
𝑉 ?̂?𝑅𝑊
∗ + 𝑋𝐹𝐸𝑖
𝑇 ?̂?𝐹𝐸
∗ ) − 𝐹(?̂?∗ + 𝑋𝑅𝑊𝑖
𝑉 ?̂?𝑅𝑊
∗ + 𝑋𝐹𝐸𝑖
𝑉 ?̂?𝐹𝐸
∗ ) (10) 
Hence, the contribution of each of these variables to the debt prevalence gap is equal to the 
change in the average predicted probability from replacing the Vietnamese households’ 
distribution with the Thai households’ distribution of that variable while holding the 
contribution of the rest of the variables constant. Then, the sum of the contributions of each 
independent variable will be equal to total contribution of all of the independent variables 
estimated using the full sample. 
5.4.2.2 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Method 
To compute the level of household debt and indebtedness gap between rural households in 
Thailand and Vietnam and decompose these gaps into their separate underlying factors, we 
use the mean-based Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method. This method is based on the 
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assumption that the relationship between log of debt or indebtedness and a vector of 
household characteristics is linear and additive: 
𝑌𝑐 = 𝑋𝑐𝛽𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐 , 𝐸(𝜀𝑐) = 0, 𝑐 𝜖 {𝑇, 𝑉}                 (11) 
where  𝑋 is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝛽 is a vector of estimated coefficients including 
the intercept and 𝜀 is the error term. Given that 𝐸(𝜀𝑐) = 0, the total difference in the mean log 
of debt or over-indebtedness, ∆𝑌
𝜇
 or 𝜇(𝐹𝑌𝑉 − 𝐹𝑌𝑇), can be decomposed as follow: 
∆𝑌
𝜇
= 𝐸(𝑌𝑉) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑇) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑉)𝛽𝑉 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑉)𝛽𝑇⏟            
𝑖
+ 𝐸(𝑋𝑇)𝛽𝑇 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑉)𝛽𝑉⏟            
𝑖𝑖
             (12) 
where 𝐸(𝑋𝑉)𝛽𝑇 is the unconditional counterfactual distribution of log of debt or indebtedness 
at the mean. As discussed in the identification strategy section, this counterfactual distribution 
is constructed at the sample means 𝜇(𝐹𝑌𝑉
𝐶 ) → 𝐸(𝑌)𝑉
𝐶 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑉)𝛽𝑇 . The terms 𝑖  and 𝑖𝑖  in 
equation (12) are also analogues to components (i) and (ii) described in the identification 
strategy section. Rearranging equation (12), we get: 
∆𝑌
𝜇
= (𝐸(𝑋𝑉)[𝛽𝑉 − 𝛽𝑇]) + ([𝐸(𝑋𝑉) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑇)]𝛽𝑇)                          (13) 
Replacing 𝐸(𝑋𝑉) and 𝐸(𝑋𝑇) by their sample means ?̅?𝑉 and ?̅?𝑇, as well as 𝛽𝑉 and 𝛽𝑇 by their 
ordinary least square regression estimates, ?̂?𝑉 and ?̂?𝑇, equation (13) can be written as: 
∆̂𝑌
𝜇
= ?̅?𝑇(𝛽𝑉 − 𝛽𝑇)⏟        
∆̂𝜃
𝜇
+ (?̅?𝑉 − ?̅?𝑇)?̂?𝑇⏟        
∆̂𝑋
𝜇
                                       (14) 
The first term, ∆̂𝜃
𝜇
, captures contributions of the coefficient effect to the total differences in 
log of debt between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. The second term, ∆̂𝑋
𝜇
, captures 
the contributions of the covariate effect i.e. differences in the distribution of mean  
characteristics. Due to the additive linearity assumption of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
method, these two effects can be further decomposed into contributions attributable to each 
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covariate. Then, the total covariate and coefficient effects are simply the sum of the 
contributions of individual characteristics: 
∆̂𝑋
𝜇
= ∑ (?̅?𝑉𝑗 − ?̅?𝑇𝑗)?̂?𝑇𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1                                (15) 
and 
∆̂𝜃
𝜇
= (?̂?𝑉0 − ?̂?𝑇0) + ∑ (?̂?𝑉𝑗 − ?̂?𝑇𝑗)
𝑗
𝑗=1 ?̅?𝑇𝑗                           (16) 
where 𝑗  represents the 𝑗 th household characteristics and ?̂?𝑉0  and ?̂?𝑇0  are the estimated 
intercept coefficients of the rural households in Vietnam and Thailand respectively.  
In the detailed decomposition, identifying the contribution of categorical variables is not easy 
because the result is not invariant to the choice of the omitted base category. Changing the 
omitted category alters the contribution of the other categories and the contribution of the 
entire categorical variable to the coefficient effect. To solve this problem, we use a 
normalization approach proposed by Yun (2005b).  The idea behind this approach is to restrict 
the coefficients of the individual categories to sum to zero and express the effects as 
deviations from the grand mean (Jann, 2008). The decompositions results with normalization 
approach are analogous to the simple average of the results generated from a series of 
decompositions in which the categories are alternated one after the other as the base category 
(Yun, 2005b). 
5.4.2.3 Re-centered Influence Function Regression Decomposition Method 
The distribution of household debt is important in assessing financial market risk and 
sustainability of household debt. The detailed decomposition of the distribution of household 
debt gap based on household characteristics such as age, occupation, income and wealth can 
map vulnerabilities in household debt.  Hence, the Recentered Influence Function Regression 
(RIF-regression) method (Firpo et al., 2009) is used to decompose the level of household debt 
and indebtedness gap across the two countries and identify the contribution of individual 
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covariates and the economic environment at different quantiles of the unconditional 
(marginal) distributions. The RIF-regression method is an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method that is based on an unconditional quantile estimator. The RIF-
regression method provides a way of estimating the marginal effect of a vector of explanatory 
variables, 𝑋, on the quantiles of the unconditional distribution of a dependent variable, 𝑌. The 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables are estimated by regressing a transformed 
version of the dependent variable, known as the recentered influence function (RIF), on 𝑋.      
The RIF of log of debt and indebtedness is estimated by first calculating the sample quantile 𝑞 
and then estimating the density at that quantile using kernel density methods. The RIF of each 
observation is then estimated using the following equation: 
𝑅𝐼𝐹(𝑌; 𝑞𝜏) = 𝑞𝜏 +
𝜏−1[𝑌≤𝑞𝜏]
𝑓𝑌(𝑞𝜏)
                  (17) 
Where 𝑞𝜏 is the 𝜏th quantile of log of debt and indebtedness and  𝑓𝑌(𝑞𝜏) is the unconditional 
density of log of debt and indebtedness at the 𝜏th quantile and 1[𝑌 ≤ 𝑞𝜏] is an indicator 
function for whether the log of debt and indebtedness are less than or equal to the 𝜏 th 
quantile. The coefficients of the covariates for the Vietnamese and Thai rural households are 
then estimated at each quantile by regressing the RIF on 𝑋: 
 𝑞𝑐𝜏 = 𝐸𝑋 [𝐸[𝑅𝐼?̂?(𝑌𝑐; 𝑞𝑐𝜏)|𝑋𝑐]] = 𝐸[𝑋𝑐]?̂?𝑐𝜏, 𝑐 𝜖 {𝑇, 𝑉}              (18) 
where 𝑞𝑐𝜏  is the unconditional  𝜏 th quantile of log of debt and indebtedness for rural 
households in Thailand and Vietnam and ?̂?𝑐𝜏 is the coefficient of the vector of covariates from 
the unconditional quantile regression that captures the marginal effect of a change in the 
distribution of each covariate on the unconditional log of debt or indebtedness. Equation (18) 
is comparable to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean. Therefore, using the same 
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logic as the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the log of debt and indebtedness gap across the 
two countries at the 𝜏th quantile can be decomposed as follows: 
∆𝑌
𝜏= [𝑅𝐼?̂?(𝑌𝑉; 𝑞𝑉𝜏)] − [𝑅𝐼?̂?(𝑌𝑇; 𝑞𝑇𝜏)]                (19) 
∆𝑌
𝜏= ?̅?𝑇(?̂?𝑉𝜏 − ?̂?𝑇𝜏)⏟        
∆̂𝜃
𝜏
+ (?̅?𝑉 − ?̅?𝑇)?̂?𝑇𝜏⏟        
∆̂𝑋
𝜏
                 (20) 
Then, the detailed decomposition of the composition and coefficient effects into contributions 
of individual covariate at the 𝜏th quantile can be computed as: 
 ∆̂𝑋
𝜏= ∑ (?̅?𝑉𝑗 − ?̅?𝑇𝑗)?̂?𝑇𝑗𝜏
𝑗
𝑗=1                                
(21) 
and 
∆̂𝜃
𝜏= (?̂?𝑉0𝜏 − ?̂?𝑇0𝜏) + ∑ (?̂?𝑉𝑗𝜏 − ?̂?𝑇𝑗𝜏)
𝑗
𝑗=1 ?̅?𝑇𝑗𝜏               (22) 
where (?̂?𝑉0𝜏 − ?̂?𝑇0𝜏) indicates the omitted group effect, ?̅?𝑐𝑗𝜏 and ?̂?𝑐𝑗𝜏 indicate the 𝑗th element 
of ?̅?𝑐  and ?̂?𝑐  at 𝜏 th quantile respectively. (?̅?𝑉𝑗 − ?̅?𝑇𝑗)?̂?𝑇𝑗𝜏  and (?̂?𝑉𝑗𝜏 − ?̂?𝑇𝑗𝜏)?̅?𝑇𝑗𝜏  are the 
respective contributions of the 𝑗th covariate to the composition and coefficient effect at 𝜏th 
quantile. 
5.5. Results 
In this section, we present the results from the decomposition analysis based on the three 
methods discussed above. First, we discuss the results from the non-linear decomposition 
method used to decompose the observed cross-country difference in the prevalence of debt 
holding and over-indebtedness among rural households in the two countries. The non-linear 
decomposition analysis is based on coefficient estimates from pooled logit models with 
dependent variables that take the value one when the rural households either have outstanding 
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debt or are over-indebted based on the DSR or default indicators. Second, we discuss the 
results from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis used to decompose the observed 
difference in the conditional log amount of outstanding debt, DSR, DIR and DAR between 
rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. This method is based on pooled linear regression 
model estimated using either the log of conditional debt holding, DSR, DIR and DAR as a 
dependent variable. Finally, we discuss the results from the RIF-regression decomposition 
method. This method is based on RIF-regression models at different percentiles of the 
conditional debt holding, DSR, DIR and DAR distributions.    
As explained in the previous section, throughout the decomposition analysis we estimate the 
observed differences in debt situation as the gap between the observed debt situation among 
rural households in Thailand and of those in Vietnam (𝑌𝑇 − 𝑌𝑉). Hence, a positive coefficient 
effect would mean that the economic environment in Thailand is more favorable for rural 
households to participate in the credit market and hold high amounts of debt than the 
environment in Vietnam. Alternatively, if the covariate effect is positive that would mean that 
rural households in Thailand have a configuration of characteristics that allows them to 
participate in the credit market and shoulder higher amounts of debt compared to those in 
Vietnam.  
5.5.1. Decomposing the Prevalence of Debt and Over-indebtedness   
Table 5.3 shows the differences in the prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness between rural 
households in Thailand and Vietnam and their decomposition into covariate and coefficient 
effects that denote configuration of household and economic environment characteristics 
effects, respectively. These results are estimated with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
method using coefficients from a pooled logit regression models as explained in sub-section 
4.2.1. The aggregate decomposition shows that the observed differences in the prevalence of 
debt and over-indebtedness are mainly due to the coefficient effect that is always in favor of 
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rural households in Thailand. In other words, the cultural, institutional and economic 
environment in Thailand appears to be much more conducive to rural households having debt 
or being over-indebted measured both in terms of defaulting on a loan or having a high debt 
burden than in Vietnam. If Vietnamese rural households faced the same cultural, institutional 
and economic environment as their Thai counterparts, the observed gap in the prevalence of 
debt and over-indebtedness would completely disappear and the Vietnamese households 
would face the problem of over-indebtedness just the same as their Thai counterparts.   
Table 5.3: Decomposition of Differences in the Prevalence of Debt and Over-Indebtedness in 2008 
 Debt Debt-Service 
Ratio>40% 
Default 
Overall    
Thailand 0.817*** 0.427*** 0.111*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Vietnam 0.662*** 0.113*** 0.056*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Total difference 0.155*** 0.314*** 0.055*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Covariate effect -0.033*** -0.009 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Coefficient effect 0.188*** 0.324*** 0.059*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Covariate effect    
Female -0.001 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age  -0.015*** -0.015** -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education -0.010* -0.021 0.017 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
Married -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH size 0.003*** 0.002** 0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Occupation -0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Income -0.001 0.004 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
wealth -0.003 0.023*** -0.016 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Financial expectation  -0.001 0.001 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Adverse shocks -0.007*** -0.008* -0.011 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.006*** 0.004* 0.009 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Risk preference -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Coefficient effect    
Female -0.020** -0.015* 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  -0.032 0.017 -0.042** 
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 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Education -0.020 -0.043 0.029 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Married -0.040 -0.059 -0.007 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
HH size -0.074* 0.022 -0.012 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Occupation 0.000 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.023 0.096*** 0.023 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
wealth 0.030 -0.026 -0.003 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Financial expectation  -0.064 -0.051 -0.019 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Adverse shocks -0.042** 0.010 0.023* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.002 -0.024 0.018 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Risk preference -0.038 -0.098*** 0.029* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 0.462*** 0.501*** 0.013 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) 
Observations 4211 4211 4211 
Notes: 
1. Results are from decomposition analyses that compare the prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness among rural households in 
Vietnam to those in Thailand using coefficients from pooled logit regression models. 
2. Results are based on the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Method. 
3. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
4. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
A detailed decomposition of the coefficient effect for being indebted and over-indebted 
according to the DSR indicator, also displayed in table 5.3, show that the constant term that 
represents the base category is what mainly generates the positive coefficient effect. In this 
study, the base category was selected in such a way that it represents rural households that are 
expected to be economically disadvantaged, i.e. households with the oldest, less educated and 
single household head whose main income sources is agricultural production and those that 
have worst financial future expectation and low income and wealth.  Hence, the constant term 
in the decomposition analysis reflects to what extent the prevalence of debt and over-
indebtedness among the most economically disadvantaged rural households in Vietnam would 
differ if they were to face the same cultural, institutional and economic environment as their 
Thai counterparts. The results reveal that the economically disadvantaged rural households in 
Thailand are much more likely to participate in the credit market and become over-indebted 
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than their counterparts in Vietnam. This means that the economic environment in Thailand is 
significantly more conducive for the economically disadvantaged rural households to 
participate in the credit market and become over-indebted than in Vietnam. This finding is in 
line with the notion of a higher incidence of debt and over-indebtedness among the poor and 
vulnerable groups of the population in Thailand that are more likely to face difficulty in 
repaying their debt, especially when faced with adverse economic conditions (ADB, 2013). 
Additionally, we note that income is also one factor that contributes significantly to a positive 
coefficient effect for the difference in the prevalence of over-indebtedness measured with the 
DSR indicator. This means that at any given amount of household income, the economic 
environment in Thailand favors having high debt burden more than in Vietnam.  On the other 
hand, the main factors contributing to a significant coefficient effect for the differences in 
prevalence of default are adverse shocks and risk preferences.    
The covariate effect is estimated to be negative and is significant only in the case of 
differences in the prevalence of holding debt. This shows that if rural households in Thailand 
had the same characteristics as the rural households in Vietnam, they would be more likely to 
participate in the credit market. This implies that the observed higher household debt among 
rural households in Thailand is not really explained by endowment effects such as higher 
amount of income or wealth. Looking further at the detailed decomposition of the covariate 
effect, it is noticeable that the estimated negative total covariate effect is largely due to age 
and education level of the household head. The explanation is that since age and level of 
education are related negatively and positively with being indebted respectively and 
Vietnamese rural households are younger and more educated than the Thai rural households, 
their prevalence of debt should be higher indicating a higher demand for debt and higher debt 
repayment capacity in the future. However, the economic environment effect is so strong that 
it takes over the opposite effect of the population characteristics. Finally, experiencing 
adverse shocks significantly reduces the difference while income fluctuation increases the 
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difference. Though experiencing adverse shocks and income fluctuation both increase the 
likelihood of holding debt, the two factors had a different effect on the covariate effect 
because their incidence differed among rural households in the two countries (see table 5.2).  
5.5.2. Decomposing the Amount of Debt Holdings 
Table 5.4 reports the results of the decomposition analysis at the mean using the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition method. Once again, the results from the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition show that the coefficient effect largely explains the observed difference in debt 
holding indicating that the economic environment in Thailand is generally more favorable to 
holding higher amount of debt than the economic environment in Vietnam. If the rural 
households in Vietnam were to face the same economic environment as those in Thailand, the 
total difference in average log of debt between the households in the two countries would 
decrease by about 0.497 points (top panel, table 5.4). Therefore, about 71% of the total 
difference in average log of conditional amount of debt is explained by differences in the 
economic environment. According to the detailed decomposition analysis, financial wealth 
and financial expectation mainly contributed to the estimated positive coefficient effect. This 
means that for any given amount of financial wealth or type of financial expectation, the 
economic environment in Thailand is more favorable for rural households to hold higher 
amount of debt than in Vietnam.  
Table 5.4: Decomposition of Differences in Average Log of Debt, Debt-Service Ratio, Debt to Income 
Ratio and Debt to Asset Ratio in 2008 
 Amount of Debt 
Debt-Service 
Ratio 
Debt to 
Income 
Ratio 
Debt to 
Asset Ratio 
Overall     
Thailand 8.133*** 48.346*** 106.224*** 17.956*** 
 (0.03) (1.34) (2.96) (0.64) 
Vietnam 7.436*** 15.590*** 63.779*** 11.861*** 
 (0.03) (0.77) (2.11) (0.43) 
Total difference 0.697*** 32.755*** 42.445*** 6.095*** 
 (0.04) (1.54) (3.63) (0.77) 
Covariate effect 0.200*** 12.303*** 10.881** -2.805** 
 (0.07) (2.16) (5.43) (1.14) 
Coefficient effect 0.497*** 20.452*** 31.564*** 8.900*** 
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 (0.08) (2.46) (6.22) (1.33) 
Covariate effect     
Female 0.001 0.244 -0.764 -0.135 
 (0.01) (0.28) (0.66) (0.14) 
Age  0.016 -0.199 -0.798 0.311 
 (0.01) (0.41) (1.08) (0.25) 
Education -0.171*** -1.838** -5.655*** -2.490*** 
 (0.03) (0.89) (2.19) (0.53) 
Married -0.010* -0.383** -0.159 -0.083 
 (0.01) (0.18) (0.48) (0.10) 
HH size 0.001 0.074 -0.014 0.015 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.15) (0.03) 
Occupation 0.012 0.109 0.793 0.206 
 (0.01) (0.21) (0.65) (0.15) 
Income 0.021*** -0.691 -1.005 0.184** 
 (0.01) (0.51) (1.49) (0.09) 
Financial wealth 0.164*** 12.115*** 10.967** 1.697* 
 (0.06) (1.61) (4.27) (0.87) 
Real wealth 0.166*** 3.006*** 6.341*** -2.979*** 
 (0.02) (0.50) (1.17) (0.35) 
Financial expectation  -0.001 -0.043 1.716* 0.049 
 (0.01) (0.34) (0.91) (0.21) 
Adverse shocks -0.013 -0.459 -2.839*** -0.094 
 (0.01) (0.35) (0.94) (0.21) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.011** 0.285 0.513* 0.170** 
 (0.00) (0.18) (0.30) (0.08) 
Risk preference 0.003 0.081 1.787* 0.343 
 (0.01) (0.40) (1.02) (0.21) 
Coefficient effect     
Female -0.008 -0.917 -2.949 -1.120** 
 (0.03) (1.01) (2.23) (0.50) 
Age  -0.045 1.457 -0.982 -0.641 
 (0.09) (2.76) (6.61) (1.49) 
Education 0.092 -1.946 7.409 2.331 
 (0.15) (6.36) (13.69) (2.76) 
Married 0.055 -1.164 -0.753 -1.949 
 (0.12) (3.91) (10.24) (2.21) 
HH size 0.103 -0.590 -1.014 4.366* 
 (0.12) (3.78) (11.43) (2.23) 
Occupation 0.046 -0.502 1.102 0.758 
 (0.03) (1.14) (2.51) (0.61) 
Income -0.121 -17.249*** -6.301 0.297 
 (0.10) (5.41) (12.47) (2.03) 
Financial wealth 0.179*** 7.400*** 10.766*** 2.167*** 
 (0.04) (1.56) (3.48) (0.67) 
Real wealth -0.093 4.436 -8.637 -7.298*** 
 (0.08) (3.12) (7.18) (1.91) 
Financial expectation  0.248* -3.278 14.408 3.060 
 (0.15) (4.40) (10.87) (2.56) 
Adverse shocks -0.097 2.604 -1.871 -1.515 
 (0.06) (1.93) (4.75) (0.98) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) -0.012 0.127 -2.637 0.319 
 (0.06) (1.82) (4.42) (0.95) 
Risk preference -0.118 -12.082*** -4.558 -1.524 
 (0.08) (2.91) (6.89) (1.47) 
Constant 0.267 42.155*** 27.581 9.649* 
 (0.31) (11.02) (27.09) (5.49) 
Observations 3117 3975 3141 3397 
Notes: 
1. Results are from decomposition analyses that compare the average amount of debt, DSR, DIR and DAR of rural households in 
Vietnam to those in Thailand using coefficients from pooled linear regression models. 
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2. Outstanding amount of debt is conditional on participation in credit markets. 
3. Results are based on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method. 
4. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
5. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
However, the coefficient effect does not entirely explain the total observed difference in 
amount of debt holding instead approximately 29% of the difference is attributed to the 
covariate effect. As can be seen from the detailed decomposition, evidently rural households 
in Thailand have combination of characteristics that make them more likely to hold larger 
amounts of debt, particularly income, financial and real wealth reflecting a higher ability to 
repay debt. Income fluctuation in the previous year also contributed to the positive covariate 
effect since Thai rural households experienced more income fluctuation in the previous year 
than those in Vietnam and income fluctuation is positively related with holding higher amount 
of debt. On the contrary, education contributes significantly to a negative covariate effect 
implying that on average Vietnamese rural households are more educated than their Thai 
counterparts and education is positively related with holding higher amount of debt. Overall, 
rural households in Thailand have configuration of characteristics, such as better endowments, 
and an economic environment that’s conducive to holding higher amounts of debt and hence 
have higher amounts of debt outstanding than rural households in Vietnam.  
Having reviewed findings from the decomposition analysis at the mean, we now move on to 
the results from RIF-regression decomposition method to get deeper insights into the factors 
that explain the observed debt holding differential. Results from the RIF-regression 
decomposition analysis at different percentiles of the conditional debt distribution are 
presented in table 5.5. At the aggregate level, we can see that the cross-country difference in 
debt holding increases along the debt distribution. Interestingly, the observed difference in log 
of debt holding attributable to the covariate and coefficient effect also differs along the debt 
distribution. Evidently, from the lowest percentile up to the median, the covariate effect or 
differences in composition of rural households’ characteristics positively and significantly 
 151 
 
explain the observed cross-country difference in the amount of debt holding. This means that 
up to the median, differences in the distribution of household characteristics accounts for the 
large portion of the difference between rural households’ debt in Thailand and Vietnam. In 
contrast, from the median onwards, the covariate effect becomes insignificant reflecting that 
the distribution of households’ characteristics such as higher endowments do not actually 
explain the higher amount of debt holding observed for rural households in Thailand in the 
top percentiles. Instead, the difference in debt holding beyond the median debt is fully 
explained by the coefficient effect. This indicates that the economic environment is what 
mainly contributes to the higher amount of debt holding observed among rural households in 
Thailand.    
Table 5.5: Decomposition of Differences in Log of Debt at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th Percentiles 
in 2008 
 Log of debt 
 10th  25th 50th 75th  90th  
Overall      
Thailand 6.509*** 7.188*** 8.064*** 8.905*** 9.880*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
Vietnam 6.138*** 6.896*** 7.518*** 8.154*** 8.707*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Total difference 0.371*** 0.292*** 0.546*** 0.751*** 1.173*** 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
Covariate effect 0.280* 0.209** 0.221*** 0.130 -0.048 
 (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) 
Coefficient effect 0.090 0.083 0.325*** 0.621*** 1.221*** 
 (0.18) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) 
Covariate effect      
Female -0.023 -0.002 -0.000 0.008 0.006 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age  0.046 0.013 0.021 0.003 -0.014 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Education -0.173*** -0.161*** -0.128*** -0.122*** -0.266*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
Married -0.008 -0.017* -0.008 -0.013* -0.012 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Occupation 0.009 0.010 0.018** 0.023** 0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Income 0.018** 0.014** 0.015** 0.022** 0.029** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Financial wealth 0.323*** 0.215*** 0.143** 0.026 -0.081 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
Real wealth 0.112*** 0.118*** 0.147*** 0.182*** 0.243*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Financial expectation  -0.005 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Adverse shocks -0.054** -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 0.014 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.017** 0.011* 0.007 0.011* 0.014 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Risk preference 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.009 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Coefficient effect      
Female -0.027 -0.012 -0.046 0.012 0.061 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Age  -0.085 -0.041 0.074 -0.008 -0.234 
 (0.18) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) 
Education -0.156 0.052 -0.143 0.122 0.443 
 (0.35) (0.24) (0.19) (0.21) (0.31) 
Married 0.036 0.235 -0.119 0.158 0.302 
 (0.26) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.23) 
HH size -0.221 -0.006 0.078 -0.007 0.336 
 (0.24) (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.27) 
Occupation 0.008 -0.007 0.039 0.070 0.227*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
Income 0.091 -0.005 0.097 0.144 1.540* 
 (0.75) (0.50) (0.46) (0.53) (0.87) 
Financial wealth 0.347*** 0.251*** 0.121** 0.137** 0.058 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
Real wealth -0.528 0.534 0.149 0.577 2.747** 
 (1.18) (0.76) (0.67) (0.79) (1.20) 
Financial expectation  0.313 0.302* 0.439*** 0.196 0.403 
 (0.27) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.25) 
Adverse shocks -0.053 -0.038 -0.064 -0.101 0.035 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.047 -0.016 0.066 -0.109 -0.050 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
Risk preference -0.167 -0.181* 0.007 -0.195* -0.164 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.18) 
Constant 0.484 -0.985 -0.372 -0.373 -4.484*** 
 (1.27) (0.80) (0.68) (0.79) (1.33) 
Observations 3005 3005 3005 3005 3005 
Notes: 
1. Results are from decomposition analyses that compare the distribution of amount of debt of rural households in Vietnam to those 
in Thailand using coefficients from pooled linear regression models. 
2. Outstanding amount of debt is conditional on participation in credit markets. 
3. Results are based on the RIF-Regression decomposition method. 
4. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
5. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
The detailed decomposition further explains these observed differences by capturing the 
contribution of each characteristic to the estimated log of debt equations. We find that, similar 
to the results at the mean, income, financial wealth, real wealth and income fluctuation mainly 
explain the estimated positive covariate effect at the lower percentile of the debt distribution. 
This suggests that the Thai rural households had higher endowments that explain the higher 
amount of debt they hold especially at the lower tail of the debt distribution. Turning to the 
coefficient effects at the top percentiles of the debt distribution, again the detailed 
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decomposition shows that income, financial and real wealth are the key significant 
contributors to the estimated positive effect. If we interpret the coefficient effect as capturing 
the economic environment then this finding suggests that Vietnamese rural households would 
have higher amount of debt if they were to experience the economic environment that Thai 
rural households with comparable level of income, financial and real wealth face.  
In summary, the findings from the RIF-regression decomposition analysis are broadly 
consistent with the results from the decomposition analysis at the mean, while adding the key 
insight into the varying role of the coefficient and covariate effect at the different points of the 
debt distribution. In the case of higher amount of debt observed at the lower tail of the debt 
distribution, better endowments explain the gap reflecting that Thai households possess 
resources that indicate a higher demand for debt and capacity to bear higher debt burden. On 
the other hand, in the upper tail of the debt distribution, the high debt gap between rural 
households in Vietnam and Thailand is overwhelmingly explained by differences in the 
economic environment, with this differences widening at higher debt levels.  
5.5.3. Decomposing the Indebtedness Indicators 
According to the findings from the RIF-regression decomposition analysis, the higher amount 
of debt observed among rural households in Thailand is partly due to having better resources 
that might make them more capable of servicing their debt and less likely to face high debt 
burden. Hence, we further look into differences in debt burden using the common DSR, DIR 
and DAR indicators of indebtedness.  
At the aggregate level we can see that rural households in Thailand on average have a higher 
debt burden or level of indebtedness even though they tend to have higher income and wealth 
compared to rural households in Vietnam (see table 5.4). This observed gap in debt burden is 
largely attributable to differences in the economic environment regardless of the indicator 
used. Looking further at the detailed decompositions, table 5.4 shows that financial wealth has 
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a strong and positive effect on the difference in indebtedness levels using all three indicators 
through the coefficient effect. The reason behind this finding could be that saving secured 
loans are common in Thailand and hence amount of saving households have determines the 
amount of debt they take out by signaling better repayment capacity. Especially for group 
loans in Thailand, the maximum amount of loan households can borrow might depend on the 
accumulated amount of savings they have at the village bank (Coleman, 1999). Furthermore 
focusing on the DSR and DAR indicators, it is clear that the economic environment in 
Thailand is again more tolerant to the economically disadvantaged rural households to bear 
higher debt burden than in Vietnam as showed by the positive significant constant.       
Turning to the covariate effect, we can see that configuration of the rural households 
characteristics in Thailand explains about 37% and 25% of the observed difference in level of 
indebtedness using the DSR and DIR indicators respectively (see table 5.4). The key factors 
that contribute to the positive covariate are again financial and real wealth and are in favor of 
those in Thailand. In general, these findings are in line with the findings from the 
decomposition analysis of the log of debt. Additionally, financial expectation and risk 
preferences explain the higher level of indebtedness among rural households in Thailand in 
terms of the DIR indicator (see table 5.4). Since being a risk taker and having a worst future 
financial expectation is associated to facing higher debt burden, a positive significant 
contribution to the covariate effect means that more of the Thai households have these 
characters making them more disposed to higher debt burdens.  In the case of the DAR, the 
covariate effect is negative indicating that rural households in Vietnam have characteristics 
that make them more likely to experience higher level of debt burden. However, given the 
favorable economic environment in Thailand that is more tolerant to rural households having 
higher debt burdens than in Vietnam, the negative covariate effect is neutralized.     
Table 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 present the RIF-regression decomposition results at different 
percentiles of the indebtedness distribution for the three indebtedness indicators. In general, 
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the difference in the level of indebtedness increases when going along the indebtedness 
indicators distribution and the coefficient effect explains larger portion of the difference 
especially at the upper tail of the distribution. Turning to the specific results from the detailed 
decomposition for the DSR indicator, table 5.6 presents financial and real wealth as the key 
individual contributors to both the coefficient and covariate effects. This suggests that rural 
households in Thailand have higher amount of financial and real wealth that explain their 
need and capacity to bear higher amount debt relative to their income and also at any given 
level of wealth the economic environment in Thailand is more tolerant to rural households 
holding high level of indebtedness. Another notable finding is again that the economic 
environment in Thailand allows the economically disadvantaged group of rural households to 
get into high debt burden situation as shown by the high positive significant estimate of the 
constant term.  
According to the detail decomposition analysis of the DIR indicator, table 5.7 also shows that 
the key individual covariates that contribute to the positive estimated coefficient effects are 
again financial and real wealth. While financial wealth explains the observed cross-country 
difference in level of indebtedness at the lower distribution of the DIR, real wealth is the 
factor that largely explains the high difference in debt burden observed at the top 90
th
 
percentile. The reason for the positive effect of these two individual covariates to the 
coefficient effect could be that both financial and real wealth are used more to secure loans 
than in Vietnam, or to assess future repayment capacity of rural households. Additionally, the 
main occupation of the household head also contributes positively to the coefficient effect at 
the top part of the DIR distribution. The underlying mechanism of this effect can be explained 
as follows. As shown in table A2 in the appendix, having a self-employed household head is 
associated to facing higher debt burden compared to those that have a household head 
involved in agricultural production. Hence, the positive coefficient effect from occupation 
means that the economic environment in Thailand is particularly lenient to higher debt burden 
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for the rural households with self-employed household heads than the economic environment 
in Vietnam.  
Moving on to the coefficient effect for the DAR indicator presented in table 5.8, once more 
this effect fully explains the observed cross-country difference in indebtedness and also 
neutralizes the negative covariate effect that is in favor of rural households in Vietnam facing 
higher debt burden throughout the DAR distribution. Table 5.8 further presents the detailed 
decomposition that shows income and financial wealth as the factors that contribute to the 
positive coefficient effect throughout the DAR distribution while at the middle and higher 
level of the distribution occupation and household size partly explain the cross-country 
difference in debt burden. Another finding worth noting from the DAR indicator is that the 
economic environment is less conducive to higher debt burden for the economically 
disadvantaged groups in Thailand at the lower tail of the debt distribution, while at the top 
90
th
 percentile the economic environment is more conducive to higher debt burden for 
economically disadvantaged groups in Thailand.  
Covariate effects also play a statistically significant role although the direction of the effect 
varies depending on the indebtedness indicator used (see table 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8). For DSR and 
DIR indicators, the covariate effect is estimated to be positively significant indicating that 
rural households in Thailand have configuration of characteristics that make them assume 
larger level of debt burden than what is observed for rural households in Vietnam, especially 
at the lower tail of the distribution.  The key characters that explain this positive effect are 
financial and real wealth, financial expectation, income fluctuation and risk preferences. 
Other characters such as age, education and income contribute negatively to the covariate 
effect showing that Vietnamese rural households for instance have younger and more 
educated household heads that should make them more prone to face higher debt burdens than 
Thai households as these characters are associated with higher debt burden.  
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On the contrary, for the DAR indicator, the covariate effect has generally a negative impact 
on the cross-country debt burden gap, with a particularly sizable effect at the top percentiles. 
This means that if it were for the composition of household characteristics, the Vietnamese 
rural households would have had higher level of debt burden than what is observed. 
According to the detailed decomposition the main contributor to this negative effect is 
education. However, the difference in the economic environment is so strong that it prevails 
over the opposite influence of the covariate effect and hence the observed higher debt burden 
for rural households in Thailand.  
To sum up, the findings from the decomposition analysis of the three indebtedness indicators 
suggests that rural households in Thailand face significantly higher level of indebtedness 
compared to rural households in Vietnam. The main explanation for this observed cross-
country debt burden gap is the economic environment in Thailand that seems to be more 
tolerant of high level of indebtedness among rural households.   
Table 5.6: Decomposition of Differences in Debt-Service Ratio Distribution at the 50th, 75th and 90th 
Percentiles in 2008 
 Debt-service ratio 
 50
th
 75
th
  90
th
  
Overall    
Thailand 29.400*** 70.269*** 139.900*** 
 (1.37) (2.44) (3.53) 
Vietnam 1.732*** 14.730*** 44.104*** 
 (0.22) (1.17) (2.26) 
Total difference 27.668*** 55.539*** 95.796*** 
 (1.39) (2.70) (4.19) 
Covariate effect 12.502*** 16.135*** 18.237*** 
 (1.95) (3.61) (5.57) 
Coefficient effect 15.166*** 39.404*** 77.560*** 
 (2.32) (4.20) (6.42) 
Covariate effect    
Female -0.065 0.097 0.138 
 (0.26) (0.48) (0.71) 
Age  -1.061*** -1.539** 1.267 
 (0.36) (0.72) (1.13) 
Education -1.226 -1.505 -3.869 
 (0.76) (1.57) (2.47) 
Married -0.135 -0.566* -0.615 
 (0.16) (0.29) (0.43) 
HH size 0.170* 0.089 0.068 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.18) 
Occupation 0.221 0.057 -0.211 
 (0.21) (0.38) (0.55) 
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Income -0.787** -2.110*** -3.720*** 
 (0.31) (0.81) (1.43) 
Financial wealth 14.029*** 16.427*** 16.075*** 
 (1.58) (2.74) (4.19) 
Real wealth 2.289*** 5.062*** 9.490*** 
 (0.42) (0.86) (1.41) 
Financial expectation  0.387 -0.429 -0.152 
 (0.32) (0.60) (0.91) 
Adverse shocks -0.806** -0.090 -1.422 
 (0.33) (0.64) (0.99) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.145 0.372 0.464 
 (0.17) (0.33) (0.50) 
Risk preference -0.660* 0.272 0.724 
 (0.38) (0.72) (1.09) 
Coefficient effect    
Female -0.998 -0.918 -5.291** 
 (0.83) (1.66) (2.67) 
Age  5.703** 2.380 -6.146 
 (2.27) (4.46) (7.37) 
Education 1.171 -2.438 -22.646 
 (5.40) (9.58) (17.10) 
Married 0.109 1.180 -4.562 
 (3.24) (6.30) (10.30) 
HH size 7.320** -4.297 -17.428 
 (3.28) (6.74) (10.70) 
Occupation 0.464 -0.045 -1.021 
 (1.06) (2.08) (3.15) 
Income -136.192*** -236.540*** -228.663*** 
 (12.74) (25.62) (48.45) 
Financial wealth 9.193*** 13.515*** 11.377*** 
 (1.40) (2.55) (4.09) 
Real wealth 83.035*** 91.632** 107.448* 
 (18.09) (36.82) (58.35) 
Financial expectation  -5.271* -6.268 -10.526 
 (3.19) (6.89) (11.49) 
Adverse shocks 2.569 2.808 3.778 
 (1.79) (3.56) (5.41) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) -0.697 -2.494 -2.548 
 (1.70) (3.32) (5.10) 
Risk preference -8.213*** -23.234*** -23.562*** 
 (2.65) (5.28) (7.88) 
Constant 56.975*** 204.121*** 277.349*** 
 (18.69) (37.36) (57.35) 
Observations 3997 3997 3997 
Notes: 
1. Results are from decomposition analyses that compare the distribution of debt service to income ratio of rural households in 
Vietnam to those in Thailand using coefficients from pooled RIF-regression models. 
2. Results are based on the RIF-Regression decomposition method. 
3. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
4. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
Table 5.7: Decomposition of Differences in Debt to Income Ratio  Distribution at the 25th, 50th, 75th and 
90th Percentiles in 2008 
 Debt to income ratio 
 25
th
 50
th
 75
th
  90
th
  
Overall     
Thailand 22.598*** 63.754*** 156.412*** 308.169*** 
 (1.33) (1.90) (7.31) (3.62) 
Vietnam 13.661*** 35.265*** 83.267*** 161.139*** 
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 (0.87) (1.67) (3.30) (1.60) 
Total difference 8.937*** 28.489*** 73.145*** 147.030*** 
 (1.59) (2.53) (8.02) (3.96) 
Covariate effect 5.206* 5.977 18.250 7.918 
 (2.66) (3.82) (12.63) (6.18) 
Coefficient effect 3.731 22.512*** 54.895*** 139.113*** 
 (3.16) (4.44) (14.23) (6.88) 
Covariate effect     
Female -0.335 -0.912* -0.633 -0.416 
 (0.32) (0.47) (1.55) (0.79) 
Age  0.028 -0.119 -0.327 -0.068 
 (0.52) (0.78) (2.48) (1.24) 
Education -1.929* -5.456*** -13.356*** -5.129** 
 (1.00) (1.55) (4.87) (2.42) 
Married -0.060 -0.188 -0.991 -0.085 
 (0.23) (0.33) (1.11) (0.55) 
HH size -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.21) 
Occupation -0.244 0.464 1.863 0.559 
 (0.31) (0.43) (1.54) (0.74) 
Income -0.647* -1.853* -5.883* -2.498* 
 (0.34) (0.95) (3.02) (1.29) 
Financial wealth 6.851*** 8.129*** 24.597** 8.069 
 (2.19) (2.99) (10.09) (5.04) 
Real wealth 0.622 4.377*** 13.542*** 6.624*** 
 (0.48) (0.78) (2.66) (1.39) 
Financial expectation  0.028 1.250** 2.628 2.411** 
 (0.41) (0.62) (2.12) (1.09) 
Adverse shocks -0.601 -0.590 -4.582** -3.224*** 
 (0.43) (0.65) (2.22) (1.11) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.330** 0.457** 0.251 0.284 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.69) (0.34) 
Risk preference 1.163** 0.418 1.149 1.400 
 (0.45) (0.67) (2.34) (1.20) 
Coefficient effect     
Female -1.054 -2.709* -4.399 -2.358 
 (1.02) (1.60) (4.67) (2.42) 
Age  -3.399 0.854 -0.402 4.880 
 (3.19) (4.87) (14.82) (7.48) 
Education 5.577 1.239 44.490 -1.243 
 (6.55) (8.95) (29.04) (16.14) 
Married 0.496 0.449 -2.485 -8.074 
 (4.49) (7.03) (20.19) (10.50) 
HH size -1.330 -9.695 -18.956 17.494 
 (4.40) (7.12) (22.44) (12.34) 
Occupation -1.177 0.568 11.637** 5.094* 
 (1.20) (1.79) (5.75) (2.81) 
Income -10.327 47.608* -254.708*** -133.948*** 
 (17.55) (24.60) (81.42) (47.62) 
Financial wealth 5.637*** 10.360*** 26.581*** 6.070 
 (1.80) (2.63) (7.47) (3.75) 
Real wealth 14.667 -17.652 157.170 148.682** 
 (22.07) (33.59) (111.70) (59.07) 
Financial expectation  1.324 14.433* 40.723* 6.215 
 (4.46) (7.74) (21.81) (11.85) 
Adverse shocks -3.546 -2.977 13.713 3.395 
 (2.32) (3.55) (10.85) (5.31) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.577 -5.594* -12.412 6.201 
 (2.13) (3.22) (10.22) (5.00) 
Risk preference -2.384 -0.792 -8.104 -7.051 
 (3.06) (4.64) (15.08) (7.63) 
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Constant -1.329 -13.582 62.047 93.755 
 (22.22) (34.35) (116.68) (62.45) 
Observations 3176 3176 3176 3176 
Notes: 
1. Results are from decomposition analyses that compare the distribution of amount of outstanding debt to income ratio of rural 
households in Vietnam to those in Thailand using coefficients from pooled RIF-regression models. 
2. Results are based on the RIF-Regression decomposition method. 
3. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
4. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
Table 5.8: Decomposition of Differences in Debt to Asset Ratio Distribution at the 25th, 50th, 75th and 
90th Percentiles in 2008 
 Debt to asset ratio 
 25
th
 50
th
 75
th
  90
th
  
Overall     
Thailand 2.963*** 8.229*** 19.669*** 44.793*** 
 (0.17) (0.44) (0.75) (2.64) 
Vietnam 2.349*** 6.425*** 13.832*** 27.891*** 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.58) (1.14) 
Total difference 0.614** 1.803*** 5.837*** 16.902*** 
 (0.24) (0.50) (0.94) (2.88) 
Covariate effect -0.428 -1.325* -4.797*** -17.612*** 
 (0.38) (0.79) (1.37) (4.74) 
Coefficient effect 1.042** 3.128*** 10.635*** 34.514*** 
 (0.45) (0.90) (1.56) (5.65) 
Covariate effect     
Female -0.028 -0.041 -0.392** -0.805 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.18) (0.55) 
Age  -0.008 -0.101 -0.076 -0.044 
 (0.08) (0.16) (0.28) (0.90) 
Education -0.526*** -1.149*** -2.947*** -8.531*** 
 (0.15) (0.30) (0.60) (1.96) 
Married -0.016 -0.074 0.006 0.008 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.12) (0.40) 
HH size 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.051 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) 
Occupation 0.014 0.209** 0.346* 0.178 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.18) (0.56) 
Income 0.020 0.063 0.126 0.362 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.11) (0.32) 
Financial wealth 0.870*** 1.959*** 2.207** 1.187 
 (0.30) (0.63) (1.03) (3.54) 
Real wealth -0.871*** -2.388*** -4.431*** -11.024*** 
 (0.09) (0.22) (0.42) (1.32) 
Financial expectation  -0.025 0.244* 0.044 0.508 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.23) (0.77) 
Adverse shocks -0.054 -0.113 0.070 -0.883 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.24) (0.79) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.042* 0.095* 0.162* 0.350 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) (0.27) 
Risk preference 0.146** -0.039 0.080 1.033 
 (0.06) (0.14) (0.25) (0.85) 
Coefficient effect     
Female -0.011 -0.242 -1.235** -2.141 
 (0.16) (0.30) (0.58) (1.63) 
Age  -0.190 0.364 -1.983 -0.106 
 (0.49) (0.92) (1.69) (5.04) 
Education 0.232 4.001** 2.211 1.295 
 (0.89) (1.88) (3.21) (11.49) 
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Married 0.075 0.697 -0.750 -7.621 
 (0.71) (1.35) (2.61) (7.31) 
HH size -1.280* 0.847 -0.864 19.667** 
 (0.68) (1.35) (2.54) (8.47) 
Occupation -0.043 0.609* 1.916*** 3.227 
 (0.17) (0.35) (0.68) (2.16) 
Income 5.547*** 6.291 17.488** 66.716** 
 (2.11) (4.22) (8.28) (27.04) 
Financial wealth 0.855*** 1.732*** 2.506*** 4.379* 
 (0.27) (0.48) (0.86) (2.62) 
Real wealth 2.907 -18.707*** -19.689 -188.845*** 
 (3.24) (6.10) (12.07) (44.97) 
Financial expectation  0.665 0.679 6.078** 8.915 
 (0.73) (1.35) (3.06) (8.59) 
Adverse shocks -0.686* -1.092 -0.449 3.676 
 (0.36) (0.70) (1.30) (3.88) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.272 -0.057 -0.910 0.448 
 (0.32) (0.64) (1.18) (3.68) 
Risk preference -0.123 -2.048** -1.938 -0.321 
 (0.45) (0.92) (1.82) (5.53) 
Constant -7.177** 10.053 8.253 125.224** 
 (3.32) (6.65) (13.27) (48.75) 
Observation 3288 3288 3288 3288 
Notes: 
1. Results are from decomposition analyses that compare the distribution of amount of outstanding debt to asset ratio of rural 
households in Vietnam to those in Thailand using coefficients from pooled RIF-regression models. 
2. Results are based on the RIF-Regression decomposition method. 
3. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
4. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This paper explored cross-country differences in credit market participation, level of debt 
holding and indebtedness between rural households in Thailand and Vietnam. In the first 
instance, the non-linear extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is used to 
assess determinants of differences in the prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness. Then the 
mean based Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is used to assess differences in average 
log of debt and indebtedness. Finally, the analysis is extended to the RIF-Regression 
decomposition method to assess differences in the entire log of debt and indebtedness 
distribution. Such decomposition analysis provides additional insight into the concentration of 
debt among certain groups of households and the distinct roles played by the determinants at 
different points of the debt distribution.  
The findings shed light on debt and household balance sheet vulnerabilities especially for 
certain groups of rural households that is not apparent from analysis of aggregate data. Firstly, 
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the findings show higher prevalence of debt and over-indebtedness among rural households in 
Thailand than in Vietnam. Secondly, those that participate in the credit market hold also 
larger amounts of debt and face higher level of indebtedness in Thailand than in Vietnam. 
Thirdly, these observed differences arise mainly due to dissimilarity in the economic 
environment that rural households of similar characteristics face in the two countries. The 
economic environment in Thailand is more conducive for rural households to participate in 
the credit market and become over-indebted than in Vietnam. Particularly for the 
economically disadvantaged rural households, the economic environment in Thailand is more 
lenient to having high amounts of debt as compared to what their counterparts face in 
Vietnam.  
Finally, the gap in debt holding and indebtedness increase significantly along the debt 
distribution. The factors that explain the observed differences also differ along the 
distribution, i.e., at the lower tail of the distributions, larger portion of the debt holding and 
indebtedness gaps are attributable to differences in population characteristics, such as 
household’s endowments. Hence, the higher debt observed among Thai rural households at 
the lower debt distribution can be explained by the endowment effect. In contrast, at the upper 
tail of the distribution, the debt holding and indebtedness gaps are mainly attributable to 
differences in the economic environment. This indicates that the higher debt holding observed 
among rural households in Thailand, especially at the extreme end of the debt distribution is 
explained by lax economic environment than by endowment effects.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Determinants of the prevalence of debt, over-indebtedness and default in 2008 
 Debt Debt-service 
Ratio 40% 
Default 
Female HH head -0.007 0.234
**
 -0.061 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) 
Age of HH head below 39 0.573
***
 0.104 0.037 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) 
Age of HH head 40-49 0.600
***
 0.311
***
 0.371
**
 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) 
Age of HH head 50-59 0.750
***
 0.379
***
 0.514
***
 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) 
Primary education 0.532
***
 0.602
***
 -0.045 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) 
Secondary education 0.257
*
 -0.057 -0.764
***
 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) 
Higher education 0.249 0.037 -0.657 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.45) 
Married HH head 0.101 0.140 0.024 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) 
Household size 0.122
***
 0.043
**
 0.150
***
 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Self-employed HH -0.070 0.130 0.233 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.24) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.077 0.122 0.500
***
 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) 
Inactive HH -0.057 0.227 0.345 
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 (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) 
Income quintile 2 0.042 -0.097 -0.131 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) 
Income quintile 3 -0.022 -0.708
***
 -0.318
*
 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) 
Income quintile 4 0.194 -1.175
***
 -0.411
**
 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) 
Income quintile 5 -0.030 -1.618
***
 -0.675
***
 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) 
Real wealth quintile 2 0.092 0.219
**
 0.025 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) 
Real wealth quintile 3 0.252
**
 0.735
***
 -0.105 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) 
Real wealth quintile 4 0.011 0.801
***
 -0.490
**
 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) 
Real wealth quintile 5 0.347
**
 1.112
***
 -0.078 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) 
Better future financial expectation -0.240
*
 -0.156 -0.351
**
 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.17) 
Same future financial expectation -0.215
*
 -0.360
***
 -0.369
**
 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) 
Unexpected shocks to expense  0.342
***
 0.016 0.330
***
 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Expected shocks to expense  0.116 0.158 0.042 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) 
Unexpected shocks to income  0.239
***
 -0.102 0.333
***
 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.478
***
 0.329
***
 0.520
***
 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) 
Risk averse 0.034 -0.118 -0.178 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
Risk neutral 0.201
*
 0.175 -0.223 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) 
Constant -1.026
***
 -1.779
***
 -3.248
***
 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.37) 
Log-likelihood -2266.298 -2236.405 -1130.018 
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.091 0.066 
Observation 4211 4211 4211 
Notes: 
5. Results are from logistic regression models for the probability of holding debt, DSR>40% and default. 
6. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
7. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
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Table A2: Determinants of the amount of outstanding debt, Debt-Service Ratio, Debt to Income Ratio and 
Debt to Asset Ratio in 2008 
 Debt Debt-Service 
Ratio 
Debt to Income 
Ratio 
Debt to Asset 
Ratio  
Female HH head 0.009 1.877 -3.761 -1.054 
 (0.06) (2.02) (5.57) (1.06) 
Age of HH head below 39 -0.053 2.800 1.086 -1.360 
 (0.07) (2.38) (6.77) (1.29) 
Age of HH head 40-49 0.088 5.976
***
 13.379
**
 0.442 
 (0.06) (2.14) (5.98) (1.14) 
Age of HH head 50-59 0.215
***
 9.277
***
 14.773
**
 1.660 
 (0.06) (2.14) (5.94) (1.12) 
Primary education -0.012 -0.861 4.553 -0.153 
 (0.08) (2.71) (7.73) (1.47) 
Secondary education 0.330
***
 2.457 18.789
**
 4.954
***
 
 (0.09) (2.85) (8.11) (1.54) 
Higher education 0.739
***
 9.669
**
 34.954
***
 9.575
***
 
 (0.14) (4.66) (13.37) (2.58) 
Married HH head 0.137
*
 5.962
**
 1.402 1.086 
 (0.07) (2.41) (6.83) (1.31) 
Household size 0.047
***
 0.464 2.811
**
 0.500
**
 
 (0.01) (0.40) (1.12) (0.21) 
Self-employed HH 0.457
***
 5.619
*
 22.711
***
 8.949
***
 
 (0.08) (2.90) (8.26) (1.57) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.030 -1.112 5.886 1.596 
 (0.06) (1.99) (5.51) (1.06) 
Inactive HH 0.092 0.844 8.387 1.611 
 (0.09) (3.00) (8.47) (1.61) 
Income quintile 2 -0.055 -8.993
***
 -64.369
***
 -2.503
**
 
 (0.07) (2.50) (7.11) (1.24) 
Income quintile 3 0.045 -27.510
***
 -108.679
***
 -1.264 
 (0.07) (2.53) (7.18) (1.25) 
Income quintile 4 0.033 -35.268
***
 -137.226
***
 -2.391
*
 
 (0.07) (2.64) (7.42) (1.28) 
Income quintile 5 0.449
***
 -43.688
***
 -154.398
***
 3.801
***
 
 (0.08) (2.96) (8.28) (1.44) 
Financial wealth quintile 2 0.095 18.085
***
 12.985 1.046 
 (0.08) (3.01) (8.15) (1.55) 
Financial wealth quintile 3 0.344
***
 24.591
***
 30.083
***
 4.413
***
 
 (0.08) (2.96) (8.01) (1.51) 
Financial wealth quintile 4 0.214
***
 18.494
***
 21.965
***
 2.134 
 (0.08) (2.82) (7.88) (1.49) 
Financial wealth quintile 5 0.209
**
 6.834
**
 10.184 1.212 
 (0.09) (2.73) (8.00) (1.54) 
Real wealth quintile 2 0.126
**
 7.129
***
 1.213 -13.628
***
 
 (0.06) (2.09) (5.77) (1.10) 
Real wealth quintile 3 0.364
***
 14.409
***
 15.670
**
 -15.568
***
 
 (0.07) (2.34) (6.43) (1.22) 
Real wealth quintile 4 0.549
***
 12.384
***
 36.932
***
 -17.989
***
 
 (0.07) (2.58) (7.12) (1.35) 
 168 
 
Real wealth quintile 5 0.920
***
 19.894
***
 48.208
***
 -20.080
***
 
 (0.08) (2.84) (7.72) (1.44) 
Better future financial 
expectation 
0.020 2.939 -5.773 -1.631 
 (0.07) (2.43) (6.66) (1.26) 
Same future financial expectation 0.013 1.016 -13.356
*
 -0.786 
 (0.07) (2.47) (6.87) (1.31) 
Unexpected shocks to expense  0.024 0.828 2.780 1.589
**
 
 (0.04) (1.53) (4.18) (0.79) 
Expected shocks to expense  0.043 1.261 10.672 1.407 
 (0.07) (2.56) (6.88) (1.32) 
Unexpected shocks to income  0.058 2.455 14.876
***
 0.811 
 (0.05) (1.56) (4.32) (0.82) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.117
***
 2.367 7.669
*
 1.827
**
 
 (0.05) (1.56) (4.29) (0.82) 
Risk averse -0.029 -0.971 -9.897
*
 -1.133 
 (0.05) (1.91) (5.28) (1.00) 
Risk neutral -0.011 -0.242 3.438 0.633 
 (0.06) (2.16) (5.90) (1.12) 
Thailand 0.497
***
 20.452
***
 34.549
***
 8.900
***
 
 (0.08) (2.44) (7.18) (1.37) 
Constant 6.303
***
 12.160
**
 111.925
***
 14.972
***
 
 (0.15) (4.91) (14.48) (2.75) 
R2 0.247 0.197 0.186 0.134 
Observation 3117 3975 3178 3397 
Notes: 
1. Results are from linear regression models for the average amount of debt, DSR, DIR and DAR. 
2. Outstanding amount of debt is conditional on participation in credit markets. 
3. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
4. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
Table A3: Determinants of the amount of outstanding debt at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile  
 Amount of debt 
 10
th
  25
th
  50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
Female HH head -0.184
*
 -0.035 -0.005 0.039 0.076 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
Age of HH head below 39 -0.262
*
 -0.046 -0.076 0.028 0.087 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) 
Age of HH head 40-49 0.050 0.049 0.041 0.017 0.121 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) 
Age of HH head 50-59 0.084 0.152
*
 0.233
***
 0.244
***
 0.352
***
 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) 
Primary education -0.010 0.058 0.040 -0.013 -0.348
*
 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) 
Secondary education 0.363
**
 0.423
***
 0.313
***
 0.265
**
 0.224 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) 
Higher education 0.548
**
 0.555
***
 0.655
***
 0.707
***
 1.040
***
 
 (0.27) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.31) 
Married HH head 0.117 0.198
**
 0.100 0.164
*
 0.171 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) 
Household size 0.042
*
 0.047
***
 0.031
**
 0.026 0.052
**
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 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Self-employed HH 0.015 0.239
**
 0.332
***
 0.649
***
 1.135
***
 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.024 -0.042 -0.044 0.033 0.281
**
 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
Inactive HH 0.099 0.054 0.173 0.222
*
 0.048 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) 
Income quintile 2 0.073 0.116 -0.044 -0.188
**
 -0.290
*
 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
Income quintile 3 0.423
***
 0.202
**
 0.051 -0.155
*
 -0.356
**
 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
Income quintile 4 0.433
***
 0.267
***
 0.117 -0.165
*
 -0.434
***
 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) 
Income quintile 5 0.532
***
 0.438
***
 0.423
***
 0.487
***
 0.654
***
 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17) 
Financial wealth quintile 2 0.325
**
 0.082 0.140 -0.044 -0.155 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) 
Financial wealth quintile 3 0.676
***
 0.630
***
 0.314
***
 0.113 -0.080 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) 
Financial wealth quintile 4 0.418
***
 0.279
**
 0.208
**
 0.133 -0.048 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) 
Financial wealth quintile 5 0.269 0.165 0.109 0.127 0.250 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) 
Real wealth quintile 2 0.249
**
 0.137
*
 0.058 0.089 0.054 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
Real wealth quintile 3 0.361
***
 0.293
***
 0.376
***
 0.403
***
 0.296
**
 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
Real wealth quintile 4 0.456
***
 0.465
***
 0.575
***
 0.670
***
 0.606
***
 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) 
Real wealth quintile 5 0.483
***
 0.609
***
 0.798
***
 1.141
***
 1.513
***
 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17) 
Better future financial 
expectation 
0.089 0.108 0.056 -0.090 -0.006 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
Same future financial 
expectation 
0.069 0.032 0.023 0.007 0.068 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) 
Unexpected shocks to 
expense  
-0.049 -0.031 0.036 0.027 0.152 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
Expected shocks to expense  -0.042 0.081 0.099 0.192
*
 0.030 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) 
Unexpected shocks to 
income  
0.205
**
 0.033 0.053 0.021 -0.067 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.196
**
 0.125
**
 0.092
*
 0.148
**
 0.144 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
Risk averse -0.041 0.020 -0.024 -0.028 -0.137 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) 
Risk neutral 0.038 0.068 0.029 -0.012 -0.095 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
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Thailand 0.114 0.089 0.314
***
 0.589
***
 1.192
***
 
 (0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17) 
Constant 4.831
***
 5.579
***
 6.541
***
 7.264
***
 7.781
***
 
 (0.29) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.34) 
R2 0.059 0.092 0.149 0.183 0.170 
Observation 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 
Notes: 
1. Results are from RIF-regression models for the log of debt at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile. 
2. Outstanding amount of debt is conditional on participation in credit markets. 
3. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
4. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
Table A4: Determinants of the DSR at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile  
 Debt-service ratio 
 50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
Female HH head -0.500 0.959 1.385 
 (1.82) (3.58) (5.56) 
Age of HH head below 39 6.637
***
 10.841
**
 -3.276 
 (2.15) (4.22) (6.56) 
Age of HH head 40-49 8.370
***
 13.790
***
 2.642 
 (1.93) (3.78) (5.87) 
Age of HH head 50-59 5.916
***
 14.728
***
 15.097
**
 
 (1.93) (3.78) (5.87) 
Primary education 0.855 3.322 -0.481 
 (2.44) (4.79) (7.44) 
Secondary education 2.797 5.563 5.156 
 (2.57) (5.05) (7.84) 
Higher education 10.425
**
 18.758
**
 23.025
*
 
 (4.22) (8.29) (12.87) 
Married HH head 1.363 8.569
**
 10.399 
 (2.18) (4.27) (6.63) 
Household size 1.011
***
 0.653 0.671 
 (0.36) (0.70) (1.09) 
Self-employed HH 1.376 10.145
**
 9.885 
 (2.62) (5.15) (8.00) 
Off-farm employed HH -1.506 -0.438 -2.113 
 (1.79) (3.52) (5.47) 
Inactive HH 3.199 0.254 -4.773 
 (2.70) (5.30) (8.23) 
Income quintile 2 2.172 -11.710
***
 -36.703
***
 
 (2.24) (4.40) (6.83) 
Income quintile 3 -5.143
**
 -35.958
***
 -87.795
***
 
 (2.27) (4.45) (6.91) 
Income quintile 4 -12.072
***
 -51.971
***
 -100.725
***
 
 (2.37) (4.65) (7.22) 
Income quintile 5 -23.502
***
 -66.949
***
 -115.784
***
 
 (2.66) (5.21) (8.09) 
Financial wealth quintile 2 21.548
***
 21.343
***
 22.306
***
 
 (2.71) (5.32) (8.27) 
Financial wealth quintile 3 27.308
***
 31.721
***
 30.079
***
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 (2.67) (5.23) (8.12) 
Financial wealth quintile 4 22.411
***
 27.590
***
 20.404
***
 
 (2.54) (4.99) (7.74) 
Financial wealth quintile 5 4.796
*
 8.858
*
 14.157
*
 
 (2.47) (4.84) (7.52) 
Real wealth quintile 2 3.384
*
 5.082 14.973
***
 
 (1.89) (3.70) (5.75) 
Real wealth quintile 3 8.844
***
 20.275
***
 28.285
***
 
 (2.11) (4.14) (6.43) 
Real wealth quintile 4 7.850
***
 16.391
***
 33.129
***
 
 (2.33) (4.57) (7.10) 
Real wealth quintile 5 14.795
***
 30.456
***
 46.615
***
 
 (2.57) (5.04) (7.82) 
Better future financial 
expectation 
-0.924 4.102 11.677
*
 
 (2.19) (4.30) (6.68) 
Same future financial 
expectation 
-2.722 4.187 5.106 
 (2.23) (4.38) (6.80) 
Unexpected shocks to expense  -0.298 1.192 1.997 
 (1.38) (2.71) (4.21) 
Expected shocks to expense  3.542 1.856 1.330 
 (2.31) (4.54) (7.05) 
Unexpected shocks to income  3.711
***
 0.814 7.986
*
 
 (1.41) (2.77) (4.30) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.906 2.786 3.656 
 (1.41) (2.76) (4.28) 
Risk averse -1.934 -3.182 2.168 
 (1.72) (3.38) (5.25) 
Risk neutral -4.411
**
 -1.000 4.581 
 (1.95) (3.82) (5.94) 
Thailand 14.877
***
 38.598
***
 77.760
***
 
 (2.21) (4.33) (6.73) 
Constant -10.014
**
 7.055 59.054
***
 
 (4.43) (8.69) (13.49) 
R2 0.169 0.167 0.188 
Observation 4016 4016 4016 
Notes: 
1. Results are from RIF-regression models for the DSR at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile. 
2. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
3. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
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Table A5: Determinants of the Debt to Income Ratio  at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile  
 Debt to income ratio 
 25
th
  50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
Female HH head -2.365 -6.526
*
 -3.797 -2.817 
 (2.24) (3.37) (11.13) (5.58) 
Age of HH head below 39 0.274 1.747 2.139 0.422 
 (2.72) (4.09) (13.53) (6.78) 
Age of HH head 40-49 6.336
***
 9.893
***
 24.256
**
 6.973 
 (2.40) (3.62) (11.96) (5.99) 
Age of HH head 50-59 6.297
***
 13.318
***
 23.613
**
 5.747 
 (2.39) (3.59) (11.87) (5.95) 
Primary education 4.600 4.748 15.957 -3.100 
 (3.10) (4.67) (15.45) (7.74) 
Secondary education 8.170
**
 15.714
***
 42.261
***
 5.291 
 (3.26) (4.90) (16.21) (8.12) 
Higher education 20.910
***
 30.834
***
 74.853
***
 8.262 
 (5.37) (8.08) (26.72) (13.39) 
Married HH head 0.246 1.470 10.226 0.059 
 (2.74) (4.13) (13.66) (6.84) 
Household size 0.332 0.655 3.756
*
 3.270
***
 
 (0.45) (0.67) (2.23) (1.12) 
Self-employed HH 3.592 9.759
*
 50.294
***
 12.819 
 (3.32) (4.99) (16.51) (8.27) 
Off-farm employed HH -1.610 0.691 15.859 3.833 
 (2.21) (3.33) (11.01) (5.52) 
Inactive HH -4.038 4.385 16.434 3.806 
 (3.40) (5.12) (16.92) (8.48) 
Income quintile 2 -3.903 -17.408
***
 -90.907
***
 -54.250
***
 
 (2.85) (4.30) (14.21) (7.12) 
Income quintile 3 -8.165
***
 -39.850
***
 -160.695
***
 -86.809
***
 
 (2.88) (4.34) (14.35) (7.19) 
Income quintile 4 -14.196
***
 -63.119
***
 -227.772
***
 -98.280
***
 
 (2.98) (4.49) (14.84) (7.43) 
Income quintile 5 -27.284
***
 -78.651
***
 -246.678
***
 -104.401
***
 
 (3.33) (5.01) (16.55) (8.29) 
Financial wealth quintile 2 11.117
***
 10.105
**
 30.546
*
 8.054 
 (3.27) (4.93) (16.29) (8.16) 
Financial wealth quintile 3 12.159
***
 16.466
***
 56.422
***
 18.235
**
 
 (3.22) (4.84) (16.00) (8.02) 
Financial wealth quintile 4 8.274
***
 10.524
**
 26.678
*
 11.467 
 (3.16) (4.76) (15.74) (7.89) 
Financial wealth quintile 5 2.181 5.178 13.598 2.747 
 (3.21) (4.84) (15.99) (8.01) 
Real wealth quintile 2 -1.799 -2.018 2.758 -0.575 
 (2.32) (3.49) (11.54) (5.78) 
Real wealth quintile 3 -0.384 6.378 16.929 8.127 
 (2.58) (3.89) (12.86) (6.44) 
Real wealth quintile 4 1.620 15.372
***
 46.111
***
 25.746
***
 
 (2.86) (4.30) (14.23) (7.13) 
Real wealth quintile 5 2.215 26.916
***
 77.623
***
 30.614
***
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 (3.10) (4.67) (15.43) (7.73) 
Better future financial 
expectation 
-3.803 -10.661
***
 0.771 -8.801 
 (2.67) (4.02) (13.31) (6.67) 
Same future financial 
expectation 
-1.566 -9.971
**
 -13.114 -15.386
**
 
 (2.76) (4.15) (13.74) (6.88) 
Unexpected shocks to 
expense  
2.911
*
 6.068
**
 7.903 -1.528 
 (1.68) (2.53) (8.36) (4.19) 
Expected shocks to expense  2.966 6.248 24.822
*
 1.129 
 (2.76) (4.16) (13.76) (6.89) 
Unexpected shocks to 
income  
3.469
**
 4.154 21.931
**
 14.183
***
 
 (1.73) (2.61) (8.63) (4.32) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 3.716
**
 5.049
*
 3.433 4.437 
 (1.72) (2.59) (8.57) (4.29) 
Risk averse -0.923 -1.953 -7.003 -7.770 
 (2.12) (3.19) (10.56) (5.29) 
Risk neutral 4.360
*
 0.422 0.285 0.820 
 (2.37) (3.56) (11.79) (5.91) 
Thailand 3.702 20.772
***
 49.535
***
 136.938
***
 
 (2.88) (4.34) (14.34) (7.19) 
Constant 9.598
*
 52.860
***
 131.488
***
 208.264
***
 
 (5.82) (8.75) (28.95) (14.50) 
R2 0.071 0.159 0.128 0.343 
Observation 3178 3178 3178 3178 
Notes: 
1. Results are from RIF-regression models for the DIR at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile. 
2. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
3. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
Table A6: Determinants of the Debt to Asset Ratio at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile  
 Debt to asset ratio 
 25
th
  50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
Female HH head -0.295 -0.326 -2.506
**
 -4.343 
 (0.32) (0.69) (1.27) (4.13) 
Age of HH head below 39 0.052 0.614 0.283 -0.698 
 (0.39) (0.83) (1.53) (5.00) 
Age of HH head 40-49 0.779
**
 1.868
**
 1.725 4.319 
 (0.34) (0.74) (1.36) (4.42) 
Age of HH head 50-59 0.999
***
 3.304
***
 2.375
*
 4.372 
 (0.34) (0.73) (1.34) (4.37) 
Primary education -0.139 1.025 -0.546 -7.250 
 (0.44) (0.95) (1.75) (5.71) 
Secondary education 0.849
*
 3.468
***
 5.272
***
 9.398 
 (0.46) (1.00) (1.84) (6.00) 
Higher education 2.336
***
 6.064
***
 11.832
***
 28.205
***
 
 (0.78) (1.66) (3.07) (10.02) 
Married HH head 0.216 1.199 0.583 2.373 
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 (0.39) (0.84) (1.56) (5.09) 
Household size 0.245
***
 0.327
**
 0.301 1.887
**
 
 (0.06) (0.14) (0.25) (0.82) 
Self-employed HH 1.253
***
 3.447
***
 8.826
***
 28.340
***
 
 (0.47) (1.01) (1.87) (6.09) 
Off-farm employed HH 0.036 1.013 2.367
*
 3.004 
 (0.32) (0.68) (1.26) (4.10) 
Inactive HH 0.118 2.632
**
 3.728
*
 0.689 
 (0.49) (1.04) (1.92) (6.27) 
Income quintile 2 -0.341 -0.942 -0.908 -5.148 
 (0.37) (0.80) (1.48) (4.84) 
Income quintile 3 0.117 -0.896 -0.710 -3.301 
 (0.38) (0.80) (1.48) (4.84) 
Income quintile 4 0.285 -0.709 -1.558 -6.580 
 (0.38) (0.83) (1.52) (4.97) 
Income quintile 5 0.656 2.687
***
 6.834
***
 15.899
***
 
 (0.43) (0.93) (1.71) (5.59) 
Financial wealth quintile 2 1.032
**
 2.717
***
 2.032 -9.037 
 (0.47) (1.00) (1.85) (6.02) 
Financial wealth quintile 3 1.873
***
 4.013
***
 3.918
**
 10.456
*
 
 (0.45) (0.98) (1.80) (5.87) 
Financial wealth quintile 4 1.315
***
 3.268
***
 3.427
*
 1.926 
 (0.45) (0.97) (1.78) (5.81) 
Financial wealth quintile 5 -0.114 0.549 2.308 2.671 
 (0.46) (0.99) (1.83) (5.98) 
Real wealth quintile 2 -1.331
***
 -6.341
***
 -15.588
***
 -35.295
***
 
 (0.33) (0.71) (1.31) (4.28) 
Real wealth quintile 3 -2.524
***
 -8.786
***
 -17.866
***
 -44.322
***
 
 (0.37) (0.79) (1.45) (4.74) 
Real wealth quintile 4 -3.383
***
 -11.635
***
 -22.136
***
 -45.024
***
 
 (0.41) (0.87) (1.60) (5.24) 
Real wealth quintile 5 -5.239
***
 -13.749
***
 -24.723
***
 -54.050
***
 
 (0.43) (0.93) (1.71) (5.59) 
Better future financial 
expectation 
-0.476 -1.017 -1.374 -3.014 
 (0.38) (0.82) (1.51) (4.91) 
Same future financial 
expectation 
0.025 -1.406
*
 0.019 -2.267 
 (0.39) (0.84) (1.56) (5.07) 
Unexpected shocks to 
expense  
0.611
**
 0.690 2.223
**
 4.620 
 (0.24) (0.51) (0.95) (3.09) 
Expected shocks to expense  0.032 0.347 2.464 8.891
*
 
 (0.40) (0.85) (1.58) (5.14) 
Unexpected shocks to 
income  
0.424
*
 0.680 0.388 4.700 
 (0.25) (0.53) (0.98) (3.20) 
Income fluctuation (t-1) 0.532
**
 1.218
**
 2.019
**
 4.973 
 (0.25) (0.53) (0.98) (3.19) 
Risk averse -0.249 -1.076
*
 -2.121
*
 -1.808 
 (0.30) (0.65) (1.20) (3.91) 
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Risk neutral 0.402 -1.076 -1.185 3.996 
 (0.34) (0.73) (1.34) (4.37) 
Thailand 0.995
**
 2.706
***
 9.721
***
 31.731
***
 
 (0.41) (0.88) (1.63) (5.32) 
Constant 0.871 5.788
***
 18.438
***
 31.389
***
 
 (0.83) (1.77) (3.27) (10.68) 
R2 0.087 0.121 0.129 0.078 
Observation 3397 3397 3397 3397 
Notes: 
1. Results are from RIF-regression models for the DIR at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile. 
2. Numbers in brackets represent standard errors.  
3. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively. 
Source: Own calculation based on household survey 2008. 
 
 
